

MEDIATION DYNAMICS AND COMMITMENTS FOR PEACE IN MOZAMBIQUE (1989-2019)

Cremildo de Abreu Coutinho¹
Eduardo Munhoz Svartman²



Introduction

In the period immediately following the proclamation of independence, a civil war broke out in Mozambique, with the main belligerents being the government of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)³ and the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO)⁴, an insurgent movement made up mostly of FRELIMO dissidents who disagreed with the direction the country was taking. According to Nowak (2012), conflicts and desires for peaceful relations coexist in human nature. It was in this context that, after a negotiation process, the Rome Agreement was signed in 1992, with the objective of achieving peace. According to Galtung (1995), this is a phenomenon characterized as a framework in which conflict manifests itself in a non-violent and creative way.

The vast literature available on the peace process in Mozambique focuses on the analysis of the leading role of the two main belligerents. There

1 Department of Letters, Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidade de Púnguè. Manica, Mozambique. E-mail: cremildo.coutinho@gmail.com. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0466-9495>.

2 Department of Political Science, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Porto Alegre, Brazil. E-mail: eduardosvartman@gmail.com. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0381-5224>.

3 In the original: “*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)*”.

4 In the original: “*Resistência Nacional de Moçambique (RENAMO)*”.

is a gap in the detailed understanding of the commitment of mediators and observers to achieving sustainable peace. To this end, the first stage of the article is reserved for addressing the dynamics of mediation between the various levels of actors, supported by the theory of multi-track diplomacy which, according to McDonald (2012), is a paradigm that seeks to identify and understand the causes of conflicts within a nation, and seek to develop mutual understanding between the parties in conflict, through multifaceted diplomacy, with the involvement of both government actors and private institutions, using multiple channels of communication, aiming at reconciliation and pacification of the nation. Subsequently, the commitment to peace on the part of the FRELIMO government and the former rebel movement, RENAMO, is analyzed. Thus, the research has the following guiding question: how has mediation occurred and what is the commitment to peace between the belligerents?

The approach to mediation dynamics may allow us to understand the trajectories of the peace process in the face of contradictory ideologies, not only in the pretexts that determined the civil war (1977-1992), but also in how the Rome Peace Agreement was possible. Understanding the phenomenon suggests the obedience of path dependency, a mechanism that consolidates the understanding of the present, following the paths that determined the present itself. Associated with the political culture rooted in the heart of the main proponents, the data presented will allow us to understand the success or failure of the thirty years of implementation of the Rome Peace Agreement, which, from a formal point of view, brought a series of social and political reforms.

The civil war and the stalemate on the battlefields

Two years after independence, Mozambique was immersed in a war. The government led by FRELIMO called it a war of destabilization, while its opponent, RENAMO, characterized it as a war for democracy. However, given the *modus operandi* of the conflict, the most appropriate name is civil war. In the first half of the 1980s, the Mozambican government showed itself unwilling to negotiate with the insurgents who, in official discourse, were considered armed bandits and reactionaries to independence. This unwillingness was due to the fact that FRELIMO was convinced that it would be possible to achieve a military victory, similar to the paths that created the conditions for the proclamation of independence in 1975. Thus, it was believed that the triumph of socialist ideology would be possible and that

Mozambique would be one of the tombs of capitalism. On the other hand, the RENAMO insurgency believed that capitalism and liberal democracy would be achievable. However, the means used to achieve these irreconcilable objectives proved ineffective.

Faced with the impossibility of a military victory, the Mozambican government had to change its strategy. It was in this context that it began negotiations with the South African government, which, during the apartheid regime, supported RENAMO, both in military training and logistics. According to Langa (2021), the negotiation process in question resulted in the signing of the Nkomati Agreement on March 16, 1984, which called for an end to support for RENAMO and, in exchange, the Mozambican government would no longer provide shelter to militants of the African National Congress (ANC), one of the organizations fighting against racial segregation in South Africa, and its armed wing, *Umkonto we Sizwe*⁵.

