
Deleuze and the Work of Death: A Study from the Impulse-Images

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Abstract

When formulating the concept of the impulse-image, Deleuze never tires of asserting that these images are saturated with death and obsessed by degradation. They stand at a curious intersection in the taxonomy of images, a constitutively in-between space: they are formally inserted between affection-image and action-image in *The Movement-Image*, but produce a direct passage to the time-image. However, they do not reach the time-image due to obsession by the negative effects of time. This article introduces the concept of the impulse-image in Deleuze's work on the impulse and death instinct, in his fundamental texts of the 1960s and 1970s, including his collaboration with Félix Guattari. The death instinct in the late 1960s was a transcendental principle that acquired the form of the groundless or crack-up essential for the production of difference. It is at this time that Deleuze publishes *Zola and the Crack-up*, an embryonic essay for what would later become the impulse-image. In the 1970s, Deleuze, along with Guattari, fought the need to include a groundless force in the mould of the death instinct. Speaking of cinema in the 1980s, which is when he returns to the impulse theme, one finds characteristics of both preceding periods, especially the structure conceived in the 1960s (the incidence of the groundless as a transcendental force of disarticulation), associated with the criticism of the 1970s (a need to overcome the song of death to reach time and desire). However, Deleuze now stands apart, recognising a naturalistic image and admiring a practice of symptomatology, but pointing out that his own understanding of the world does not lie in it. With the impulse-images, Deleuze also plays a relevant role in studies of film naturalism,

Deleuze and Guattari Studies 14.2 (2020): 229–254

DOI: 10.3366/dlgs.2020.0400

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shaping a powerful concept for studies of contemporary naturalistic symptomatologies that emerge in situations of misery of civilisation.

Keywords: Deleuze, impulse-image, naturalism, death instinct, symptom, Brazilian cinema

I. Introduction

The impulse¹ that exists in the impulse-image corresponds to the very specific way in which Deleuze takes the theory of drives and instincts as his own. Although he does not explain the concept of impulse used to compose such images, his previous works are necessarily involved. The impulse of the impulse-images includes the author's conception referring to his late 1960s works and the identification of the death instinct as a transcendental principle within the framework of the drive theory. However, the impulse of impulse-images also reflects the whole change of perspective which Deleuze's appropriation faced after he worked with Félix Guattari in the 1970s.

There are a number of references in both *The Movement-Image* (1986a) and the classes that preceded it (Deleuze 1982a, 1982b, 2011) about the existence of a fundamental death instinct in the impulse-images.

In the poor or the rich, impulses have the same goal and the same destiny: to smash into fragments, to tear off fragments, gather up the scraps, form the great rubbish dump and bring everything together in a single and identical death impulse. Death, the death impulse–naturalism is saturated with it. (Deleuze 1986a: 129–30)²

Although the author does not return to the term 'instinct' to designate the transcendental instance that governs the impulse world, he reaffirms the existence of a 'great death-impulse' or the gathering of all impulses in a single one, called 'death impulse'. The existence of death as a fundamental impulse unfolds in innumerable characteristics that Deleuze points out in the impulse-images: degradation, entropic or cyclical temporality, exhaustiveness of the tearing off the fragments. All these elements come from the fact that there is a fundamental impulse for death.

Deleuze maintains a multifaceted position with respect to impulse-images. Certainly, he is fascinated with these images, or rather with naturalism in general, stating that if he had the opportunity he would fulfil the dream of studying literature, returning to Émile Zola (Deleuze 2011: 229). He also asserts that impulse-image filmmakers should be

regarded as physicians of civilisation and that each of these images is worth a diagnosis in the world (Deleuze 1986a: 125). However, in one of his classes Deleuze feels the need to make a clear separation: the impulse-image could only be carried out by those who had a certain conception of the world not compatible with that of Deleuze himself. 'I am not obliged to be a naturalist,' says the author, adding immediately, 'this is not my idea; it immediately feels that it is a very obscure world' (Deleuze 2011: 218, my own translation).³

In this article, I cover Deleuze's preliminary work on the death instinct, highlighting Freudian influence. The conceptual apparatus that supports the impulse-image is very close to that of *Zola and the Crack-up*, a study written in the 1960s (Deleuze 1990a). Between these two, however, there is the crucial work of the 1970s in conjunction with Guattari. The impulse-image includes both the 1960s proposal, coupled with the fascination for naturalistic aesthetics, as well as the detachment recommended by the 1970s theory, one that vehemently opposed the necessity of death as a theoretical condition for a philosophy of difference.

II. Framework on the Intervention of This Work in the Study of the Impulse-Images

The concept of the impulse-image triggered controversial and, to some extent, extreme reactions in readers who first perused Deleuze's film books. Serge Daney (1983), for example, stated that this was the most beautiful chapter of *The Movement-Image*. Ackbar Abbas (1992: 180–1), during the American book's launch, stated that impulse-images were probably the most beautiful images of all. Raymond Bellour (2005 [1995]) has used the impulse-images as a 'touching' example of Deleuze's way of researching cinema proposing 'embarrassing' and 'open' assemblages, connections that were not previously made in the history and theory of cinema.

This radical opening of which Bellour speaks, however, also served to keep the concept somewhat marginalised in the studies built upon Deleuze's taxonomy. This is a point that De Gaetano highlights.⁴ Impulse-images are a radical transition, a permanent border between affection-image, action-image, time-image, naturalism, realism, surrealism, death instinct, body without organs, and the logic of sensation.

The proposition of the impulse-images also problematised the relationship between cinema and naturalism, because this is normally

seen as lending itself to an aesthetic of transparency rather than a study of human beasts under the force of death. The controversy surrounding impulse-image and naturalism can be clearly apprehended in the virulent words of Luc Moullet (2005). For this filmmaker, we have here ‘by far the worst chapter of the Deleuzian diptych’, one which confuses two traditions of naturalism (in cinema and literature) and carries on to formulate a confused and misleading image.

We can, of course, rebut Moullet with the argument that no one is forbidden from analysing cinema in the light of a tradition that flourished earlier in other fields. Problematising the notion of naturalism in cinema is, in fact, one of the great contributions of Deleuze on the concept of impulse-image.

Before turning to the specific argument of this article, it is appropriate to set out some general trends in the work on impulse-images in order to better situate it.

