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ACADEMICS AND POLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: FROM THE "GOLDEN AGE" TO THE "GREAT GAP"

Porto Alegre

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Tese apresentada ao Programa de Pós-Graduação em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais da Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas da UFRGS, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Doutor em Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. André Luiz Reis da Silva

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From force to matter and back to force,
From form to content and back to form,
From norm to crazy and back to norm,
From bound to free and back to bound,
From sound to sense and back to sound
So back and forth. It almost scares
A man the way things come in pairs.

ROBERT FROST –

To a Thinker

RESUMO

Um dos mais recentes debates internos no campo das Relações Internacionais tem sido o debate sobre o "gap", sobre a relação entre acadêmicos de RI e formuladores de políticas. Vários autores argumentam que o conhecimento produzido no campo se tornou cada vez mais irrelevante para a política e que os acadêmicos recuaram para a "torre de marfim", ignorando as necessidades do "mundo real". Essa visão pressupõe que as RI costumava ser uma disciplina orientada para a formulação de política externa, mas que veio se distanciando cada vez mais dos formuladores de políticas. A maioria dos autores envolvidos no debate, no entanto, não analisa essa suposição subjacente que orienta suas análises. Esta dissertação visa preencher esta lacuna, respondendo à questão "os acadêmicos de Relações Internacionais nos Estados Unidos mudaram seu envolvimento com relação à esfera da política?". Para fazer isso, dois tipos ideais de engajamento acadêmico foram desenvolvidos, e então usados para analisar dois períodos distintos: o imediato pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial (1945-1960) e o período atual (2000-2016). Esses tipos ideais são uma combinação dos fundamentos ideológicos do engajamento acadêmico (isto é, a auto percepção do papel social dos acadêmicos) com as restrições práticas impostas pela profissão. Os dois tipos ideais resultantes são os do "clérigo" (termo tomado emprestado do autor Julien Benda) e o intelectual engajado. Seguindo os autores do debate do "gap" esperava-se que os acadêmicos de RI tivessem transitado do tipo ideal "engajado" no primeiro período para o "clérigo", no segundo. Isto foi apenas parcialmente confirmado.

Palavras-chave: Relações Internacionais. Política Externa. Estados Unidos. Academia. Intelectuais.

ABSTRACT

One of the latest internal debates in the field of International Relations has been the "gap debate", regarding the relation between academics of IR and policymakers. Several authors argue that the knowledge produced in the field has become increasingly irrelevant for policy and that academics have retreated into the "Ivory tower", ignoring the needs of the "real world". This view assumes that IR used to be a policy-oriented discipline, but has grown ever more distant from policymakers. Most of the authors involved in the debate, however, do not analyze this underlying assumption that guides their analyses. This dissertation aims to fill this gap by addressing the question "have International Relations academics in the United States changed their engagement with the policy world?". To do this, two ideal-types of academic engagement were developed, and then used to analyze two distinct periods: the immediate post-world War II (1945-1960) and the current period (2000-2016). These ideal-types are a combination of the ideological underpinnings of academic engagement (that is, the self-perception of the social role of academics) with the practical constraints of the profession. The two resulting ideal-types are those of the clerk (borrowing Julien Benda's term) and the engaged intellectual. Following the authors of the "gap debate" it was expected that IR academics had transitioned from the "engaged" ideal-type in the first period to the "clerk", in the second. This was only partially confirmed.

Keywords: International Relations. Foreign Policy. United States. Academia. Intellectuals.

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SUMMARY

1 INTRODUCTION

The debate regarding the influence of academics and academic work on policymaking is neither new nor exclusive to the disciplines of International Relations and Political Science[1]. It is almost impossible, when taking part in it, to avoid hearing Keyne's (1936) – an economist – famous quote: "practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back." It is true, however, that the preoccupation with relevance seems to be more acute in International Relations and Political Science. The reason for this is perhaps as obvious as it appears: how could disciplines whose object of study is politics itself be completely unconcerned with the knowledge that is the base for political decisions? At the heart of this debate, after all, regardless of the field in which it takes place, is the notion that academic knowledge can "make a difference" (STEIN, 2009, p. 120) – how so and to what extent, then, are the matters of contention.

In International Relations (IR), particularly, this debate takes place against the backdrop of the disciplinary self-image as having been founded on a grandiose objective – a *political* objective. Anyone who has studied the history of the discipline, however superficially, has surely come across its foundational myth[2]: IR came to be in the context of the destruction caused by the First World War. Its goal was, through the study of the phenomenon of war, to maintain the peace – if not completely at least to avoid another conflict of such scale between the European powers. The creation of the first Department of International Politics in Aberystwyth in 1919 was the practical result of this spirit. The inaugural holder of the aptly named Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics was Alfred Zimmern (ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY, online). Professor Zimmern and his colleague Sydney Herbert, the only members of the new Department, were later berated,

[1] Somewhat differently from Brazil, International Relations in the United States has grown largely attached to Political Science, despite efforts to the contrary in the 1940s and 1950s (GUILHOT, 2008). International Relations Programs are often housed at Political Science Departments and Political Science Journals, like the American Political Science Review, are considered some of the most relevant in the field. (MALINIAK; PETERSON; TIERNEY, 2012)

[2] Bell (2006, p. 5) defines disciplinary myths as: "Myths, on this anthropological reading, are highly simplified narratives ascribing fixed and coherent meanings to selected events, people and places. They are easily intelligible and transmissible, and help to constitute or bolster particular visions of self, society and world".

along with all those "idealists" who believed in a "prescriptive" study of International Relations, for believing this could be done (PORTER, 2000, p. 39).

This did not imply, however, a wish to distance the discipline from politics. Rather, self-labeled realists, such as E.H. Carr, argued that policymakers would be unable to make wise decisions based on a utopic view of international reality, and therefore needed a theory that presented what is rather than what should be (CARR, 1981). Classical Realism has even been described as "a set of maxims about statecraft" (LEPGOLD, 1998, p.45) and Carr himself advocated "the interdependence between academic study and the actual practice" (HAUKALLA, 2011, p. 21).

The current debate regarding the utility for policymakers of academic output in the field of International Relations - which appears to have been jump-started by Alexander George's 1993 *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy* - incorporates this view of IR. It sees it as a discipline that has been marked, from the beginning, by a close relationship with politics, and by an "in-and-out" of academics that got involved in politics and politicians who have joined the academic debate, especially in the United States (NYE, 2008). When authors speak of a "gap" between scholars and policymakers they often speak of a *growing* gap, of the growing irrelevance of a field that was once much closer to policymakers and much more invested in influencing their decisions.

There is not, however, a consensus regarding the growth of the infamous gap. Table 1 (below) presents a summary of the main points presented in 34 journal and newspaper articles dedicated to the "gap debate"[3]. As can be seen, the vast majority of authors (76%) believes there is a gap, but when it comes to the question of whether it has grown, a smaller majority answers in the affirmative (56% of those that approach the subject), while 44% believe it has *not* increased. The lack of preciseness, however, in establishing *since when* the gap has begun growing, makes it difficult to compare these answers.

[3] These articles have been published in a variety of journals (including Security Studies, Perspectives on Politics, International Studies Quarterly, International Studies Perspectives, among others) and newspapers (The Washington Post, The New York Times). Their dates range from 1997 to 2016. Most of them are from American authors (29), the remaining are European. While these articles do not encompass all of the debate, I believe they present a good sample of it. In any case the purpose of Table 1 is not to make any causal claims based on statistical relevance, but rather to introduce the main points being discussed by those who have approached the subject.

Table 1 - The Gap Debate: a summary

	YES	NO	NA
Answer to the question: "Is there an academia-policy gap?"	26	7	1
Answer to the question: "Has the gap increased?"	9	7	18
Answer to the question: "Should the gap be smaller?"	22	10	1
Places Burden Gap on Academia	15	17	2
Presents Ways to Decrease Gap	22	12	x

Source: author's own elaboration based on 34 journal/newspaper articles[4].
Note: NA means "Not Addressed", meaning the author did not approach this particular question.