This diplomacy took place after the Mozambican government supported the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU - PF) and its armed wing, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), in the fight for the independence of Southern Rhodesia, achieved in 1980. It is worth noting that, according to Fernando (2021), RENAMO was created by Mozambicans, but supported by the Secret Services of Rhodesia, a country that after the Lancaster House agreements in 1979, followed by the proclamation of independence a year later, became known as Zimbabwe. Until then, the diplomacy carried out by the Mozambican government aimed to weaken and break RENAMO's sources of funding. However, it is said that these two national sovereignties were not the only ones that supported the Mozambican insurgent movement, but only part of multiple supporters, notably some Western countries.

Diplomacy also demonstrated that it was believed that the Mozambican insurgency was driven from abroad and that these lines should be blocked, creating conditions for its dismantling and consequent stabilization of the country. On the other hand, and in agreement with Mazula (1995), this diplomacy revealed the difficulty of the FRELIMO government in recognizing the insurgent movement as a relevant actor in the Mozambican political process. According to data highlighted by Vines (2013), the last move in this direction occurred in September 1988, when Joaquim Chissano, then president of Mozambique, met with South African president Piter Botha, in Songo, Tete province, where it was reinforced that the South African government should commit to the Nkomati Agreement. Despite this meeting, the actions

5 "Spear of the Nation" in isiZulu language.

carried out in the war theater, throughout almost the entire country, proved that a military solution to the war was almost a utopia. Therefore, both the guerrilla strategy used by RENAMO to destabilize the government, as well as the attacks on RENAMO bases and the defensive position of government forces, proved ineffective in proclaiming victory. There was an inability to achieve military victory.

Gujamo (2016) calls this dilemma conflict maturation, which is characterized by the perception of a mutually painful stalemate, where the pursuit of a unilateral solution reaches unacceptable levels among the parties in conflict, generating motivation and willingness to negotiate, as well as optimism regarding the results of the negotiation. Gentili (2013) explains that, in the preliminary phase, the belligerents agreed that countries previously involved in supporting one side or the other of the conflict, including all those involved in the various phases of the struggle for independence or suspected of supporting one side to further its own agenda, should be excluded from the mediation platform. Here are included countries such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Portugal, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the United States of America (USA).

There is no evidence of Kenya's direct involvement in the civil war in Mozambique. However, during the colonial war for independence, many FRELIMO dissidents, considered reactionary by this independence movement, emigrated to Kenya as a refuge. Among the dissidents, it is worth highlighting the murderer of Filipe Samuel Magaia, then commander of the Defense Department of this libertarian movement, on October 16, 1966. The murderer was Lourenço Matola, who, after being discovered and following the decision to be executed by the guerrillas, was later handed over to the Tanzanian authorities⁶. However, he managed to escape and take refuge in Kenya, where he died in 1989, after being run over by a car that failed to stop (Nkomo 2004).

Furthermore, it is said that the then Kenyan president, Daniel Arap Moi, had some close relationship with the RENAMO leadership. In fact, in February 1989, Moi, in coordination with the then Malawian president, Hasting Kamuzu Banda, hosted the first official meeting attended by Raul Domingos and Vicente Ululu (representatives of RENAMO) and Mozambican clergy, namely Cardinal Dom Alexandre dos Santos, Dom Jaime Gonçalves, Dom Dinis Sengulane and Pastor Ozias Mucache, who brought a letter from

6 FRELIMO used Tanzanian territory as a safe rearguard for training its guerrillas and logistics during the war for independence (1964-1974). Many incursions into the interior of Mozambique were planned from this neighboring country (Pereira 2016).

the Mozambican government, creating the initial basis for the decisive stages of peace negotiations for the country (Raul Domingos, in an interview with Media Mais TV, October 5, 2020). However, although Kenya was the host that sowed the seeds that culminated in the 1992 Rome agreements, this country still did not have good relations with Mozambique because, like Malawi, it is believed that it had hosted many FRELIMO dissidents since the times of the struggle for independence.