Some authors have taken a genealogical approach to impulse-images, seeking to situate them in relation to Deleuze’s previous work or transversal axes that suffuse all his work. In this sense, Montebello (2008, 2011) analyses impulse-images in relation to *Zola and the Crack-up* (Deleuze 1990a), a precursor text relating naturalism to the death instinct, while Hyunjun (2008: 96–101) argues that impulse-images are those which carry on the logic of sensation in Deleuze’s film books, reproducing a certain dualistic interpretation between instinct and object that had already appeared in his work on Francis Bacon. Other authors place the impulse-image in relation to cross-cutting themes in Deleuze: De Gaetano (2006, 2015) situates it on the issue of the body, Ulpiano (1995, 1996) in the problematisation of time.

This paper also problematises the impulse-images in relation to Deleuze’s previous work, in line with the general evolution of the author’s concepts of impulse and death instinct. Only by examining this line of problematisation can we take full advantage of the impulse-images, directing them to analyses of symptomatological cinema. In addition, this line of investigation allows for an understanding of the formal constitution of the concept, preventing it from being dissolved among so many neighbouring concepts. After all, as Deleuze (1986a: 136) states, ‘it is difficult to reach the purity of the impulse-image and particularly to stay there’.

This work further incorporates another axis of research on impulse-images: the expansion of taxonomy. This expansion was made to explore films or filmmakers mentioned, or not, by Deleuze. As an open concept and with a series of assemblages, it is logical to assume that

the expansion of taxonomy would occur in different directions. Certain analyses of impulse-images in David Lynch explore their surrealist unfolding (Buttazzi 2001; Arêas 2003). The study of De Gaetano (1996) highlights the combination of impulse-images with the baroque in Peter Greenaway. Deamer's approach (2016) favours the impulse-image in horror and fantasy films, such as *The Human Centipede* (first sequence), *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows—Part 1*, *Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows—Part 2*, and *Innocence*.

Deamer raises the issue of the aesthetic traditions articulated in impulse-images: they would have a foundation in naturalism, but a privileged unfolding in horror, fantasy and surrealist films.⁵ That is why the author directs his interest to the above-mentioned films. Deamer argues that naturalism must be seen as an 'initial inspiration' for the impulse-images in Deleuze. However, Deamer's interpretation deserves to be problematised. The Deleuzian movement on impulse-images is more interested in renovating the understanding of naturalism in cinema than in taking it as a starting point. Deleuze (1986a: 127) does not abandon the premise that 'naturalism's most important element is the impulse-image', although the naturalism of impulse-images extends itself in surrealism⁶ and 'opens' itself to other genres, such as the prehistoric and science fiction. On horror and science fiction films that build the originary world as a derived milieu, Deleuze (1986a: 234) is explicit: 'Such films are part of naturalism.' If we look at Deleuze's relationship with the naturalism of Émile Zola, we will see that this is not a fortuitous relationship, but a concern that dogged the author for several decades. It is worth remembering that, in the 1960s, Deleuze wrote *Zola and the Crack-up* on naturalism and death instinct; in the 1980s, in addition to proposing the naturalist impulse-image, he expressed a desire to return to Zola if the right occasion arose.⁷

Thus, it is true that the concept of impulse-image is elastic enough to encompass science fiction, horror and surrealism, but it does so because naturalism, as Deleuze understands it, also extends and sometimes embraces these genres. For Deleuze, naturalism is not a dogmatic project, as it is understood by Deamer (2016: 91). It is in this sense, furthermore, that Deleuze's impulse-images become relevant in problematising the very notion of naturalism in cinema, a notion that is often considered a dated aesthetic.⁸

Concerning this article, interest remains in the naturalistic aspect of impulse-images. This is the best approach for analysing certain contemporary political cinemas of the so-called developing world, notably Brazilian cinema. It is known that Glauber Rocha's work was

fundamental to Deleuze's analysis of 'modern political cinema in the third world', where people were a force in becoming, in the process of reinventing themselves (Deleuze 1989: 215–24). However, in contemporary Brazilian cinema, especially in a strong and relevant strain that developed throughout the 2000s, the people are absolutely present and bestialised. These people are trapped in ordinary worlds that refer to the great death inscribed as an impregnated and almost immemorial disease in the country, which filmmakers will capture in the throes of civilisation, in wider Brazil or in the periphery of big cities. Thus, what responds to this cinema is the naturalism and the symptomatology of the impulse-images, not the people in a state of invention as in modern cinema à la Glauber Rocha. This is the case in *Latitude Zero* (dir. Toni Venturi, 2000), *Through the Window* (dir. Tata Amaral, 2000), *Mango Yellow* (dir. Cláudio Assis, 2003), *Up Against Them All* (dir. Roberto Moreira, 2004), *Árido Movie* (dir. Lírio Ferreira, 2005), *Bog of Beasts* (dir. Cláudio Assis, 2006), *Drained* (dir. Heitor Dhalia, 2006) and *Happy Desert* (dir. Paulo Caldas, 2007), among others. In the final paragraphs of this article, I will make brief analyses of those works and the pertinence of impulse-images for studying contemporary naturalistic films.

III. Impulse-images and Their Peculiar Placement in Deleuze's Taxonomy of Images

The impulse-images underwent an increasing process of autonomisation during the courses Deleuze delivered prior to the publication of his cinema books. This is also reflected in the first paragraph in the 'movement-image' chapter, in which Deleuze (1986a: 123) begins his approach to the theme by indicating that there is something that does not subsist in the characteristics of affection-images, nor in those of the action-image, but has elements of both. In the same paragraph, the author makes an excuse that refers to an evolution of his own line of reasoning, a sort of self-awareness note: 'Now we must recognise that this new set is not a mere intermediary' (Deleuze 1986a: 123). We should be aware, however, that in his first formulations impulses appeared as a first type of action-image. In Deleuze's first round of courses, besides being regarded as an inner type of action-images, the final concept formulation as impulse-image does not even exist. The author frequently mentions the existence of an 'impulse cinema' inside action-images, but although having already pointed out a great number of characteristics that would later appear in *The Movement-Image*, he does not call it 'impulse-image' (Deleuze 1982a, 1982b). This term

would appear later during the second year of his cinema courses, along with the autonomisation of the impulse cinema in the face of action-images. Not by chance, while introducing the impulse-image course, Deleuze says, 'I am very attached to this scheme because I thought it over. It gave me a lot of work, no doubt about it. Now it satisfies me completely, so I do not have to do it anymore or do it again?' (Deleuze 2011: 215, my own translation).⁹

From the point of view of movement-image types, impulse-images are situated between affection-images and action-images. Affection-images are conceived from pure affection, in any-space-whatevers not defined historically and geographically. According to Henri Bergson's theory, affection-images correspond to the first moment in which the external image produces an excess, a strangeness when it collides with a special image in the system of infinite variation. Special images are all living beings capable of producing a hiatus, a differentiation in the universal fluctuation of the matter-image. Action-images, however, have only real behaviours historically and geographically located. They are conceived in the overarching causality between action and reaction. From the point of view of universal fluctuation, action-images correspond to the moment when images restore movement to universal fluctuation after being struck by another image (Bergson [1896] 1990, 17–76; Deleuze 1986a: 57–70).