Even among those who believe the gap has increased there is some fuzziness when it comes to establishing more precisely when this distance began to grow. There is a sense of a past when engagement was the norm, but it is seldom clearly defined. While the 2012 TRIP Survey asked academics whether they thought the gap has grown in the past 20 or 30 years[5] (MALINIAK; PETERSON; TIERNEY, 2011, p. 67), some authors who see a growing gap point to a more distant past. Hiski Haukalla (2011, p. 21), for instance, refers to the "golden age" of academic influence over policymaking as the late 1950's and early 1960's "when figures such as Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn and Henry Kissinger and the RAND Corporation in particular held sway in Washington D.C.". Michael Desch (2015) points to the early 1960s as the turning point of relevance, since that is when policy prescription started to vanish from the leading Political Science and International Relations journals. Jentleson (2002, p. 181) argues that "thirty or forty years ago academics were the main if not sole cohort of experts on international affairs outside of government and international institutions", while today they must compete with a much more saturated "marketplace of ideas". Finally, Walt (2005, p.39) cites the "founders of modern political science in the United States" as

[4] ANDERSON ([2011]), BAILES (2011), BYMAN; KROENIG (2016), DEL ROSSO (2015), DESCH (2015), DINESEN (2011), FAZAL (2016), FEARON (2014), GALLUCCI (2012), GEORGE (1997), GOLDMAN (2006), HAUKALLA (2011), JENTLESON (2002), JENTLESON; RATNER (2011), JERVIS (2008), JONES (2009), KEOHANE (2009), KRASNER (2009), KRISTOF (2014), LEPGOLD (1998), LIEBERTHAL (2006), LYNCH (2016), MALIN; LATHAM (2001), NAU (2008), NYE (2008a, 2009), OREN (2015), PARKS; STERN (2015), SJOBERG (2015), SPIEGELLERI; JONNIEMI (2011), STEIN (2000), VOGEL (2006), WALLANDER (2006) and WALT (2005).

[5] The question posed by the survey was "What statement comes closest to representing your views on the relationship between the kind of research IR scholars produce and the kind of research that the policy community finds most useful?". The options presented were "The gap is growing" (chosen by 37% of respondents), "The gap, whatever its size, is about as wide as it was 20-30 years ago." (chosen by 39% of respondents "The gap between IR scholars and policy practitioners is shrinking" (chosen by 23% of respondents) and "There is no gap" (chosen by 2% of respondents).

scholars who "consciously sought to use their knowledge to improve the world", naming Woodrow Wilson, Quincy Wright and Hans Morgenthau as examples.

Part of the problem in finding accuracy might be due to the fact that the majority of this literature does not seek to find corroborating evidence to support their views – be it that the gap has grown or that it has not. And while the number of articles and books on the subject has grown "there appears in general, to be little systematic information about the more recent trends. There exists a small(ish) – mostly anecdotal – literature on the matter, which tends to be much heavier on pathos and prescription than on data" (SPIEGELEIRI; JOENNIEMI, 2011, p. 8)[6].

Prescription - recommendations on how to "bridge the gap" (NYE, 2008a) - indeed, is present in two-thirds of the pieces analyzed, not surprisingly the same number that believe the gap between academics and policymakers should be smaller. Oddly enough, there is not much commentary on *why* academics should strive to bridge the gap on the part of those who argue they should. That appears to be mainly because the notion that academic work can help make better policy decisions seems rather obvious to most authors. Stephen Walt (2005, p. 23-24) opens his article is the following manner: "If the scholarly study of international relations—and especially work on IR theory—were of great value to policy makers, then those charged with the conduct of foreign policy would be in a better position today than ever before". He then continues: "The need for powerful theories that could help policy makers design effective solutions would seem to be apparent as well" due to the emergence of new phenomena like globalization and multipolarity, since "These phenomena—and many others—have all been objects of sustained scholarly inquiry, and one might expect policy makers to consume the results with eagerness and appreciation.".

Some authors who do not argue that the gap should be smaller do so because they conclude there is already a close and fruitful relationship between the two spheres. Bailes (2011), writing from the point of view of a policy practitioner, claims that there is a significant interdependence between academia and policymakers, Lynch (2016) and Stein (2000) believe scholars are in fact closer to policymakers than they have ever been, and Parks

[6] Some noteworthy exceptions to this are Fazal's (2016) analysis of the hypothesis that quantitative methods make academic work less policy relevant; Fearon's (2014) look into the presence of Political Science experts interviewed by New York Times; Jackson and Kauffman's (2007) analysis of the attempt by scholars to influence the decision to invade Iraq, and Long et al (2015) comparison of public and scholar's opinions on the Iraq War; Parks and Stern's (2013) study of the influence of direct engagement with policymaking on academic's tendency to publish on policy-oriented publications.

and Stern (2013) conclude that "crossover attempts" between academia and policy may be more common than it is generally assumed.

Other authors, however, debate whether the gap should be bridged at all. Stephen Krasner (2009, p.116), having made the attempt himself concluded that "My three-plus years in Washington […] only reinforced my conviction that the 'gap' between academia and the policy world is unbridgeable", a similar conclusion to that of Robert Keohane (2009). Some, like Jones (2009) and Sjoberg (2015) question whether trying to engage policymakers is indeed the best way to make academia relevant to society as whole. Jones argues that rather than looking for a narrow relevance that comes from being useful to the government and to the private sector academics should "be trying to communicate our work to our students, trade unions, citizens' groups, non-governmental [organizations], and citizens who are simply curious about the world", while Sjoberg (2015, p. 396) claims that "attention from the Beltway is at best orthogonal to and quite possibly negatively correlated with the sort of relevance I find important, intellectually and normatively."

It is hardly surprising that positions like those of Jones and Sjoberg are in the minority in the "gap debate", since academics who engage the subject are often motivated to enter the debate in the first place by the perception that academic work is losing its relevance. Most of these authors are focused on why the gap is as wide as it is, and what can be done to revert this situation. The arguments presented tend to be similar: the topics addressed by academics are not relevant to policymakers, the methods used are not accessible, research is published in obscure academic journals rather than vehicles that are read by policymakers, there are no incentives in the profession to engage with the policy world, there are wide differences between the cultures of academia and policy.

In terms of the topics addressed, many authors see a growing "Cult of the Irrelevant", which Michael Desch (2015, p. 378) describes as

> the tendency among many American social scientists to frame and orient their work around internal, disciplinary criteria and agendas, and to ignore the relevance of their scholarship for addressing broader societal concerns, government policy needs, or the concerns of people in the "real world" more generally.

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2013) forwarded a similar argument in a widely quoted article, titled "Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for International Relations". Although the authors' focus is on how this has adversely affected the evolution of International Relations Theory and the advancement of the discipline as a whole,

their argument is similar to that presented by Desch (2015). The authors posit that professional incentives within the discipline have increased the amount of research that is devoted to "simplistic hypothesis testing", that is, to finding a correlation between two variables using quantitative methods. They claim the danger is that this type of work is often not concerned with explaining *why* the correlation occurs and, furthermore, that the hypothesis to be tested are often chosen not for their relevance, interest or possibility of advancing a theory, but rather by their amenability to statistical treatment.

Quantitative methods are often cited as one of the reasons policymakers find academic work in the field of International Relations increasingly useless. It is undeniable that quantitative methodologies are present in a growing share of articles published in journals with the highest impact, especially in the United States. The TRIP project has shown that in 2014, around 66% of articles published in the 12 top journals used either quantitative methods or formal modeling; this number was 33% in 1980[7]. And policymakers do seem to prefer qualitative methodologies. On a survey conducted by Avey and Desch (2011, p. 20), policymakers found "Area Studies" and "Contemporary Case Studies" to be the most useful, and "Formal Models" and "Theoretical Analysis", the least. It is worth noting, however, that 71% of respondents found "Quantitative Analysis" to be either "very useful" or "somewhat useful".

Along with methodologies that make them unattractive to policymakers (or to 'laymen' in general), academic articles are also criticized for using jargon-filled and needlessly complicated language. Nicholas Kristof (2014, online) made such an argument in a hotly debated op-ed in the New York Times: "A basic challenge is that Ph.D. programs have fostered a culture that glorifies arcane unintelligibility while disdaining impact and audience. This culture of exclusivity is then transmitted to the next generation through the publish-or-perish tenure process." Nye (2008a, p. 599), makes a similar argument, criticizing the "use of academic jargon and the lack of interest in communicating in plain language to a policy public". In addition to this, the "publish-or-perish" model, which puts the highest premium on popular (and peer-reviewed) academic journals (see footnote 7 on the previous page), gives little or no credit for publishing in policy-oriented publications like Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs.