It should also be clarified that during the 1980s, the Malawian authorities led by Hasting Kamuzu Banda were accused by the Mozambican government of providing shelter and support to the RENAMO insurgency. For example, on September 11, 1986, after repeated complaints against Malawi about RENAMO incursions from this neighboring country, Samora Machel, then president of Mozambique, in the presence of Robert Mugabe and Kenneth Kaunda, presidents of Zimbabwe and Zambia, respectively, presented a dossier full of evidence of military, logistical and training support from Malawi and the South African government to the RENAMO rebels (African Roots 2021). Gujamo (2016) also confirms that during the period of friction with Malawi, there is evidence that the then South African government negotiated and agreed with Malawi the use of some posts, through which logistical support would be made available to RENAMO. Machel later threatened to place missiles along the border with Malawi for a preemptive strike against that country if it continued to support the rebel movement. The agreement between Malawi and South Africa should also be seen as a ploy and an attempt to gain sympathy with South Africa so that, in the event of an invasion, South Africa would have guaranteed support from that country. However, on October 19, 1986, just over a month after this meeting with Kamuzu Banda, Samora Machel died in a plane crash in the Mbuzini Hills, South Africa. The circumstances of which remain unknown.

While Kenya and Malawi had affinities with RENAMO, Zimbabwe and Tanzania provided military support to the FRELIMO government during the civil war. Gujamo (2016) states that, in 1982, a thousand Zimbabwean soldiers were initially sent to Mozambique, a number that gradually grew to ten thousand. No data has been found on the number of Tanzanian soldiers who fought in Mozambique. However, it is known that in December 1988, Tanzania decided to withdraw its soldiers due to the high cost of operations and their low effectiveness, with Zimbabwe also beginning the withdrawal process in 1989 and completing it in 1993 (Vines 2013). Zimbabwe's support is not a coincidence. Just as Tanzania did in relation to the fight for Mozambican independence, during the war for Zimbabwe's independence, the Mozambican border territory served as a safe rearguard for ZANU-PF guerrillas. It

was there that they prepared incursions to attack the Rhodesian government of Ian Smith, who, in response, also attacked the interior of Mozambique, using as pretext targets that they believed to be ZANU-PF military bases. These attacks continued until the eve of Zimbabwe's independence in 1980.

Portugal's lack of direct involvement in the peace negotiations in Mozambique was due to the fact that this former colonizing power had strong ties to Orlando Cristina and Jorge Jardim, some of the founders of RENAMO, and who were on the list of those considered reactionary to the independence led by FRELIMO. Similarly, the US and Russia could not have direct involvement in the peace process. However, both Portugal and the US, as well as Russia, participated as observers in the final phase of the negotiations that culminated in the Rome Peace Accords in 1992. It is worth noting that both the US and the USSR, a bloc of which Russia was a part, were directly involved in the logistics and ideological aspects of the civil wars, not only in Mozambique, but also in many countries around the world during the Cold War. The consummation of *Perestroika*, a policy of government reform and economic restructuring initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR in 1985, and the consequent harbinger of the end of the Cold War that was consummated and symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, also had direct impacts on many national sovereignties, including the processes that culminated in the end of multiple conflicts at the time.

The civil war in Mozambique resulted in approximately one million deaths, thousands of internal and external displaced persons, and the destruction of housing, railway, road and agricultural production infrastructures, among others, in a context in which the government did not have control over the majority of the national territory, being basically confined to urban centers and towns. Therefore, the continuation of the civil war would be unsustainable, hence the intensification of the creation of negotiation mechanisms aimed at ending the conflict.