In *The Movement-Image*, references to Peirce are insufficient to address the impulse-images, but continue to be relevant in the courses that preceded the book. In response to a listener, Deleuze says that Bergson remains the main thread of the research. However, he asserts that Peirce extrapolates from Bergson without contradiction, because he presents another kind of problem, whose tools would enable extending the taxonomy of the three images to which Deleuze had arrived with Bergson: perception-image, affection-image and action-image (Deleuze 1982a). In fact, with the introduction of Peirce and his resonance in the base constructed with Bergson, Deleuze formulates five types of image: perception-image or zeroness, affection-image or firstness, impulse-image or intermediate degree, action-image or secondness, and mental-image (relation-image) or thirdness (Deleuze 2011: 215). Later, he reports on the inclusion of reflection-image, which would be an intermediate between action-image and relation-image, briefly mentioned in 'The Crisis of the Action-Image in the Movement-Image' (Deleuze 1986a: 197–215), but included as one of six types of movement-images in the recapitulation of *The Time-Image* (Deleuze 1989: 25–43).

Thus the impulse-image, from Peirce's point of view, would be in the interval between firstness and secondness. The firstness would be the scope of pure quality, hence its association with affections and any-space-whatevers not determined historically and geographically. The secondness would always have a duality: 'Everything which only exists by being opposed, by and in a duel ...' (Deleuze 1986a: 98). The author says, however, that the opposition of the secondness happens between two individuated, existing and actual elements. Therefore, it is not about the same dualism that constitutes the impulse-images, which occurs between an element individuated and something of the order of pure quality. Dualisms internal to the secondness are of the order of action and reaction, of excitation-response (Deleuze 1986a: 98).

The indication of these two image specifications is necessary to understand impulse-images, because each of them lends a certain aspect of its components to composing the constituent characteristics of impulse-images, namely, the originary worlds and the derived milieux. The impulse-images exist only with the conjunction of these two spheres, which have their own nomenclature seen only in the context of the impulse-images, but which are linked to the images that are at their borders. Derived milieux are historically and geographically determined spaces (secondness), while the originary worlds are pure forces which refer to affection (firstness). But rather than existing in isolation, these dimensions are in a relationship of immanence. The originary worlds, or pure forces, are the immanent force that exists under and comes upon the derived milieux. In this way, there is no dimension in the impulse-images without the other; there is always the impulse and its practices of connection between the two spheres of the image.

With regard to the proximity of time-images, the impulse-images have a somewhat unique condition in the series of movement-images. While considering the general project of *The Movement-Image*, it is possible to see that Deleuze composes his book by defining the types of image, organising the flow of thought to finally consider that there existed a crisis of action-images and of movement-images as a whole. It turns out, however, that in the midst of work, in this relatively obscure and enigmatic image, Deleuze claims that we have come very close to time-images. In several passages, the author is fascinated by the type of temporality inscribed in the impulse-images. He says, for example, that in the impulse-images time makes a very strong appearance, as an 'originary image of time', which provides the beginning and the end in itself (Deleuze 1986a: 124). However, an impulse-image cannot be a time-image because time appears as a pure negative effect.

Whether it is time of entropy or time of eternal return, in both cases time finds its source in the originary world, which confers upon it the role of a destiny which cannot be expiated. Curled up in the originary world which is like the beginning and the end of time, time unravels in derived milieux. This is almost a neo-Platonism of time. And it is undoubtedly one of the naturalist cinema's great achievements to have come so close to a time-image. However, what prevented it from reaching time as pure form was its obligation to keep time subordinate to naturalistic co-ordinates, to make it dependent on impulse. (Deleuze 1986a: 127)

Thus, perhaps contrary to the explicit organisation of *The Movement-Image*, the impulse-images are close to time-images, which in fact constitute one of their immediate boundaries. Deleuze (1986a: 133; 1989: 102–3) asserts, for example, that Luis Buñuel is a director who has transited this borderline, reaching time-images 'from inside', by overcoming the impulse-images in films such as *Belle de Jour*, *The Discreet Charm of the Bourgeoisie*, *The Phantom of Liberty* and *That Obscure Object of Desire*. Deleuze attributes the reason for this negativity precisely to the fixation on the theme of impulses, but does not provide in the cinema books the theoretical background for understanding the link between his appropriation of instincts theory and the negativity of time. This explanation can only be found in the analysis of the evolution of his work, following the tense and purposeful relationship he maintained with the concept of the death instinct for three decades.

IV. The Dangerous Death Instinct

The subject of the death instinct is frequently mentioned in the works of Deleuze in the late 1960s. In the early 1970s, after meeting Félix Guattari, the author opposes themes in the psychoanalytic universe, from which it is possible to observe a radical change in his understanding of instincts.¹⁰

In *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty*, published in 1967, Deleuze aims to undo the 'semiological howler' term 'somasochism', constituted by psychoanalysis (Deleuze 1991: 134). To do so, he reveals details of both the literature of Sacher-Masoch and the Marquis de Sade, as well as Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis. It is here that the author presents with clarity his specific articulation between impulses and instincts. Without entering into the polemics about the correct translation of the Freudian *Trieb*, Deleuze affirms that it is necessary to use both terms, 'impulse' and 'instinct', to explore the conceptual complexity proposed by Freud.