[7] The journals are: American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, British Journal of Political Science, European Journal of International Relations, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, Journal of Politics, Security Studies, and World Politics.

The probability of policymakers reading "lengthy" academic journals is very slight given time constraints that are inherent to their activity. Policy culture puts a premium on time, while academic culture is more concerned with refining arguments than with getting them out quickly – it may take years between submitting an article to an academic journal and seeing it published. Haukalla (2011, p.21) argues that "academics reside in their ivory towers at universities far removed from the centers of political power" while policy makers "are living in the never-ending present moment madly rushing after the latest Macmillanian 'event'". Drawing from his personal experience, Nye (2008a, p. 398) makes a similar argument: "As an academic going into a policy position at the State Department three decades ago, I was struck by the fact that bureaucracy is a huge machine for turning out reams of paper, but the top policy world is really an oral culture."

These trends, according to Jentleson and Ratner (2011, p.7), have resulted in a void of policy-oriented research that has been increasingly filled by think-thanks, which have been growing in "scope, number and prominence". The major difference between academic institutions and think-thanks is that the later are not primarily focused on understanding phenomena, but on influencing the policy debate, be it via policymakers or public opinion. That does not mean they are necessarily partisan, although some of them clearly are. Unlike most academic work, think-thanks focus on short releases of two or three pages that are written with the specific purpose of reaching a wide audience (SVARTMANN, 2015). While the main concern within this debate is that academia might be undermining its own relevance – and therefore its importance in the eyes of society – there are also fears that the absence of the more objective view of academia may contribute to the polarization of the debate, especially with the growing number of "advocacy think-thanks" (WALT, 2005, p. 41).

As can be seen, most reasons presented by authors involved in the "gap debate" to explain the gap place the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of scholars. While many authors also list reasons connected to the policy world, these reasons tend to be either a response to changes in academic output (that have made it less appealing) or a natural consequence of the demands placed on policymakers. Byman and Kroenig (2016, p.302), for instance, argue (in a footnote) that policy side is "also at fault" since policymakers "lack adequate methodological training, are too busy to delve into academic studies, and rely on other sources of information, such as intelligence analysis". Yet no author suggests policymakers seek more knowledge of quantitative methods or find time to read more.

Of course, this is not surprising, since these pieces are being written by academics and for academics. So instead, virtually all prescription on bridging the gap is aimed at scholars. The goal of academics here should be dual: firstly, to make research relevant. This means tackling issues that are of interest to policymakers. Byman and Kroenig (2016) suggest more focus on middle-range theory – rather than grand and abstract paradigms – and on dependent variables, that is, what policymakers actually can control, the "tools at their disposal" (BYMAN;KROENIG, 2016, p. 305). As Haukalla (2011) had already argued, timing is also of the essence: ideas are more likely to have influence if they are presented before decisions have been made, or if they are dealing with an unexpected occurrence (for example: terrorism prior to 2001). Qualitative methods are preferred, and authors should strive for readability, no "jargon-filled argot, often embellished with mathematical formulae, aimed primarily at fellow cognoscenti" (DEL ROSSO, 2015, p. 3). Tackling issues in a policy-friendly manner often requires crossing disciplinary lines, and this should be encouraged (GEORGE, 1997).

These changes would require a renegotiation of the system of incentives in the academic profession. Several authors claim that trying to engage with policy - be it by working directly for the government or by writing policy-oriented articles and op-eds – can actually be detrimental to professional advancement in academia. They suggest that "real-world relevance" of research (WALT, 2005, p. 42) should also be a criterion for hiring and promotion. Reaching and audience beyond other scholars should also be valued, which means publishing in commercial houses and writing for policy-oriented vehicles. Finally, professors on the tenure-track should not be penalized for taking time off to serve in government.

*

The "gap debate" seems to tell a straightforward story: International Relations and Political Science used to be disciplines strongly connected to the "real world" of policymakers, its most renown scholars used to be concerned with creating knowledge that was useful in advancing policy objectives. However, due to changes in the internal dynamics of academia – the growing specialization of disciplines, the turn towards quantitative methodologies, the search for more abstract and elegant theories – the two spheres grew more and more apart and the research conducted inside universities is seen as increasingly useless by policymakers. There are, however, some gaps in the gap debate. Most facts presented are taken as givens, rather than corroborated, especially the idea that IR used to be a more policy-

engaged discipline. *When* this golden age of policy engagement took place is rarely clearly presented and often to be guessed.

This dissertation aims to make a small contribution to this on-going debate by addressing some of the points that have been ignored thus far. The first question that guided my efforts in this research was *has the gap increased?*, a question for which, it seemed to me, diverging answers were presented without much in the way of justification. It soon became apparent, however, that it was impossible to answer this question without first establishing more precisely what *is* the gap. And here lies the problem: the gap itself is either the distance between academics and policymakers or the influence of academic work on policymaking, and these definitions are both a) extremely hard to assess and b) not what most authors refer to when writing about the gap. Both of these concepts would have to involve a look into both spheres (academia and policymaking) and, at least in the case of the second definition, a look into policy outcomes and their inputs[8]. However, what is presented in the literature cited above as an increase in the gap is not that, but *changes is academic work,* which are driven by an *unwillingness in the part of academics to engage* with policymakers. Even when arguments concerning policymakers are made, they do not imply any changes there and therefore could not explain any changes in the gap.

I decided then[9], to focus on the following question: has academic engagement with politics and policymaking changed? More precisely, have International Relations academics in the United States changed their engagement with the policy world? I use academics here in the sense that it is commonly used in the gap literature: to mean university professors. It is a somewhat restrictive choice that I explore in further detail in chapter 3. I chose to focus on the United States for two main reasons: first, because the vast majority of the literature is dedicated to the American case. Second, because there is a more significant tradition of "political appointments that is amenable to "in and out" circulation between government and academia" (NYE, 2008, p. 594) in the United States than most countries – particularly Brazil, which might have been a natural choice otherwise. The change aspect also implies the delimitation of a time period to be analyzed. As I mentioned before, there isn't much specificity regarding this, so I decided to focus on the two time periods that were mentioned:

[8] For a study of the influence of ideas on Foreign Policy see the book organized by Goldstein and Keohane (1992), *Ideas and Foreign Policy*.

[9] As will become apparent, I have decided to use the first-person singular throughout this dissertation. I have two main reasons for this choice: the first is that I feel uncomfortable using the plural "we" and the second is that English is simply not as amenable to the passive voice as Portuguese.

the "golden age" of policy engagement (the post- World War II until 1960) and the current period, which I have restricted to the Bush and Obama administrations.

The chosen methodology to attempt to answer the proposed question is analyticism. Patrick Jackson (2011, p. 142) describes it as "a strategy involving the instrumental oversimplification of complex, actual situations; these deliberate oversimplifications, or ideal types are then utilized to form case-specific 'analytical narratives' that explain particular outcomes". These ideal-types are formalized and idealized by blending a "value-laden ethical stand", that is, the acknowledgement of the social context, with empirical observations (JACKSON, 2011, p. 145). In the final step of ideal-typification, the analytics is "consistently applied to specific empirical cases in order to produce […] facts" (JACKSON, 2011: 145). The objective of the case study is, then, not to falsify the analytical framework, but to reveal "intriguing and useful things about the objects to which it is applied". The difference between the ideal-types and the case can, therefore, actually be an interesting/useful fact. This methodology seemed particularly apt for my chosen topic, since I am, in fact, emphasizing a particular aspect – academic engagement – of a much broader subject.

One of the gaps in the literature so far has been a lack of engagement with relevant sociological thought on the subject (OREN, 2015), so I start with an exposition of the main authors (Julien Benda, Antonio Gramsci, Norberto Bobbio, Jean-Paul Sartre, Karl Mannheim, Max Weber) who have debated the role of intellectuals and their relationship with politics on chapter 2. This will provide the substructure for my ideal-types of academic engagement, which I present on chapter 3. Before that, however, I explore the development of the modern academic *profession, using* primarily Andrew Abbott's (1988) model. My ideal-types, then, are a combination of the ideological underpinnings of academic engagement (that is, the self-perception of the social role of academics) with the practical constraints of the profession. The two resulting ideal-types are those of the clerk (borrowing Julien Benda's term) and the engaged intellectual.