Involvement of African and non-African actors in the peace negotiations in Mozambique

In a context in which the conflict had already matured and the country was devastated by the dynamics of the civil war, the belligerents concluded that the differences that created the conditions for war would only end through a negotiated solution, as later occurred. The process that culminated in the Peace Agreements in Mozambique encompassed the involvement of national,

regional, African and non-African actors, including government and religious entities and international organizations, both in mediation and observation, as well as in aspects related to the logistics for the operationalization of the peace agreements.

Involvement of African governments

The negotiations that culminated in the peace agreement in Mozambique involved the participation of countries from the Southern African Development Community (SADC), such as Malawi, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Kenya, which is a member of the African Union and, like Mozambique, is also part of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, also joined the group.

As previously mentioned, like Tanzania, Zimbabwe believed that a military solution to the conflict would be possible, as was the case during the fight for its independence. As the civil war in Mozambique matured and after gradually abandoning a military solution, some countries in the region began to promote an end to the civil war through a negotiated agreement. It is in this context that, according to data highlighted by Gentili (2013), Mugabe, president of Zimbabwe, allied himself with Arap Moi of Kenya and Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, both friends of RENAMO, to promote African mediation for the conflict. Zimbabwe, the country that had previously been proposed as host of the negotiations by the government of Mozambique, has always been present in the process, but as an observer. In an initial action, the Zimbabwean president promoted a meeting with Afonso Dhlakama that took place in Botswana in July 1992, in the presence of the host president Quett Masire (Gujamo 2016). Branco (2011) then adds that Mugabe was also instrumental in the meeting between Joaquim Chissano (president who replaced Samora Machel after the plane crash and death in 1986) and Afonso Dhlakama in Botswana, which served to agree on the creation of a commission to supervise the security services and the presence of the United Nations (UN) in monitoring the agreement.

In the case of Malawi, despite tense relations with Mozambique, similar to apartheid South Africa, which was accused for years of providing shelter to RENAMO, a fact that led the Mozambican government to consider a military invasion of that country, under the pretext of dismantling hypothetical hiding places that were supposed to exist, the country also played an important role in the negotiation process for peace in Mozambique. In addition to providing the corridor that allowed the first meeting between the RENAMO delegation and the Mozambican clergy to take place in Kenya

in 1988, in November 1990 it hosted a meeting in which the mediation group met with Dhlakama in order to break the impasse that was preventing the ceasefire agreement from being reached, whose foundations had been laid at the Botswana meeting. This particular meeting was attended by Tiny Rowland, an English businessman and president of the *Lonrho* conglomerate with economic interests in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, who offered his good offices and logistics to facilitate the negotiations and also to protect his investments in the region (Gentili 2013; Branco 2011).

After 1994, the year in which ONUMOZ's mandate ended⁷, the SADC countries were only contacted again in 2014, through the Military Observation Team for the Cessation of Military Hostilities (EMOCHM), after the signing of the agreement to end military hostilities between RENAMO and government forces (between 2012 and 2014). This agreement was preceded by more than one hundred rounds of negotiations between representatives of RENAMO and the government in Maputo, also mediated by Mozambican clerics. However, the mandate ended in a context in which many RENAMO military bases had not yet been deactivated. The military hostilities that occurred in the period following the Rome peace agreements reveal porosities in the reconciliation process between the former belligerents.

Intervention of non-African actors in the peace process

In addition to the involvement of African governments, the mediation process was complemented by several actors from the African diaspora. Branco (2011) highlights two that were particularly active, namely Italy and the United States of America. Italy became one of the main interlocutors in the process through the Catholic organization Santo Egídio and Dom Jaime Gonçalves, bishop of Beira. Coleman *et al* (2011) explain that, through successful contacts and efforts, it was possible to arrange the visit of the President of Mozambique, Samora Machel, to the Vatican in 1986. They add that, on the other hand, the Santo Egídio organization managed to organize a secret visit by Dom Jaime Gonçalves to the RENAMO headquarters in 1988, a year that coincided with the visit of Pope John Paul II to Mozambique. These meetings also became turning points in the peace process that led to the signing of the General Peace Agreement in 1992.