‘Instinct’ would designate the transcendental principle that governs the empirical, in which there would be only the impulses (Deleuze 2014: location 1453–1594).¹¹

It is precisely because Freud has reached the transcendental principle that he would have made a ‘specifically philosophical reflection’ in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Freud [1920] 1990), ‘and how penetratingly’ (Deleuze 1991: 111). Deleuze, at this point in his work, associates philosophy with transcendental reflection. What is transcendental in Freud’s thought is precisely the discovery that there is one sphere beyond the pleasure principle. Notice that the beyond is not the exception. What Freud does is not to deny the efficiency of the pleasure principle, but to discover that it is not the most fundamental element that governs experience. Clinical analysis showed Freud that the pleasure principle was not enough, not because it eventually failed, but because there would exist a more fundamental principle. In *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, it is notable that Freud very clearly delimits the sphere of study that refers to psychology in the strict sense, and the one that goes beyond, which precisely for this reason can only be ‘speculation, often far-fetched speculation, which the reader will consider or dismiss according to his individual predilection’ (Freud 1990: 18).

Therefore, Freud delimits his spheres of action between psychology and metapsychology, between psychoanalytical analysis and speculation. What Deleuze does is insist on the importance of the discovery of the *beyond*, which is obtained through speculation. Then, he operates the use of both notions: impulse is what exists in the *Id*, in the experience, submitted to the pleasure principle; and instinct is what exists beyond, which rules but is not given in experience.

These two instincts are Eros and Thanatos, life instinct and death instinct. As transcendental principles, they are regents, but only appear through their representatives, that is, impulses. Among these impulses are the erotic and destructive ones, those on which Freud worked in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (Freud [1930] 2010). It is also relevant to observe aspects of the relationship between instincts and impulses. Instincts exist in the unconscious only through their representatives and are never in the pure state, but always mixed with one another and governed by the pleasure principle. Eros is noisy, easily observable, while Thanatos is silent but implacable. Eros is the instinct that carries out the connections and therefore is responsible for the existence of the culture. According to Deleuze, for governing the connections, Eros is responsible for the institution of the pleasure principle. In short, Eros is the *ground*. As for Thanatos, it problematises the connection, existing

together with it, but with the function of a groundless. Thus, what is contrasting to the ground is the groundless, always silent 'and all the more terrible', because it is what prevents the connections from being perpetuated (Deleuze 1991: 115–16).

Still in *Coldness and Cruelty*, Deleuze links the transcendental sphere to his concept of repetition, since Eros would operate a 'repetition that links', whereas Thanatos would operate a 'repetition that erases and destroys'. He further asserts that repetition, 'as conceived by Freud's genius', is a synthesis of time, precisely the transcendental synthesis (Deleuze 1991: 114–15). These references obviously refer to the book that Deleuze would publish the following year in 1968, *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze 1995a), which, along with *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze 1990b), published in 1969, explores the conceptual specification of impulse and instinct the way it was conceived in *Coldness and Cruelty*.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze (1995a: 70–128) presents his passive syntheses of time, all existing on a transcendental level, *beyond* the psychic apparatus and the pleasure principle. The first passive synthesis, inspired by David Hume, is that of *Habitus*, of the contractions and decelerations that occur at the level of habit. In other words, it is the *foundation*. The second is formed by the conjunction of the idea of Eros, based on Freud, and the idea of memory, based on Bergson. Deleuze says that the virtual memory thought by Bergson is in itself erotic. It is the basis upon which the first synthesis, relative to habit, occurs. In other words, it is the *ground*. The third synthesis is the empty form of time, that is, the death instinct. Here time has no more content, neither in habit nor in memory: 'Time empty and out of joint, with its rigorous formal and static order, its crushing unity and its irreversible series, is precisely the death instinct' (Deleuze 1995a: 111). The death instinct in Deleuze's temporal conception corresponds to what the author had already mentioned in *Coldness and Cruelty*. It is the groundless, the silent, the empty. Next, we will see that the death instinct can also be the crack-up.

Deleuze states that the relationship between Eros and the death instinct is not of symmetry, nor of opposition, nor cyclical. To admit that there is a dichotomy between Eros and the death instinct would be to introduce the negative into thought, which Deleuze is rightly problematising in *Difference and Repetition*. Therefore, what the death instinct produces is another series, which 'testifies to a completely different synthesis' (Deleuze 1995a: 111). Thus, Deleuze can affirm that death is not opposite to, but that which problematises life: 'Death is,

rather, the last form of the problematic, the source of problems and questions, the sign of their persistence over and above every response, the “Where?” and “When?” which designate this (non)-being where every affirmation is nourished’ (Deleuze 1995a: 112).

In *The Logic of Sense* (Deleuze 1990b), the theme of the instincts reappears in some series in which issues of psychoanalysis and sexuality come into play. However, what is most relevant in the book, according to the problem we are facing, is an appendix, part of the set of texts included by the author himself since the French editions of the book. This is *Zola and the Crack-up* (Deleuze 1990a), originally published in 1967, just two years before *The Logic of Sense*, and in the same year of publication of *Coldness and Cruelty*. Deleuze here analyses the death instinct from the point of view of its configuration as a crack-up within the literature of Zola. The text is particularly relevant because it bears witness to the way in which Deleuze conceived the theory of impulses and instincts in naturalism. We find in *Zola and the Crack-up* a direct articulation between impulses and naturalism, which is probably the only one made prior to the cinema books. After all, the impulse-images are regarded by the author as naturalism in the cinema, which inherited the aesthetics of Zola.

In *Zola and the Crack-up*, Deleuze (1990a) uses the articulation he theorised in *Coldness and Cruelty*. However, instead of referring to impulses and instincts, he prefers to speak of instincts and the death instinct. The instincts are many and noisy, but the death instinct is silent. It is relevant that in the text the author does not mention Eros and his relationship with the instincts. The general movement consists in presenting the crack-up as the procedure of Zola to conceive the death instinct and its relation with the other instincts.

The crack-up appears explicitly in *The Beast Within* (Zola [1890] 2008) to designate a heredity characteristic in the novel series *The Rougon-Macquart*. For Deleuze, there are two types of heredity in the series: first, the small heredity, which is characterised by the rooting and transmission of instincts, in which instinct and object syntheses would be subject to hereditary transmission (thus, for example, Jacques Lantier’s alcoholism in *The Beast Within*); and second, the grand heredity, which is the crack-up, passing from generation to generation. The crack-up transmits only itself, is silent and has no objects. The relationship with the death instinct and the empty form of time, how they were developed in *Difference and Repetition*, is evident. In addition, small heredity is described by Deleuze as a function of repetition of ‘the Same’, while grand heredity is a function of Difference (Deleuze 1990a: 324–5).