The last two chapters, 4 and 5, are the application of the ideal-types to empirical cases, the two time periods mentioned before. My working hypothesis (derived from the 'gap debate' literature) is that we have a preponderance of "engaged intellectuals" in the first period and of "clerks", in the second. These two chapters have the same structure: I start with a brief account of the discipline of International Relations in the period in question, followed by an analysis of the self-perception of academic role, academic publications and of direct

engagement with policymaking. The analysis of self-perception is done by the study of writings by prominent academics on this topic (this choice is further explained in chapter 4). The analysis of publications focuses on three aspects: the readability of academic writing, the presence of policy recommendations and publication in policy-oriented vehicles. Engagement with the policy world focuses primarily on the Policy Planning Staff – the State Department's in-house think-thank – and its composition.

The choice of one avenue of research necessarily means the abandonment of others, and this dissertation is no exception. It makes, as can be seen, a limited contribution to what is a very broad subject, which implied a considerable number of roads-not-taken. Most obvious among those is the policy side of the equation, more specifically what policymakers want from academics and whether their getting it. It is worth mentioning here that this subject has been largely addressed by a survey with policymakers conducted by Avey and Desch (2013). The authors show that their opinions are what academics had come to expect in some areas (for example, policymakers do prefer qualitative approaches), but perhaps not what we would have thought in others (96% of respondents think International Affairs research is either very useful or somewhat useful). On the topic of the policy side, I also feel compelled to mention that my focus has remained on the Department of State rather than on the Department of Defense.

The focus on professors also meant ignoring a large part of what is a much broader marketplace of ideas, that includes, among others, think-tanks and public intellectuals. Think-tanks are featured in this dissertation, not as an object of study, but as competitors for jurisdiction over the task of producing research in the field of international relations and possibly influencing American foreign policy. As for public intellectuals, they are one of the branches of engaged intellectuals, and some academics may indeed be public intellectuals, the caveat here being that those intellectuals do not necessarily have to be academics as well. They also have a broader definition of what academic engagement means, and tend to navigate towards engaging public opinion rather than policymakers. This focus on policymaking is an additional limitation. A desire, on the part of intellectuals, to have influence over the 'real world', does not necessarily implies the policymaking world. However, following the gap literature, I decided to concentrate on the relationship between academics and policymakers.

Finally, I would like to add that although it may not appear explicitly on the research design, one final objective of this research is to help Brazilian academia evaluate its own relation with public policy. This will not be done by a case comparison (especially since the time and resources of this researcher would not allow it) but it can be used as a basis for reflection and as a starting point for future research. In this sense, there will be a commitment to analyze the American case taking into account its historical and institutional particularities and making them explicit.

2 INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS: FROM 'CLERGY' TO ENGAGEMENT

Even though men with “intellectual dispositions” have existed in all societies – even in the illiterate ones –, it is only in the modern era that intellectuals arise as a group who is conscious of its role (COSER, 1968, p. 13). The intellectual is, one could argue, a direct heir of the ancient world philosopher, although there are important differences between them. The modern intellectual is a product of Illuminism, arising with modern history. Melzer (2003, p. 7) states that the main difference between the pre-Illuminism philosopher and the intellectual is the modern notion of progress; in other words, the belief that the evolution of theoretical knowledge is capable of engendering material progress. Therefore, it implies an idea of knowledge's utility that goes beyond 'knowledge for its own sake', that believes the dissemination of science and philosophy can contribute to society's progress. *How* this contribution should and does happen, however, remains an open matter.

Coser (1968, p.14) suggests that the intellectual has arisen in the 17th century, when, with the Reformation and Renaissance, the “literate men” were no longer “forced to expose the only true doctrine or perish as heretics” anymore. Sartre, however, points out the 18th century as the outbreak of conditions for the intellectuals’ existence as a *distinct* group. Up until then, 'writers'[10] were basically coalesced with their audience. For that matter, there wasn't a specific audience. It only appears with the appearance of the bourgeoisie, and the audience expansion which it brings, that allows intellectuals, or writers, to see themselves as “carriers of a universal message.”(JACOBELIS, 2011, p. 20). Bauman (1992, p. 82), for his turn, argues that intellectuals as a group came to be when they, themselves, adopted this denomination, consciously standing apart from and being something more than “just journalists, novelists, poets, artists, or university professors”.

The term intellectual starts to be diffused mainly from the Dreyfus's affair (1894). This well-known case refers to the condemnation of Alfred Dreyfus, a Jew officer of the French army, for treason. It was handled with secrecy and based on false allegations,

[10] Sartre constantly uses the word 'writer' to designate something that we normally understand as 'intellectual'. In *What is Literature?* (2004, p. 9), Sartre makes the distinction between writers, intellectuals, and artists, explaining (to his critics, in first stance) that 'no, we do not want to also engage the painting, the sculpture, and the music'. The difference between the first two terms, however, only appears years later in *In Defense of Intellectuals*, in which Sartre states that writers can, yes, be considered intellectuals and that they frequently 'engage alongside each other or in their ranks', but emphasizes that these writers he mentions belong to a specific moment and place (the France of his time) (JACOBELIS, 2011). Given that this is the writer Sartre refers to when utilizing the term, it is possible to understand 'writer' as a synonym for 'intellectual'.

which generated an uprising in some circles of French writers. Headed by Émile Zola (who wrote the famous *J'accuse* on this occasion), they organized petitions on behalf of Dreyfus's defense – becoming known as the *dreyfusards*. Most of them were collaborators on the *Revue Blanche*, such as Léon Blum and André Gide, among others. 'Intellectual' then starts to be seen as a synonym for *dreyfusard* [11](WINOCK, 2000, p. 19). This represented, according to Bauman (1992, p. 88) the birth of a "new, powerful political force", the unleashing of a well of knowledge that had been accumulating for decades, waiting for a chance to act.

The political action of intellectuals - which Bauman (1992) argues was its very *raison d'etre* - was not, however, unanimously well received. The following statement of Ferdinand Brunetière, editor of *Revue des Deux Mondes* [12], helps to understand how things were perceived at the time:

> And this petition passed by the *Intellectuals*, the fact alone that they have recently created this word, *Intellectuals*, to designate the people who live in labs and libraries, as if they were some sort of nobiliarchic caste, this fact alone denounces one of the most nonsensical evils of our time. I refer to the pomposity of elevating writers, erudites, teachers, to the position of super-men. [...] As to myself, in social order, I consider much more well-elevated the tempering of will, the strength of character, the safety of judgement, the practical experience (WINOCK, 2000, p. 32, italics from original text).

As we can see, anti-intellectualism arises alongside the intellectuals themselves[13], and paradoxically even among those who could have been considered as peers, such as Maurice Barrès, who disdained: 'All these *aristocrats of thought* insist in boasting that they do not think as the rest of the city' (BARRÈS, 1925, p. 49 apud WINOCK, 2000, p. 32, italics from original text). [14]

Brunetière's passage also illuminates one of the ever-present aspects on the debates surrounding the intellectuals: the dichotomy between intellectual activity (which Brunetière describes in the same passage as having 'relative value') and practical activity. Coser (1958, p.

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[11] Even though the most known names to have participated in the movement belonged to writers, this one basically involved all those who, at the time, were known as 'literate men': writers, journalists, lawyers, students.

[12] *Revue dês Deux Mondes* is a French magazine founded in 1829 that is still active. In the 19th century, it has published great authors such as Georges Sand and Alexandre Dumas. Under the administration of Ferdinand Brunetière, it has assumed a more of a right wing posture, defending the Catholic church. (WINOCK, 2000, website of Deux Mondes magazine http://www.revuedesdeuxmondes.fr/home/whoarewe.php#chrono).

[13] Bobbio (1997) mentions two types of anti-intellectualism: the first criticizes the *inutility* of intellectuals, believing that these do not contribute to the political conduction in a perceptible way. Normally we see them associated to the defense of practical, pragmatic, 'good sense' primacy (in the usual sense, not related to gramscianism). The second type sees intellectuals as *subversive*, as corruptive, as those who disrupt the stablished order.

[14] Barrés, as other intellectuals of the right wing, not only accepts the term, but denies that intellectuals might have any particular calling to interfere with the public debate.

10), for instance, claims that intellectuals are those who, unlike other professions that search for "concrete answers for concrete issues", feel a certain need of "going beyond the concrete and immediate task and then penetrating into a more general realm of meanings and values".

