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dc.contributor.authorSchiehll, Eduardopt_BR
dc.contributor.authorTerra, Paulo Renato Soarespt_BR
dc.contributor.authorVictor, Fernanda Gomespt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-13T01:47:05Zpt_BR
dc.date.issued2013pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1385-3457pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10183/80354pt_BR
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates whether the governance attributes of Brazilian companies are associated with voluntary executive stock option (ESO) disclosure. Results show that Brazilian companies voluntarily disclose very little about their ESO plans, and that board size, presence of a compensation committee, and auditing by a Big 4 firm are significantly related to the degree of voluntary ESO disclosure. We also show that family-controlled companies in Brazil are associated with low voluntary ESO disclosure. Results are robust to a number of specification tests, dependent and explanatory variable measurements, and sample composition. This study has professional and regulatory implications for Brazil and other emerging capital markets. The results underscore the need for stricter rules for executive compensation reporting in Brazil, and they invite policy makers and regulators in emerging markets to consider the effects of company-level governance factors on disclosure incentives.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoengpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of management and governance. New York. Vol. 17, n. 2 (May 2013), p. 331-361pt_BR
dc.rightsOpen Accessen
dc.subjectExecutive compensationen
dc.subjectRemuneraçãopt_BR
dc.subjectExecutivospt_BR
dc.subjectStock optionsen
dc.subjectVoluntary disclosureen
dc.subjectMercado emergentept_BR
dc.subjectEmerging marketsen
dc.subjectBrazilen
dc.titleDeterminants of voluntary executive stock option disclosure in Brazilpt_BR
dc.typeArtigo de periódicopt_BR
dc.identifier.nrb000904642pt_BR
dc.type.originEstrangeiropt_BR


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