Through Deleuze's analysis of *Zola and the Crack-up* it is possible to understand that the death instinct, as Deleuze understands it, can acquire various expressions according to the aesthetic or philosophical project in which it is inserted. In *Zola and the Crack-up*, it is the crack-up itself, just as it was the groundless in *Coldness and Cruelty* and the empty form of time in *Difference and Repetition*. In *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1983), the death instinct will be the body without organs, the difference being that it will transit to a diverse conceptual network, as shown in the following section. Keeping work references related to the late 1960s, it is possible to understand some characteristics invariably emphasised by Deleuze: the silence of the death instinct, as opposed to the agitation of the life instinct; the absence of content of the death instinct; and the understanding of the death instinct as a central element for the production of difference.

V. The Turning from the Death Instinct to the Body without Organs

While analysing *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1983) from the point of view of the concept of the death instinct, it is possible to see that it has a permanent, non-innocent dialogue with the concept of body without organs (BwO), a notion appropriated from Antonin Artaud which Deleuze had already worked on in *The Logic of Sense*, although not with the centrality it acquired in both volumes of *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*.¹² *Anti-Oedipus* covers a monumental series of references in dialogue, in which we find the concept of death instinct. For Pierre Montebello (2011), Deleuze's break with psychoanalysis and, therefore, the motor of *Anti-Oedipus* and *A Thousand Plateaus*, lies in the transformations through which the concept of death instinct faced in this period. According to Montebello, the fundamental opposition between Deleuze and psychoanalysis exists as a result of the Deleuzian renunciation of the death instinct as a transcendental sphere (Montebello 2011: 15, 25). Monique David-Ménard (2005: 72–5) shows that the body without organs is probably the key concept in Deleuze's estrangement from psychoanalysis in *Anti-Oedipus*. Deleuze and Guattari's insistence on the BwO's condition of producing and being produced would have the purpose of preventing the body from being squeezed under certain universals of psychoanalysis, such as the death drive. Inside the universe of the BwO, Schuster (2016: 166) affirms that the concept of anti-production is Deleuze and Guattari's version of the death drive. The author asserts that the great difference between

them lies in their conceptions of negativity. While anti-production is an 'integral part of production', the death drive is an external hole 'that can never be reconciled with the metamorphoses of the forms of life and the clamor of being' (Schuster 2016: 169).

In the first chapter of *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari associate body without organs and death instinct with a definition that serves as an introduction to the theme and anticipates a series of aspects that will be analysed later in the book:

The full body without organs is the unproductive, the sterile, the unengendered, the unconsumable. Antonin Artaud discovered this one day, finding himself with no shape or form whatsoever, right there where he was at that moment. The death instinct: that is its name, and death is not without a model. For desire desires death also, because the full body of death is its motor, just as it desires life, because the organs of life are the working machine. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 8)

However, the tendency throughout the book is to discuss this relationship between body without organs and death instinct, undoing the pairing that appears in the first chapter of the book.

Deleuze and Guattari propose a conceptualisation of body without organs based on Spinoza's philosophy of immanence.¹³ The authors of *Anti-Oedipus* present the body without organs as the substance itself and the partial objects (organs) as its attributes (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 325–7).

The body without organs is substance because it is one with infinite potentialities. According to the authors, it acts by repulsion or attraction directed to the organisms. This is why the body without organs has a zero degree of intensity, which acts to repel or attract the 'organs-objects' and, ultimately, organisms as well (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 325–7, 329–30). Thus we see a procedure that has a dialogue with the one proposed by Deleuze in the figures of the groundless and crack-up.

However, it is possible to understand in this first approach a difference of perspective that would be explicitly demarcated by the authors. How and why does the substance, a concept that possesses the world's infinity, become the unproductive associated with the death instinct? Here, concepts begin to distance themselves.

It is worth mentioning that, on a different occasion, Deleuze pointed out the incompatibility of Spinoza's project with the theory of the death drive: 'There is never a death that comes from outside. Spinoza is one of those for whom the very idea of a death drive is a grotesque concept, absolutely grotesque' (Deleuze 1981, my translation).¹⁴ This matter is supported by a series of propositions in Spinoza's *Ethics* Part III, in

which the philosopher affirms that no thing contains in itself anything whereby it can be destroyed, which means that nothing can be destroyed, except for external reasons (Spinoza [1677] 2000: 273–337).

Therefore, is it possible to reconcile these two ontologies, that of Freud and the death instinct, and that of Spinoza and the radical vitalist immanence?

It seems that the authors need to find a concept whose action explains the production of difference. On one hand, this concept must be rigorous enough to designate the force that prevents the perpetuation of stratifications. On the other hand, it cannot be of such an order that it moves the theory to a negativist ontology, which would oppose as a whole the project of the philosophy of difference. In the 1960s, Deleuze thought he had found this concept through the definition of a transcendental sphere to place the pure death. However, by the 1970s, this construction was something to fight against.

To postulate the existence of a body without organs in the Spinozan substance starts from Deleuze and Guattari's premise that the expressive production of the substance must have something violent, which exists between one and another modal expression. Each entity strives to preserve its existence, but must live the experience of daily death, which forces it to flow in the immanence of the substance towards the production of a new expression, though through the same body. This flow includes the anti-production, since the 'connective synthesis' of BwO also connects to anti-production. With this concept, Deleuze and Guattari can show that capitalism builds its bureaucracy and its fine apparatus of repression as the anti-production inherent to the system economy (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 234–6).

It is evident that the body without organs is inserted in a philosophy of difference, whose project was already being developed by Deleuze in the 1960s, along with the concept of death instinct. The groundless and the crack-up were, in those fundamental texts of Deleuze's bibliography, agents necessary to produce difference. However, while asserting with Guattari the vitalism of this new conception, he refutes the death instinct with the charge that it introduces the 'the strange death cult in psychoanalysis' through the creation of a 'pseudo-instinct'.¹⁵ From the point of view of Deleuze's theory evolution, we are therefore facing death as an experience of life, as variation in intensity and becoming, which made Deleuze move from one conceptual network to another:

Freud did not hide what was really at issue with the introduction of the death instinct: it is not a question of any fact whatever, but merely of a principle, a question of principle. The death instinct is pure silence, pure transcendence,

not givable and not given in experience. This very point is remarkable: It is because death, according to Freud, has neither a model nor an experience, that he makes of it a transcendent principle. . . . We say, to the contrary, that there is no death instinct because there is both the model and the experience of death in the unconscious. Death then is a part of the desiring-machine, a part that must itself be judged, evaluated in the functioning of the machine and the system of its energetic conversions, and not as an abstract principle. (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 332)

The option for the immanent body without organs goes through two aspects: the model and the experience. The desiring-machine's functioning implies that death at all times is experience. The body without organs itself is the model, but it only becomes effective if lived as an experience. These experiences make the running of the desiring-machine. The existence of a body without organs and the possibility of experiencing death as ordinary everyday life is a condition of the machine, but its running must always be renewed and performed.

