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Board interlocking network in the Brazilian stock market : a hypothesis on the conflicting manager

dc.contributor.authorCarbonai, Davidept_BR
dc.date.accessioned2019-10-30T03:45:45Zpt_BR
dc.date.issued2019pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn2220-9352pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10183/201105pt_BR
dc.description.abstractBrazilian law establishes a set of provisions regarding the defense of competition, usually with a dissuasive effect on the conflicting performance of the multi-company manager. However, research highlights that practices such as interlocking directorates (i.e., interconnected directorates with board members operating in multiple companies) are widespread, especially in the stock market. The present article explores this paradox by analyzing a social network of 347 Brazilian listed companies. An E-I (externalinternal) index and a permutation test are used to verify the occurrence of direct and indirect intermediation within and among economic sectors. The paper advances towards a hypothesis on the effectiveness of the Brazilian antitrust legislation.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfpt_BR
dc.language.isoengpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Governance and Regulation. Sumy, Ukraine. Vol. 8, no. 1 (2019), p. 75-81pt_BR
dc.rightsOpen Accessen
dc.subjectAntitrust lawen
dc.subjectMercado de açõespt_BR
dc.subjectBrazilen
dc.subjectLei Antitrustept_BR
dc.subjectGerenciamento de conflitospt_BR
dc.subjectConflicting manageren
dc.subjectMultiple directorshipsen
dc.subjectSocial network analysisen
dc.titleBoard interlocking network in the Brazilian stock market : a hypothesis on the conflicting managerpt_BR
dc.typeArtigo de periódicopt_BR
dc.identifier.nrb001104860pt_BR
dc.type.originEstrangeiropt_BR


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