Norberto Bobbio (1997, p. 68) defines intellectuals as people who "do not make things, but ponder about things; who do not handle objects, but symbols; people whose instruments of work are not machines, but ideas" and that "do not constitute a class, not even an order, just an inorganic junction of people that acknowledge themselves by the characteristics of their own activity" (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 92).

Julien Benda (2007, chapter 3[15], italics from original text) proposes a definition of "clerk"[16], or intellectual, based on the distinction between the material and the metaphysical:

> All those whose activity essentially is *not* the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science of metaphysical speculation, in short in the possession of non-material advantages, and hence in a certain manner say: 'my kingdom is not of this world'.

Benda's definition seems to be similar to what we would define as a philosopher – in fact, the author frequently quotes Plato as one of the examples of a 'pure' intellectual. These definitions, notwithstanding, make it difficult to create a differentiation between intellectuals and 'pre-intellectual' philosophers. In this case, which would be the defining character of the intellectual? Bauman (1992, p. 81) perfectly sums up the difficulties involved in defining a concept of intellectual in the following passage:

> The question "who are the intellectuals" is notoriously difficult to answer in a way which would not invite contention. But to answer the question "who is an intellectual", in anything approaching an operationally effective form, is virtually impossible. The first question is about a role, a function, a systemic location. The second is about personal qualities that permit (or entitle) their bearer to perform such a role and to occupy such a position. The link between the first and the second has been throughout the century a matter of hot theoretical contest, and of a practice which seemed to continually explode any theoretical propositions.

For Gramsci, it would not be possible to delimit the concept through a distinction on the nature of intellectual activity. In fact, for him every man is an intellectual "unconsciously and on his own manner" (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 325) in the sense of having the ability of accomplishing the intellectual activity, that is in its core the skill of perceiving

[15] The version we used of Benda's book is electronic and does not have page numbers (since the font size can be adjusted the page numbers change depend on the configuration you use). For this reason, I opted to include the chapter on all references to this book.

[16] According to himself, Julien Benda (2007) utilizes the cleric term in the original sense, meaning a scribe, and as a synonym of 'intellectual'.

reality in an analytical manner. At the same time, according to Gramsci (2005, p. 51), in society, not every man has the *role* of an intellectual, meaning one can talk about the intellectual (as a professional category with a specific social role), but could not speak of a "non-intellectual".

Gramsci's intellectual is, in short, the one who has overcome the "good sense" in order to reach philosophy, which represents an "analytical and coherent conception of the world" and the "consciousness of his historicity" (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 325-327).[17] Their role would be to disseminate this knowledge and, eventually, to awaken the same consciousness in others.

Intellectuals are, then, some kind of intermediary between "great thinkers" and the rest of the population. While the philosopher denotes a *way of life*, intellectual denotes a social place, a purpose, a role (MELZER, 2003, p. 7). It is in this way that most post-Dreyfus authors dedicated to the theme aim to answer the question over what – and who – would constitute this class. Robert Merton (1970, p. 287, italics from original text), for instance, suggests the following definition, which we consider particularly apt: "[we will] [c]onsider people as intellectuals, *in the way* they devote themselves in cultivating and formulating knowledge. They have access to a knowledge fund, not exclusively derivative from their personal experience, and they make it progress".

2.1 EXPERTS AND MANDARINS

While dealing with the role of intellectuals in society, certain authors intend to highlight the existence of distinct groups among those who carry out some sort of work of an intellectual nature. It is pertinent to briefly analyze these distinctions, since when approaching the role of the intellectual in politics, these authors generally refer to only one of these specific categories.

Bobbio (1997) has made a differentiation between ideologue, expert, and technical intellectuals of human knowledge. What distinguishes them, roughly speaking, are the distinct roles they are called to perform in a political context. Whereas the role of the ideological

[17] Gramsci (2005) suggests a knowledge continuum that goes from common sense to philosophy, passing by the good sense.

intellectual is connected to the definitions of 'the ends', the technical or the expert intellectual's is linked to 'the means':

> By ideologists, I understand those who provide guiding principles, and by experts, those who provide knowledge for the means. Every political action, as any other social action [...] has the need, in one hand, of general ideas about the goals to pursue [...] as I above called as principles, and that could be called 'values', 'ideals', or even 'conceptions of the world'; on the other hand, [the need] of technical knowledge that is absolutely indispensable in solving problems to which the solutions cannot entirely be attained from pure political intuition (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 73).

This distinction is important because only through the notion of the ideological intellectual we can see there is truly a tension related to the political achievement. The technical intellectual worries about the means, whilst the ends are given to them by others. Not only that, what can also be implicated is that the intellectuals, as they lose the concerns related to the ends, focusing only on the means, become strictly technical, losing a crucial part of what makes them intellectuals. This is reminiscent of the Frankfurt School's main critique, or what Levine (2012) called the repressive potential of illuminist rationality: the complete emptying of intellectual work from anything "supra-empirical", in effect denying the validity of any argument based on ethics or morals.

Moreover, Bobbio states that the ideological intellectuals may become close to the technical ones by becoming so distant from reality that they become 'utopists': "For the utopist, the separation between ends and means is absolute; in the same line of thought, on the contrary, the purely technical put their own competence in service of the powerful without inputting the problem of the legitimacy of the ends" (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 74). That is, the ideological intellectual cannot forget principles and values, thus becoming a technical, but cannot also back out so much from reality that they end up losing sight of the ends of their work.

Sartre, as mentioned above, also makes a distinction between intellectuals and technicians of practical knowledge. Once again, this distinction is related to the matter of ends and means. The technical people of practical knowledge work for the ends they did not create, having two roles: working for progress and justifying the system ruled by the idea of progress (JACOBELLIS, 2011, p. 52), even though they might have not approached the definition of what progress means and its implications. For Sartre, the technical job has also an ideological character. The difference when related to the intellectuals is that here the character is

dissimulated by the 'technical and scientific form', i.e. they 'dress it up with science's neutrality' (JACOBELLIS, 2011, p. 52).

For Merton (1970), the intellectual turns into a technical when, while being inside bureaucracy, they abdicate from questioning the ends that they work for. In other words, the government dictates the ends, and they start simply to provide the means for them. However, Merton (1970, p. 292) inquires if this division is actually possible:

> This social code [bureaucracy's] is so controlling and persuasive that it has been inducing a handful of technicians to undergo through this rigid distinction between means and ends, without acknowledging that the verbal distinction in itself can help the technicians escape their social responsibility.

So, here, the technical man does not exactly represent a distinct class, but the intellectual's forsaking of having an analytical positioning that would be otherwise natural to him. Merton (1970) claims that even at the bureaucracy's core, the intellectual would still have some capacity of imprinting his own positioning in conducting politics, through the proposition of alternative lines of action. He proposes that, in face of guidelines that run against his values, the intellectual can adopt three distinct positions:

> 1. He can accommodate his own social values and special knowledge to the values of the political ruling body;
>
> 2. He may try to alter the current guidelines from the executive power regarding the bureaucratic implementation;
>
> 3. He may react in terms of a schizoid dissociation between his own values and those of bureaucracy, considering his role as purely technical one and without value implications (MERTON, 1970, p. 297).

Merton points out the struggle of the intellectual in avoiding becoming simply a technician while entering bureaucracy, i.e. searching one of the forms to directly engage with politics. In fact, he states that usually the intellectual cannot handle the absence of personal autonomy which defines the bureaucratic service. At the same time, he believes intellectuals who opt to maintain their independence from politics have very little effect over them. He concludes: "those who innovate are not heard, and those who are heard do not innovate" (MERTON, 1970, p. 295).

A more radical view is presented by Noam Chomsky in *American Power and the New Mandarins* (1969). The book is in large part a critique of American involvement in Vietnam, more precisely of the "role that American intellectuals have played in designing and implementing policy, interpreting historical events, and formulating an ideology of social

change that in part falsifies, in part restricts and subverts it" (CHOMSKY, 1969, p. 8). Chomsky's argument, however, is not that distant from Merton's, though certainly more heavily ideological. It deals with what he calls "insane rationality" (CHOMSKY, 1969, p. 9) and "moral blindness" (CHOMSKY, 1969, p. 9). This is the abandonment of moral considerations in political debates, in favor of pragmatic considerations of cost and utility.