In *A Thousand Plateaus* there are few references to impulses and death instinct. The terminology becomes, definitively, that of the body without organs and that of the philosophy of immanence. Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 153) say that Spinoza's *Ethics* is the great book of the body without organs. The authors dedicate one of fifteen plateaus to the following question: 'How do you make yourself a body without organs?' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 149–66).

Deleuze and Guattari indicate some bodies without organs, such as the hypochondriac, the paranoid, the schizophrenic, the drugged and the masochist bodies, but they reaffirm that the production of a BwO is a daily task of desire, an immanent limit in which one does not arrive and does not stop arriving. As a limit to which one never reaches, one must act with caution, always keep a little bit of organism, because the violent gesture, instead of outlining the plan, can lead to death and catastrophe. In several passages, the authors implicitly or explicitly refute the vocabulary of death. Producing a BwO can lead one to court death, but this only occurs if injections of caution have not been sufficient (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 150). Death in itself, in the strict sense, appears in a complex relationship with BwO, because it could be destiny if there were no caution, nevertheless in this case it could also be the end of BwO: 'You invent self-destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive. Dismantling the organism has never meant killing yourself, but rather opening the body to connections that presuppose an entire assemblage . . .' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 160).

The authors invest radically in a direction that had already been evidenced in *Anti-Oedipus*, one that unlinks the concept and practice of BwO from the notion of death. In *A Thousand Plateaus*, the authors take the concept of death with literality and insist that this concept should be understood as such: death as a body of nothingness, as it occurs in cases of 'pure self-destruction' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 162). Therefore, death is the end of life. It may happen that the production of BwO leads to death; however, BwO does not exist because of a tendency to die.

The whole problem of the BwO is linked in *A Thousand Plateaus* to the philosophy of immanence. This perspective allows Deleuze and Guattari to conceive a concept that is not transcendental and that carries with it two fundamental characteristics: it produces worlds as well as operates against stratification. In *Anti-Oedipus*, the BwO is seen as an immobile motor. Now, in *A Thousand Plateaus*, it is taken as intensity equals zero: 'It is nonstratified, unformed, intense matter, the matrix of intensity, intensity = 0; but there is nothing negative about that zero, there are no negative or opposite intensities' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 153).

Understanding BwO as zero intensity allows no negative concept, no groundless or crack-up in terms formulated by Deleuze's works in the 1960s. Still, the authors further acknowledge that the BwO involves a certain amount of involution: 'It is no more projective than it is regressive. It is an involution, but always a contemporary, creative involution' (Deleuze and Guattari 1988: 164). Fundamentally, the BwO is of the order of production, creativity and experimentation. However, perhaps it is possible to say that there is a double track of BwO, a kind of involution that also characterises its production or the impacts of its realisation. But the authors warn, following Spinoza's inspiration, that this involution is not only a return, as Freud would have wanted, but also a contemporary creation. Involution would not be on the level of desire itself, nor on a transcendental involutory force; it would come from within a certain desiring-machine.

Later, in the 1990s, when asked about the theory of drives in psychoanalysis, Guattari (1995) stated that he turned away from it due to an ethical issue, because the drive would only make sense if it were a life drive. To him, applying the idea of a 'permanent drive constructivism' allows an engagement 'in the construction of one world rather than another', which is inhibited under the existence of 'psychological universals' (Guattari 1995: 102–3, my translation).¹⁶

With regard to Deleuze's work, a cycle was completed and its transformations can be understood as full bodies without organs,

resulting from his encounter with Guattari. The concepts of impulse and death instinct have changed, and these changes were inserted in a more general transformation of Deleuze's work. Those transformations would be unfolded later, when Deleuze returned to the theme of death and naturalism, this time under the affections of the cinema.

VI. Final Considerations: Impulse-Image, Naturalism and Disbelief

Deleuze's approach to impulse in *The Movement-Image* is different from his previous works, in which he proposed a philosophical system of his own. In the 1960s, Deleuze introduced the concept of death instinct in the very philosophical system he erected around *Difference and Repetition* (1995a). Later, in the 1970s, he changed his approach to the concept, to work with desire and the body without organs. In this turn, Deleuze excluded the concepts of impulse and death instinct from his own philosophical system, denouncing them along with the conceptual machinery constructed by Freud.

In his cinema books, Deleuze returns to the theme of impulses in order to identify a specific image conceived by great film directors, the physicians of civilisation. These images have the same negative characteristic that the author had vehemently fought against with Guattari. However, Deleuze is not making a philosophical clash as before, but charting images without opposing them. For this reason, he feels the need to declare that he is not obliged to be a naturalist like the makers of impulse-images (Deleuze 2011: 218).

Therefore, two different practices can be observed: one on the construction of a philosophical project and the second on researching image and art. Here, the Deleuzian approach strips itself of criticism of the song of death and manages to appreciate its richness and complexity as an image in the world. It is now necessary to situate these images very precisely, to emphasise their obsession by negativity and the reasons why it is not a time-image or an image based on desire. The time-image and the image based on desire explode the impulse-image, which is based on the groundless of the great death:

To reach a repetition which saves, or which changes life, beyond good and evil, would it not be necessary to break with the order of impulses, to undo the cycles of time, reach an element which would be like a true 'desire', or like a choice capable of constantly beginning again (we have already seen this in respect of lyrical abstraction)? (Deleuze 1986a: 133)

The encounter with the work of death in the impulse-images is also privileged because it exposes the symptomatology that Deleuze has repeatedly proposed as a practice of art. Within the scope of the cinema, only the impulse-image makers ‘deserve the Nietzschean name “physicians of civilisation”’ (Deleuze 1986a: 125). However, the symptomatology in Deleuze has a long history, probably beginning in *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (Deleuze 1986b), and having decisive episodes in *Masochism: Coldness and Cruelty*, the impulse-images from *The Movement-Image*, and *Essays Critical and Clinical* (Deleuze 1998). In the latter, however, symptomatology is no longer associated with the work of death, as we have seen in a very specific kind of cinema, but with literature in general and its vitalist role: ‘Moreover, the writer as such is not a patient but rather a physician, the physician of himself and of the world’ (Deleuze 1998: 3).