As a result of this turning point, in July 1990, the Community of Santo Egídio was accepted by both parties as a mediator in the process,

⁷ ONUMOZ was the UN operation established by Security Council Resolution 797 of 16 December 1992, and included political, military, humanitarian and electoral objectives.

and formal negotiations began in Rome. In this process, the Italian government was represented by Mario Raffaelli who, in coordination with the Santo Egídio organization, provided a venue and logistical, moral and financial support. Nevertheless, Branco (2011) states that in addition to the Santo Egídio organization, represented by Andrea Riccardi and Dom Matteo Zuppi, the negotiation round also included the presence of Mozambican churches through the Episcopal Conference, represented by Dom Jaime Gonçalves. He also highlights that, in the first phase, these institutions had observer status. However, they later became mediators and remained intact until the end of the negotiation process, with Zimbabwe and Botswana playing the role of observers.

The first stage of the negotiation was important due to the mediation of the Vatican, through the organization Santo Egídio and the Italian government. In the next stage, the process was transferred to the UN. The involvement of US diplomacy was essential to ensure the presence of the UN in the operationalization of the security agreement, guaranteeing the connection with the Security Council (Branco 2011, 98).

The involvement of both regional and non-African actors was not by chance. Mozambique's location in the eastern region of Southern Africa is strategic. Consequently, the instability of this country directly affects countries in the region, especially Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, not only due to the flow of refugees who migrated to these national sovereignties, but also, as a country with a long coastline on the Indian Ocean, it serves as a corridor for the flow of goods that arrive on the coast, destined for the hinterland. As for non-African countries, even those that are also members of the UN, they have contributed to peace in several countries. While Italy entered the process under the influence of the Catholic organization Santo Egídio, the USA and Russia have always been present in Mozambique in the antagonistic context of the Cold War, hence after the normalization of this ideological conflict, which also had an impact on the national policies of several countries, their presence as observers was inevitable. Portugal's presence as an observer was due to its strong historical and cultural ties with Mozambique, given that it was the former colonizing power.

The commitment to peace among national actors

More than thirty years have passed since the Rome Peace Agreement was signed. Given the long-term nature of the agreement and the occurrence of political phenomena that contribute to political instability in Mozambique, it is key to analyze the degree of compliance with the agreement and

the commitment to peace, not only by the main political actors, but also by society as a whole.

The fundamental principles of the agreement stated that the Government undertook not to act in a manner contrary to the terms of the Protocols that were established, and not to apply laws that might contradict the signed agreement. On the other hand, RENAMO undertook, from the entry into force of the ceasefire, not to fight by force of arms, but to conduct its political struggle in compliance with the laws in force in the existing State institutions and in compliance with the conditions and guarantees established in the General Peace Agreement (Boletim da República 1992). The Bulletin also clarifies that, in general terms, the agreement called for a ceasefire, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), the introduction of multiparty democracy, principles of electoral law, donors' conference and reconciliation.

In this chapter, the analysis focuses on the triad of electoral processes, DDR and reconciliation, both during the period in which the peace process was under ONUMOZ's monitoring and in the subsequent phase. ONUMOZ had a two-year mandate and was dismantled in December 1994, in a context in which, according to Reisinger (2009), the objectives for which it was founded had been achieved and, also, it was believed that the conditions for effective reconciliation and peace had been created. At the time, it was assumed that consensus, cooperation and sincerity guided the process that culminated in the signing of the peace agreement.