Those who eschew moral values in favor of becoming part of the political gear betray what Chomsky sees as an intellectual's foremost responsibility, that of speaking truth to power from a place of privilege. He argues that those who have done so – the 'new mandarins' – not only abdicate from influencing the ends of policy, as Merton suggests, but have in fact distorted their own intellectual work to fit the narrative dictated by the state, showing "a lack of concern for truth" and "a real or feigned naiveté with regard to American actions that reaches startling proportions" (CHOMSKY, 1969, p. 329). It is difficult to separate Chomsky's view of the role of intellectuals and the difference between those and the 'mandarins' or 'experts' from his severe criticism of American foreign policy, but it seems fair to conclude that by agreeing to join the state apparatus, an intellectual necessarily becomes a 'mandarin', an 'expert' devoted to the means of implementing policies, rather than the discussion of their goals and the ideology that supports them.

Despite their differences, most authors who define distinct groups among intellectuals do so based on a dichotomy ends/means. The main implication of this view is that "true" intellectuals must have a broader view of the societal implications of their work. The abandonment of this preoccupation with means, or the delegation of them to others – policymakers, for instance – implies, at least to a certain degree, the renunciation to the role of intellectual.

2.2 INTELLECTUALS AND POLITICS: FROM BENDA'S "CLERKS" TO SARTRE'S ENGAGED INTELLECTUALS

Below I analyze the most traditional conceptions of the role of intellectuals in society. I start with Julien Benda's defense of academic detachment, followed by Gramsci and Sartre's ode to engagement. I also debate Manheim's and Weber's more middle-of-the-road positions.

2.2.1 Julien Benda's Clerks

Certainly, one of the most renown – though scarcely read today - works regarding the relation of intellectuals and politics is Julien Benda's *The Treason of the Intellectuals (La Trahison des Clercs,* in the original*),* published for the first time in 1927. The book is a scathing critique of what Benda perceived as the increasing politicization of intellectuals. For him, this is the ultimate treason: not only the adoption of political passions by the *clerks*, but the contamination of the whole intellectual enterprise by these passions and, more than that, the use of one's social standing *as an intellectual* as a political tool. To understand Benda's depiction of betrayal one must understand both his conception of what an intellectual ought to be – his ideal clerk – and the context in which Benda is writing, which has greatly influenced him.

Although Benda affirms his use of the term clerk refers to its medieval use, which generally means scribe, it certainly has a religious connotation – the original French word, *clerc*, also meaning member of the clergy[18]. This religious feel infuses Benda's work - for him the intellectual is a type of priest, a wholly guardian of knowledge, and as such, he can only fulfill his mission by keeping himself above all that is earthly. The true clerk "never deviate[s] from single-hearted adoration of the Beautiful and the Divine by the necessity of earning their daily bread" (BENDA, 2007, cap. 3). He is "bound neither by national boundaries nor by ethnic identity" (SAID, 1994, p.25). Plato, Descartes, Kant were for him the ideal intellectuals, not only for their geniality, but for being "men who had resisted the temptations

[18] The translator's note in the 2007 edition explains this: "The word 'clercs' which occurs throughout the book, is defined by M. Benda's as 'all those who speak to the world in a transcendental manner'. I do now know the English word for 'all those who speak to the world in a transcendental manner'. But in Chaucer's time the word "clerk" […] meant anyone who was not a layman, a word employed by M. Benda as an antithesis to "clerk". We still use the word in this sense when we speak of "a clerk in holy orders" and retain its root in 'cleric'. A 'cleric' is the person described by M. Benda as 'preeminently a clerk'. "

of the earthly life", among those the "ever-present temptation to marry and to have too many 'practical interests' as 'family fathers'". (MULLER, 2006)

However, Benda admits that examples as these are rare. What he perceives as the problem of his time is that there is not even an attempt by intellectuals to distance themselves from politics. On the contrary, his perception is that intellectual activity is only valued as it has practical utility: "It is true indeed that these new 'clerks' declare that they do not know what is meant by justice, truth and other 'metaphysical fogs', that for them the true is determined by the useful, the just by circumstances". (BENDA, 2007, cap. 3).

Benda's critique becomes clearer when we take into account the historical context in which it was formulated. Starting with the Dreyfus affair, there is indeed a stronger mobilization of writers and intellectuals and a growing involvement in political matters. Not only that, but there is an increasing political polarization in society as whole accompanying the growth in influence of communism and fascism in Europe. The *compagnons de route*, intellectuals who supported the communist party, especially in France, are characteristic of the inter-war period.

Nationalism is also on the rise and, according to Benda, "with a hitherto unknown consciousness (*prodigiously formed by authors*) every nation now hugs itself up against all other nations as superior" (BENDA, 2007, cap. 1, italics in the original). Intellectuals were, by adopting the "nationalist passion", committing the sin of xenophobia, not only in their private lives, but allowing this passion to influence their work and, worse than that, putting their knowledge to the service of their nation. There had been, according to his perspective, a "complete 'reversal of values'" by which "Idealism and spiritualism had been replaced by romanticism and materialism; above all, universalism had been corroded by nationalism." (MULLER, 2006) This had happened mostly under German auspices, though as a good anti-nationalist, Benda spread his criticisms across all nationalities.

Benda's opposition to intellectual engagement in worldly affairs saw no party lines either: he criticized equally the leftist *compagon the routes* of communism, like Jean-Paul Sartre or Maurice Merleu-Ponty, and the right-wing intellectual leaders like Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras – almost, perhaps, as sanguinely as they criticized each other. Whether it was to nationalism or to class struggles, reason should never be sacrificed.

Benda criticizes these men for seeing themselves as intellectual crusaders who could save the world with their philosophies:

> The word that intellectuals today have uninterruptedly on their lips is that they are the saviors. Whether it is for the wish to restore the order or prepare the revolution, they present themselves as saviors of the world. That is what opposes them most profoundly to the *true intellectual*, who tries to think correctly and find the truth, without worrying about what will happen on the face of the earth. (apud Bobbio, 1997, p. 53)

The clerks, the true intellectuals, are saviors, but of a different kind. They are the guardians of timeless morals and eternal truths, because of clerks "it may be said that [...] humanity did evil for a thousand of years, but honored good" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3). It is not an intellectual's duty to "play the games of political passions" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3), the only acceptable position in relation to those is to either ignore them completely, or to adopt a position of moral superiority and to proclaim values that are superior to these passions. By doing so, the intellectual stays true to his function which is "to restrain the passions of the layman". By adopting political passions, instead, the intellectual "deprives them [the laymen] of the spectacle of a man solely occupied by the thirst for truth […] he prevents the laymen from hearing speech different from that of the marketplace" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 4).

Benda divides the 'sins' of his contemporaries in three 'stages': the first is the adoption of political passions. His was the time, he maintains, in which "[p]olitical passions [had] become universal, coherent, homogeneous, permanent, preponderant" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 2), not least among intellectuals. And they had not only succumbed to the same passions as the laymen but also adopted them in all their sordidness: excesses, fixed ideas, the search for immediate results. By doing so, the clerk not only betrayed his calling, but strengthened these passions, by lending them the moral prestige he possessed for being an intellectual.

First among these "layman passions" was nationalism, which increasingly led to xenophobia. This "attachment to a specific group", in this case the nation, was leading clerks to abandon their objective judgment when it came to their own nations, forgiving its errors even if they did not do the same for other nations. This signified an abandonment of their moral obligation in pursuit of "realist goals" of material gain and power, something which the ideal clerk would never incur: "I am quite ready to agree that this sort of blind patriotism

makes powerful nations, and that the patriotism of a Fénelon or Renan[19] is not the sort which secures empires. It remains to determine whether the function of 'clerks' is to secure empires" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3).

The second stage of the moral decadence of the clerk was to bring these political passions into their activities as clerks, therefore giving them increasing credence among the laymen, or at least "in that very important section of them who read and believe they think" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3). This type of behavior had begun with the "poets and novelists", among who it was not so reproachable given the nature of their work. It had spread, however, to the historians, and in Benda's view had reached even the holiest of disciplines, metaphysics, through the works of none other than Hegel.