At one point, the great death was the groundless necessary for the production of difference, then it was denounced in the name of building a vitalist project, but it reappeared as the main element in a thought-provoking, enigmatic and potentially powerful image to understand and manage symptomatology at different times.

The symptomatology of impulse-images is a tool for the aesthetic-political analysis of contemporary cinema in so-called developing countries. Glauber Rocha’s films of the 1960s were central to Deleuze’s established thesis on the invention of the ‘missing people’ in the Third World’s political cinema. However, the politics of cinema that flourished in parallel with the advance of neoliberalism in Brazil coincided with a revival of naturalism via impulse-images.

Filmmakers such as Cláudio Assis, Toni Venturi, Roberto Moreira, Beto Brant, Heitor Dhalia, Tata Amaral, Paulo Caldas and Lírío Ferreira explored Brazil’s depths and the outskirts of the big cities, doing ‘reality studies’ in the naturalistic style.¹⁷ What we see is a collection of animalistic characters; a sequence of repetitions involving entropy condemnation; extensive scenes of violence, many of them sexually and graphically portrayed; a common strategy of causing discomfort in order to constitute a symptom in civilisation.

In the naturalistic style, we see that these filmmakers have searched for spaces devastated by the bankruptcy of the established economic model, further favouring the dwellings where these bestialised beings intersect: the small locality near the sugar mill in *Bog of Beasts*; the depleted mine’s restaurant/residence where no one else goes in *Latitude Zero*; the industrial shed now converted into a predatory storeroom led by the capitalist micro-entrepreneur in *Drained*; the tenement in *Mango Yellow*;

the house on the periphery in *Up Against Them All*; the brothel in *Bog of Beasts* and *Happy Desert*.

In these films, there is not only social misery, but the action of a tragic force¹⁸ present beneath the daily routine, what Deleuze (1986a: 124) calls the 'great death impulse', to which all other drives refer. In other words, it is the 'groundless' which acts from beyond the lived world.

Gradually, over the course of the 2000s, the naturalist filmmakers were looking for loopholes that could turn cinema away from the imperialism of the great death. It is important to note that this movement occurred primarily in two ways: through displacements, when the characters moved through different spaces and produced assemblages, breaking with the constitutive dualism of naturalism, that is, the immanence of the originary world in the derived milieu (*Árido Movie*, *Happy Desert*); and also through desire, when the characters began to produce assemblages with their bodies and stopped to live them as primitive brutalism condemnation (*Happy Desert*, *Rat Fever*).¹⁹

It is relevant to point out that this evolution of naturalism in Brazilian cinema corresponds to the politics of an era. The emergence of naturalism coincides with a period of evaluating the country's reality due to the 500-year milestone of the colonisers' arrival that established its civilisation model, as well as the advance of neoliberalism through Latin America from the 1990s onwards. On the other hand, the dispersion of naturalist impulse-images in the second half of the decade is linked to discourses of a leftist politics that ascends to institutional power promising to experiment with new forms of political organisation.

Therefore, naturalism is the sign of disbelief, the negativist view of civilisation's physicians facing a morbid state of affairs that they believed to reveal. In the second half of the 2000s and the early 2010s, this entropic perspective no longer satisfied aesthetically and politically, and impulse-images were imploded from within, in line with the rise of institutional movements that aimed to build new political and social arrangements in the country.

There is no optimistic impulse-image that believes in the invention of a people, as in modern political cinema. The impulse-images are a sign of degradation that cannot be expiated and, in them, salvation only comes in small loopholes, timidly devised by the filmmakers. When belief in the invention of a new world prevails, then we are beyond the impulse-image and the paradigm of the dominant death, and we should talk, with Deleuze, in terms of desire and assemblage.

Acknowledgements

This work results from the research project ‘When the Image Makes a Symptom: Impulse-Image and Neo-Naturalism in the 2000s Brazilian Cinema’, developed by the author in the Faculty of Library Sciences and Communication of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul/Brazil, with a doctoral internship in the Institute for Research on Cinema and Audio-Visual Media (IRCAV) in the New Sorbonne University–Paris 3/France. It was funded by the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education Personnel–Capes, Brazil.

Notes

1. The term ‘drive’ translates Freud’s *Trieb*. The terms ‘death instinct’ and ‘impulse’ translate Deleuze’s *Instinct de mort* and *Pulsion*, following their official translations into English.
2. See also: ‘But it is also the set which unites everything, not in an organisation, but making all the parts converge in an immense rubbish-dump or swamp, and all the impulses in a great death-impulse’ (Deleuze 1986a: 124).
3. In the original: ‘No estoy obligado a ser naturalista. ... Esta no es mi idea, se siente inmediatamente que es un mundo muy oscuro’ (Deleuze 2011: 218).
4. ‘It is precisely this “mix” to make the impulse-image on the one hand an important conceptual operator to read films, but on the other resulted into its “marginalization” within the important impact of Deleuze’s classification of images’ (De Gaetano 2015: 6–7).
5. ‘Naturalism, in this way, is but the initial inspiration of the impulse-image, an image which will be the foundation of fantasy and horror, even surrealism’ (Deamer 2016: 87). ‘Yet there is another aspect here, where the impulse-images remains but leaves behind the dogmas of the naturalism upon which it was founded. The impulse-image can extend into fantasy and horror ...’ (Deamer 2016: 91).
6. ‘This is naturalism. It is not opposed to realism, but on the contrary accentuates its features by extending them in an idiosyncratic surrealism’ (Deleuze 1986a: 124).
7. ‘If I had the opportunity of realizing my dream of studying literature, I would return to Zola because I really like it. It is evident that he also worked with an extraordinary internal violence, and I mean a really strong violence.’ In the original: ‘Si tuviera la ocasión de cumplir alguna vez mi sueño de trabajar sobre la literatura, retomarí a Zola porque me gusta mucho. Es evidente que él también trabajó con una violencia estática extraordinaria, muy, muy fuerte’ (Deleuze 2011: 229).
8. As Aumont and Marie state (2003 [2001]: 210–11), there was no movement in cinema claiming to be naturalist. Naturalism is usually associated with the aesthetics of transparency. Xavier (2005: 41) associates naturalism with classic Hollywood cinema that emerged from 1914 onwards, disassociating this cinema from the ‘dated’ naturalism of Émile Zola. Robert Stam (2000: 15–16) considers that the antecedents of cinematic realism must be sought in the profound and democratising realism of nineteenth-century realist literature of authors like Balzac, Stendhal and Flaubert, not in the ‘reductionist’ and ‘shallow naturalism’

coming from Zola. Bazin (2004 [1955]) defines neo-realism as opposed to naturalism and verismo, which, in his words, are characterised mainly by the choice of themes.