Nonetheless, since the official end of the civil war in Mozambique, several challenges still need to be overcome. For example, despite the apparent stability, RENAMO's disarmament was only officially completed in June 2023. Incidents of political violence are frequent, especially during election periods, and an authoritarian political culture is prevalent in relevant sectors of Mozambican society. These realities contradict what was established and signed in the Rome Peace Accords of 1992, an act that reinforced the guidelines of the 1990 Constitution, which has been gradually improved over time in line with the dictates of the ongoing democratization in Mozambique. However, there are two aspects that need to be clearly differentiated: one thing is to write a constitution that emanates democratic principles, and another is to have a political culture that respects democratic principles taking into account the social contract, with principles of justice, equality and freedom in a multi-party context.

Although Mozambique claims to be a multi-party democracy, the reality that dominates the arena of government management continues, in

many aspects, to be centralized, similar to the time when it was officially guided by single-party governance. For example, there is a deep-rooted culture in the civil service that, if someone wants to be successful professionally, they must be a member and sympathizer of the FRELIMO party, the organization that has governed the country since independence. The possibility of sympathizers of opposition parties and civil servants occupying prominent positions in many areas of activity in the country is almost non-existent. The few who do are those who were democratically elected by universal suffrage, such as the mayors of some municipalities, some members of the Municipal and Provincial Assemblies and deputies of the Assembly of the Republic.

Another process that is foreign to the premises and principles of multi-party democracy is the frequent political violence. Although it is a reality that tends to decrease as the years go by, the phenomenon continues to be present in Mozambican political processes. According to news reports from Rádio Moçambique, Voz da América and Jornal Savana, in the period immediately following the signing of the Rome peace accords, it was dangerous for a FRELIMO member or sympathizer to express this position in an area of RENAMO influence, such as in the interior of Maringue, Gorongosa, Inhaminga and Marromeu. The opposite also happened very frequently. For example, it was practically dangerous for a RENAMO member or sympathizer to express this position in a FRELIMO stronghold, such as Gaza province. In both situations, the citizen was considered an enemy, rather than a simple political adversary.

Citizens in these conditions were more likely to suffer reprisals and constant threats. In extreme cases, cases of murder have been reported simply for belonging to a different party. Despite a significant reduction, these incidents continue to be present in some political circles in Mozambique. Political intolerance demonstrates a lack of a political culture of multi-party democracy. This phenomenon does not only occur between the two parties with the greatest representation in Mozambique, but also targets other groups, including the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM), a party with a significant presence in the national political arena.

Another reality that requires reflection is the context in which peace was celebrated and the fact that ONUMOZ concluded its mission before the complete fulfillment of key issues in the peace process, such as the DDR. This specific issue showed that the sentiment and commitment to the clauses of the agreement were apparent. Consequently, there were fissures that only thirty years later seem to have been corrected. Proof of this is that, for example, the last 5,200 armed men from RENAMO were demobilized and

reintegrated between 2021 and 2023. Hence the following questions: why has RENAMO remained armed over the last thirty years? Why is violence recurrent during election periods? And why is intolerance still present in political processes in Mozambique?

The common denominator is that the will to end the conflicts is present. Still, the concealment of what was agreed in the agreement makes it clear that the belligerents, or one of the parties, did not have sufficient ethics and morals to comply. This is determined by the culture of violence, as a means of resolving the conflict, combined with the authoritarian and centralizing culture rooted throughout the Mozambican political processes.

During the mediation of the aforementioned actors, it appeared that there was a spirit of sincerity among those involved. However, the process lost sight of the intentions and uncertainties that were hidden among the belligerents, which only time revealed. According to Gentili (2013), mediations are more likely to be successful if there is adequate institutional support based on up-to-date information and effective lines of communication with all interested parties. Yet, mediators have no control over attitudes and processes that take place outside the negotiating platform. These are the paths that led to the shaking or the attempt to conceal the Rome peace agreement under unilateral pretexts and not out of respect for what truly reconciles sensibilities.