> Fichte and Hegel made the triumph of the German world the supreme and necessary end of the development of Being, and history has shown whether the action of these "clerks" had an effect on the heart of their laymen. Let me hasten to add that this spectacle of patriotic metaphysics is provided by Germany alone. In France, even in this age of nationalist "clerks" we have not yet seen any philosopher […] built up a metaphysical system to the glory of France. (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3)

Finally, in the third stage, the clerks play the game of political passions by their doctrines. That is, "those whose preaching for twenty centuries had been to humiliate the realist passions in the name of something transcendental, have set themselves […] to the task of making these passions […] the highest of virtues" while at same time demonstrating nothing but scorn for all that "raises itself beyond the material". (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3). This is, of course, the highest of sins, because it implies not only an abandonment of the calling and the mission of the clerk, but also the complete perversion of this mission.

The first aspect of this phenomenon is that clerks start to embrace the attachment to the particular and criticize the "feeling of the universal" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3). Here he is speaking, as before, particularly of nationalism, but he also has particular concepts in mind: *Zeitgeist*, the "spirit of the age", and *Weltgeist*, the "spirit of the nation". It is, therefore, once again partly a criticism directed at Hegel (though he is by no means its only object). Though he doesn't mention the concept itself, Benda speaks of "a whole school of moralist-historians who admire a doctrine, not because it is just or good, but because it embodies the morality of *its time*, the scientific spirit of *its time*" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3, italics in the original).

[19] François Fénelon, French theologist of the XVIIth century, and Ernest Renan, French philosopher of the XIXth century.

Because of those and similar criticisms, Benda has lately been revived by scholars who are particularly critic of post-modernism and it relativist tendencies. In the introduction to the 2007 edition of *Treason of the Intellectuals*, Roger Kimball[20] writes that "In 1927, intellectuals still had something definite to betray. In today's "postmodernist" world, the terrain is far mushier: the claims of tradition are much attenuated and betrayal is often only a matter of acquiescence". Kimball than goes on to disparate concepts such as "African knowledge", "female language" and "Eurocentric science" as "talismanic fetishes". (In. BENDA, 2007, introduction)

Although it is hard to believe that Benda would have agreed on almost anything with postmodernists, that does not automatically mean he was a positivist. In fact, Benda criticized what he calls the "Romanticism of Positivism", mainly their belief that truth could be distilled from facts alone, a belief which he labels as a "silliness of the mind". He also derides the notion of positivists that they are "pure scientists", or the only bearers of truth: "let me add that this cult of fact also claims to be the sole discoverer of 'the meaning of history' and 'the philosophy of history', which again shows a weakness of the mind from which the preceding ages seemed to have been free" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3)

This critique of positivism is included within a broader criticism of the "divinizing of politics", which goes hand in hand with his contemporary clerk's attachment to the practical in detriment of the metaphysical. This divinizing of politics meant a reversal of values: if in the time of Plato morals dictated politics, for Benda, in his time, politics dictated morals; "the evil which serves politics ceases to be evil and becomes good". This is different, for instance, from Machiavelli, because the actions he recommended to the Prince were never cloaked in any kind of "morality or beauty" or justified on any moral grounds. The modern clerks, however, "preached that the State should be strong and care nothing about being just; and in fact, the 'clerks' do give this assertion the characteristic of preaching, of moral teaching […] in this lies their great originality". (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3)

With this positioning of politics above all else comes the notion that knowledge is neither above nor on par with politics, but must prove its usefulness by serving politics' aims. The very idea of a usefulness of intellectual work that is proved on material grounds goes

[20] Also published in 1992 as "The treason of the intellectuals & "The Undoing of Thought"" on *The New Criterion*. Available at https://www.newcriterion.com/articles.cfm/The-treason-of-the-intellectuals----ldquo-The-Undoing-of-Thought-rdquo--4648 .

against what Benda believes to be a clerk's duty. For him, the further from the material is a discipline, the closest it is to the intellectual ideal. In this sense, he cites Plato's love for geometry, which he considered to be "above all other disciplines", precisely for being the most abstract of all. (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3) This enmeshing of intellectuals and politics blurs the barrier between the moral and the political which according to Benda is necessary for civilization. He expresses this idea in a passage which also sums his argument neatly:

> Civilization seems to me possible only if humanity consents to a division of functions, if side by side with those who carry out the lay passions and extol the virtues serviceable to them there exists a class of men who depreciates these passions and glorify the advantages which are beyond the material. What I think serious is that these men should cease to perform their office, and that those whose duty was to quench human pride should extol the same impulses of soul as the leaders of armies. (BENDA, 2007, chapter 3).

Benda has been criticized throughout the years for having betrayed his own ideals by, as he would put it himself, "descending to the Market place" (BENDA, 2007, chapter 1), that is, being involved in politics. During the First World War, he was "caught in *flagrante delicto* of nationalism, a nationalism very distant from critical reason" (WINOCK, 2000, p. 253). In his defense, Benda affirmed that France represented an example of superior morals, and for that reason should be defended. He went so far as to say that, should he have the opportunity, he would exterminate all Germans with one gesture. (WINOCK, 2000, p. 254). This was not, however, the only instance of involvement in politics by Benda:

> And yet, late in life, he himself succumbed to the kind of partisanship he had always attacked. Thinking that Marxism was now the only way to defend universalism and democracy, he justified the show trials in Prague and Budapest, and sang Stalin's praises. His reputation never quite recovered from this intellectual betrayal (MULLER, 2006, p. 127)

Despite any un-clerk-like behavior from its author, Benda's work remains the fiercest defense of (extreme) intellectual objectivity and of the sanctity of intellectual work. This ideal in itself has a timeless appeal. As Edward Said writes (1996, p. 8):

> Deep in the combative rhetoric of Benda's basically very conservative work is to be found this figure of the intellectual as a being set apart, someone able to speak the truth to power, a crusty, eloquent, fantastically courageous and angry individual for whom no worldly power is too big and imposing to be criticized and pointedly taken to task.

Despite this, *Treason of the Intellectuals* has been heavily criticized. Norberto Bobbio (1997, p. 45) claims that Benda's work "establishes the basis of a war without truce between the real and the false intellectuals: on one side is the uninterested culture, on the other, irredeemably the enemy, subservient culture. Between them there is no hope of

understanding." Bobbio himself, though having his own caveats in regard to the engagement of intellectuals, is not a purist of the caliber of Benda. In fact, his alerts that complete disengagement has its own dangers:

> From the defense of the cleric, affirmed by Benda, is born the temptation of evasion, and therefore, the taste for the esoteric, the cult of the initiated or of irresponsible specialization, the complete estrangement of the *civitas*, a hedonistic conception of culture and an agnostic conception of political life. (BIOBBIO, 1997, p. 34)

Bobbio's criticism would not seem out place in any contemporary piece on the relation of academia and policymakers, it brings forth exactly one of the main arguments of this literature: academic work has become increasingly and end in itself and that specialization has led to a growing detachment from reality. Of course, this is precisely the tension between the notion of the intellectual calling of a Bobbio and of Benda, between the idea that of intellectual work that should affect political reality and intellectual work that is above it.

2.2.2 Engaged Intellectuals and the Class Struggle: Jean-Paul Sartre, Antonio Gramsci and Norberto Bobbio

Another critic of Benda is, of course, Jean-Paul Sartre. One of the biggest defendants of the engaged intellectual, his position about the relation of academics and politics is diametrically opposed to Benda's. While the last one perceives intellectuals as being above politics, Sartre (2004, p. 53) questions: "Is it about becoming the guardian of ideal values, like Benda's 'intellectual' before the treason, or is it about the concrete and day-to-day freedom that one must protect, by taking part in political and social struggles?"

Next to Sartre, one of the greatest defenders of intellectual engagement was Gramsci. He believed that intellectuals should have an active role in political life, as "constructor, organizer, 'permanent persuader', and not a simple orator" (GRAMSCI, 2005, p. 52). For Gramsci intellectuals can have completely opposed functions, as either leaders of change or maintainers of status quo. This function depends of their social place, and is connected to the concepts of organic and traditional intellectuals and their social roles.

Organic intellectuals are created, organically, with every social group. These intellectuals will give their social groups "homogeneity and an awareness of its own function"

(GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000 p. 301). For instance, the industrialist class will have its own organic intellectuals such as the industrial technician, or the specialist in political economy. “The organic intellectuals […] are, for the most part, ‘specializations’ of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type which the new class has brought into prominence” (GRAMSCI, 2005, p. 49).

The organic intellectual does not act, as one of Benda’s ideal clerks, according to timeless morals, but rather according to the ‘morals’ of his or hers own social group. That is, he acts seeking the benefit of this group which, needless to say, will influence his work, and his ideology will reflect his social standing. If he belongs to a dominant class, he will act as a “deputy” for this class, “exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government”. (GRAMSCI, 2005, p. 54).