9. In the original: 'I cling to this scheme because I thought too much about it. It was undoubtedly hard. Now I am completely satisfied, so I do not have to do it over again' (Deleuze 2011: 215).
10. 'Oddly enough, it wasn't me who rescued Félix from psychoanalysis; he rescued me. In my study on Masoch, and then in *The Logic of Sense*, I thought I'd discovered things about the specious unity of sadism and masochism, or about events, that contradicted psychoanalysis but could be reconciled with it' (Deleuze 1995b:144).
11. The edition in English read for translating this article omits a relevant articulation that can be seen in the French original. It is important to notice that translations into Portuguese (Deleuze 2009: 113–14) and Spanish (Deleuze 2001: 118–19) maintain the passage. Below I quote paragraphs from the versions in French and in English. The sentences underlined in the French original were omitted in the American edition:

Ni Éros ni Thanatos ne peuvent être donnés ou vécus. Seules sont données dans l'expérience des combinaisons des deux—le rôle d'Éros étant de lier l'énergie de Thanatos et de soumettre ces combinaisons au principe de plaisir dans le Ça. C'est pourquoi, bien qu'Éros ne soit pas plus donné que Thanatos, du moins se fait-il entendre et agit-il. Mais Thanatos, le sans-fond porté par Éros, ramené à la surface, est essentiellement silencieux: d'autant plus terrible. Aussi nous a-t-il semblé qu'il fallait en français garder le mot "instinct", instinct de mort, pour désigner cette instance transcendante et silencieuse. Quant aux pulsions, pulsions érotiques et destructrices, elles doivent seulement désigner les composantes des combinaisons données, c'est-à-dire les représentants dans le donné d'Éros et de Thanatos, les représentants directs d'Éros et les représentants indirects de Thanatos, toujours mélangés dans le Ça. Thanatos est; il n'y a pourtant pas de "non" dans l'inconscient, parce que la destruction y est toujours donnée comme l'envers d'une construction, dans l'état d'une pulsion qui se combine nécessairement avec celle d'Éros. (Deleuze 2014: location 1511–23)

Neither Eros nor Thanatos can be given in experience; all that is given are combinations of both—the role of Eros being to bind the energy of Thanatos and to subject these combinations to the pleasure principle in the id. This is why Eros, although it is no more given in experience than Thanatos, at least makes its presence felt; it is an active force. Whereas Thanatos, the ground-less, supported and brought to the surface by Eros, remains essentially silent and all the more terrible. Thanatos is; it is an absolute. And yet the "no" does not exist in the unconscious because destruction is always presented as the other side of a construction, as an instinctual drive which is necessarily combined with Eros. (Deleuze 1991: 115–16)

12. For a study of the BwO in Artaud, see David-Ménard (2005: 67–72).
13. According to Orlandi, the transition of Deleuze's two-phased work implies an exit from the Kantian sphere of influence towards a new phase inspired by the immanence based on Spinoza (Orlandi 1995: 157, 191).
14. In the original: 'Spinoza il affirme à la fois, l'extériorité radicale de la mort, toute mort est extérieure, toute mort vient du dehors, il n'y a jamais eu de mort qui vienne du dedans. Spinoza fait partie de ceux pour qui l'idée même d'une pulsion de mort, c'est un concept grotesque, absolument grotesque' (Deleuze 1981).
15. 'The strange death cult in psychoanalysis: the pseudo-instinct' is the summary of the thought included in chapter IV of *Anti-Oedipus* (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: X, 331–8).

16. In the original: 'Mas, se você parte, ao contrário, de funtores heterogêneos, de um construtivismo permanente da pulsão, a partir daí você tem um problema de responsabilidade ética, você se engaja na construção de um mundo em vez de um outro mundo, você considera, por exemplo, dimensões contextuais, dimensões sociais, dimensões econômicas, dimensões de *mass-media*, em vez de se ater a uma categorização de universais psicológicos, tais como o complexo de castração, a triangulização edípica etc.'
17. This is mainly about the movies *Latitude Zero* (dir. Toni Venturi, 2000), *Through the Window* (dir. Tata Amaral, 2000), *The Trespasser* (dir. Beto Brant, 2001), *Mango Yellow* (dir. Cláudio Assis, 2003), *Up Against Them All* (dir. Roberto Moreira, 2004), *Árido Movie* (dir. Lírio Ferreira, 2005), *Drained* (dir. Heitor Dhalia, 2006), *Bog of Beasts* (dir. Cláudio Assis, 2006) and *Happy Desert* (dir. Paulo Caldas, 2007), several of them awarded in national and international festivals.
18. Ives Chevreil (1993) has shown that naturalism is an aesthetic that brings together the tragic under daily life. David Baguley (1990) corroborates Chevreil, defining naturalism as an entropic vision. It is not difficult to recognise the relation of such analyses to that of Deleuze in the impulse-images.
19. *Rat Fever* (dir. Cláudio Assis, 2011) is the third feature-length film by Cláudio Assis, the director who had strongly explored naturalism and impulse-image in *Mango Yellow* and *Bog of Beasts*. It is also worth mentioning the case of *Madame Satã* (dir. Karim Ainouz, 2002). This is an award-winning movie from the early 2000s in which it is already possible to see the conception of a body based on desire, not impulse. Therefore, it differs from naturalistic films of the same period, such as *Latitude Zero*, *Mango Yellow* and *Up Against Them All*. In this sense, although *Madame Satã* also shows interest in the context of the peripheral tenements, it is far from the naturalism.

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- Mango Yellow*, film, directed by Cláudio Assis, Brazil: Parabólica Brasil, Olhos de Cão Produções Cinematográficas, 2003.
- The Human Centipede (First Sequence)*, film, directed by Tom Six, Netherlands: Six Entertainment, 2009.
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