This is where the challenge of reconciliation in Mozambique comes in, in a context in which the interlocutors remain bound by the dictates that, for example, determined the divisions that embodied the civil war (1977-1992), as well as the rekindling of the armed conflict (2013-2019), whose end was symbolized by the signing of the definitive peace agreement on August 6, 2019, a process signed by Filipe Nyusi, current president of Mozambique, and Ussufo Momad, current president of RENAMO. It is worth noting that the last peace process was conducted without third-party mediation. The model consisted of informal and secret meetings with the direct involvement of the leaders who signed the agreement. The details would only become public later. This negotiation model has drawn criticism from key players in national politics and some academics, who consider it to be a non-inclusive process and, on the other hand, for being a platform that could lead to political exploitation, despite the agreement aiming at social well-being, with sustainable peace as its starting point.

Conclusion

The peace process in Mozambique was complex, given that, at first, the belligerents believed that it would be possible to end the conflict through a military victory, with the support of some countries in the southern region of Africa. The civil war in Mozambique was also fueled by the dynamics of the Cold War, given that the FRELIMO government was supported ideologically and logistically by the Eastern Bloc led by the USSR, and RENAMO was supported basically by the West, led by the USA. Nevertheless, as the conflict matured, combined with the changes that were occurring around the world with the harbinger of the end of the Cold War, the technical conditions for militarily defeating its opponent in the civil war were increasingly remote.

The belief in a hypothetical military victory that never came, combined with the fact that, at first, the Mozambican government did not want to negotiate directly with RENAMO, having opted for talks that culminated in the signing of the Nkomati Agreement with South Africa, although an attempt to break the support that this country gave to RENAMO, also delayed the process of pacification in the country. After the awareness of the need for a negotiated peace, the study reveals that the other crucial step was the identification and creation of a credible platform of mediators for the implementation of negotiations that would culminate in a peace agreement and its respective operationalization in the country.

The data collected, described and analyzed reveal that the process was mediated by several stakeholders, both informally, in a context in which the first contacts were still secret, with the direct involvement of some religious figures with the leadership of RENAMO and, in the next stage, which consisted of formal negotiations, with the involvement of mediators and observers from African and non-African governments, religious institutions and international entities linked to the UN, who played leading roles in the process. While the African mediators provided legitimacy in the process, non-African mediation, in addition to reinforcing legitimacy, provided material incentive for the implementation of the peace process in Mozambique.

In the more than thirty years since the signing of the Rome Peace Accords in 1992, there have been setbacks and advances in the peacemaking process. Advances are mainly limited to the ongoing democratization of Mozambican institutions, despite some challenges that need to be improved, especially in aspects that led to setbacks in the implementation of the signed peace agreements, such as the relative continued partisanship of the State, the late disarmament of the RENAMO guerrilla group, and the prevalence of

violence between political opponents, with a greater incidence during election periods, which shows that some clauses of the peace agreement are not being fully complied with. This also shows that the points of disagreement were not sincerely acknowledged, which justifies the sequence of more than thirty years of unstable peace. However, it is worth clarifying that, since the peace agreement signed in 2019, the country has been experiencing relative stability.

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ABSTRACT

The negotiations that culminated in the signing of the 1992 peace agreement were preceded by a 16-year civil war and the belligerents were the government of the Mozambique Liberation Front and the former rebel movement, the National Resistance of Mozambique. The pretext for the war was the demand for the implementation of multi-party democracy, in a context in which the government had defined

Mozambique as a Marxist-Leninist state. The peace process was mediated by national and international actors, including clergy, diplomats and government representatives. However, despite significant advances in the democratization of the country, there were also setbacks caused by exclusion and the lack of effective national reconciliation. The research is based on a bibliographic review and supported by the theory of multi-track diplomacy, taking into account the intervention and interdependence of various levels of actors and, consequently, the intersection of multiple synergies and strategies in the conflict resolution process. The above time limit is between the beginning of negotiations that culminated in the signing of the Rome Peace Accords in 1992 and the signing of the last peace agreement in 2019.

KEYWORDS

Conflict mediation. Reconciliation. Sustainable peace.

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