Besides the organic intellectual, there is a different category of intellectual, the “traditional intellectual”, which is not created with each social group, but has had a continued existence as a group in its own. These are the “*noblesse de robe*”: administrators, philosophers, theorists, etc. Unlike the organic intellectual, the traditional intellectuals “experiences through an *esprit de corps* their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification, they thus put themselves as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group” (GRAMSCI, 2005, p. 50).

There is a continuous attempt of cooptation of these intellectuals by the dominant elite. For Gramsci, however, the role of the intellectual is, on the contrary, to oppose this elite, which could only happen when the intellectual becomes an organic intellectual of the masses, or the “simple”. The difficulty, however, is that intellectuals are very seldom originary from the masses, and, even when they are, the very process by which they become intellectuals, frequently implies a process of ‘elitization’, of approximation to the bourgeoisie. Therefore, it is indispensable that intellectuals maintain constant contact with the masses, for that is the only way by which they can make their philosophy “historical”, detaching it from “intellectualistic elements”, and turning it into a “living” philosophy. (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000 p. 332).

Sartre, similarly, affirms that it is exactly this difficulty that intellectuals have, as members of the bourgeoisie, in connecting with and speaking to the working class, that leads them to give up their political engagement and, disappointed, take refuge in what he calls

"pure abstract denial" (JACOBELIS, 2011, p. 25), or in the "abject passivity" (SARTRE, 2004, p. 29), which are disguised as objectivity and distance. These, for Sartre, are impossible (1988, p. 66):

> The error of realism has been to believe that the real reveals itself to contemplation, and that consequently one could draw an impartial picture of it. How could that be possible, since the very perception is partial, since by itself the naming is already a modification of the object? And how could the writer, who wants himself to be essential to this universe, want to be essential to the injustice which this universe comprehends? [...]
>
> And if I am given this world with its injustices, it is not so that I may contemplate them coldly, but that I may animate them with my indignation, that I may disclose them and create them with their nature as injustices, that is, as abuses to be suppressed. Thus, the writer's universe will only reveal itself in all its depth to the examination, the admiration, and the indignation of the reader; and the generous love is a promise to maintain, and the generous indignation is a promise to change, and the admiration a promise to imitate; although literature is one thing and morality a quite different one, at the heart of the aesthetic imperative we discern the moral imperative. (SARTRE, 1988, p. 67)
>
> If society sees itself and, in particular, sees itself as seen, there is, by virtue of this very fact, a contesting of the established values of the régime. The writer presents it with its image; he calls upon it to assume it or to change itself. At any rate, it changes; it loses the equilibrium which its ignorance had given it; it wavers between shame and cynicism; it practises dishonesty; thus, the writer gives society a guilty conscience; (SARTRE, 1988, p. 81)

Gramsci, however, alerts that the principle of maintaining contact with the masses does not intend to contain the advance of science in any way, or to keep intellectual work on the level of the masses. Rather, the intention is to build a moral- intellectual bloc that can serve as a basis for political advancement. That is, it can provide the understanding that will allow the masses to escape the immobility to which they had been subjected by internalizing the philosophy of the elites.

This immobility occurs because the "man of the masses" has had, historically, two contradicting "theoretical consciousness". The first is the consciousness implicit in the activity in which he works and has therefore a practical character. It "unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of the world" (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 333). The second one is "superficially explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed" (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 333). This second consciousness is tied to the hegemonic theory, which is that of the dominant class, and influences the masses' will and moral conduct. It is the contradiction between these two consciousness that creates a situation that "does not permit any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity" (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 333).

The role of the intellectual is to end this cycle. And the only way to do this is to replace this acritical consciousness, which only serves the purposes of the elites, with a theory or culture which suits the activities, needs and interests of the man of the masses. The first step to be taken for this to happen is to create a critical consciousness of history. For Gramsci, this is an intellectual activity much more significant than any other enterprise:

> Creating a new culture does not only mean one's own individual 'original' discoveries. It also, and most particularly, means the diffusion in a critical form of truths already discovered, their 'socialization' as it were, and even making them the basis of vital action, an element of coordination and intellectual and moral order. For a man of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent fashion about the real present world, is a 'philosophical' event far more important and 'original' than the discovery by some philosophical 'genius' of a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals. (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 327).

The final goal is to unify theory and practice, creating coherence between the two. This only happens if, with each elevation in complexity in the philosophy developed by intellectuals, there is an elevation of equal magnitude in the conscience of the masses. If, on the contrary, there is a growing gap between the two, this generates a perception of theory as something useless. This means that, for Gramsci, anti-intellectualism among the masses is, one could say, to blame on intellectuals themselves, for not disseminating their discoveries, but keeping them restricted to a small group of *connoisseurs.*

This unification of theory and practice becomes the more likely the more radically against the old system is the theory, and is only possible when the masses have their own organic intellectuals: "one could only have cultural stability and an organic quality of thought if there had existed the same unity between the intellectuals and the simple as there should be between theory and practice" (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 331). One way this can occur is within political parties, which can serve, according to Gramsci, as a way to create organic intellectuals "directly in the political and philosophical field rather than in the field of productive technique" (GRAMSCI; FORGACS, 2000, p. 309).

Following the same line as Gramsci, Sartre also sees a vital role for the engaged intellectual, that of action through revelation: "the engaged writer knows that word is action: he knows that revealing is changing and that one cannot reveal but with the intention of changing" (SARTRE, 1988, p. 37). Literature, for him, is a type of action, an action that is operated through imagination. He describes the unveiling process of writing as such:

> Thus, by speaking, I reveal the situation by my very intention of changing it; I reveal it to myself and to others in order to change it. I strike at its very heart, I transfix it,

> and I display it in full view; at present I dispose of it; with every word I utter, I involve myself a little more in the world, and by the same token I emerge from it a little more, since I go beyond it towards the future. (SARTRE, 1988, p. 37)

In fact, for Sartre, the very act of becoming an intellectual implies the adoption of a critical posture towards the contradictions of society. The author makes a distinction between the "technicians of practical knowledge" and the "intellectuals". While the first work towards "allegedly universal goals which he did not create" (JACOBELLIS, 2011, p. 51), and which he does not question, the intellectual earns this title only when he questions the ideology in which he has been immersed (JACOBELLIS, 2011, p. 55). That is, the intellectual becomes such when he abandons the idea of simply describing the world. When he realizes that his actions as an intellectual are only valid from the moment when he adopts a posture of contestation towards reality, of engagement with it.

Engagement is a metaphysical choice. Engaging in one's own time is not falling in historical relativism disdainful of "eternal" values because "by taking part in the singularity of our era, we ultimately make contact with the eternal, and it is our task as writers to allow the eternal values implicit in such social or political debates to be perceived". (SARTRE, 1988, p. 254).

It is worth noticing, however, that just as for Gramsci, one cannot understand Sartre's stance outside of the context of a Marxist perception of class struggle. Therefore, even if he speaks of the intellectual as a defender of universal values, Sartre's conception is quite distant from that of Benda. In fact, Sartre makes a distinction between true and false intellectuals. The false intellectuals are those who defend bourgeois values, while the true intellectuals are those who are neither "moralists nor idealists", but engage in the class struggle. (JACOBELLIS, 2011, p. 59).

However, even if Sartre defends that the writer should adopt the point of view of less favored, he also believes that the writer characteristically does not belong to any particular class (in this aspect he seems to distance himself from Gramsci). He affirms that "his reasoning [the writer's] when accepted will be an anonymous reasoning, which can be presented as belonging to all, since its source is not a specific social place" (JACOBELLIS, 2011, p. 91). He also adds that the writer should take his craft with responsibility, since he acts through his writing, but does not cease to be a writer to become a militant. (JACOBELLIS, 2011., p. 65-66).

Again, here Sartre seem to approach Benda's perspective. Steven Ungar, in the introduction of *What is Literature*, points out that "[t]he resemblances between Benda and Sartre are striking. Both cast the writer in the role of social conscience, assert the primacy of moral concerns, and employ a rhetoric of accusation." (In. SARTRE, 1998, p. 9). However, even though Sartre sees the writer as separated from other classes, he believes that it is the writer's duty to adopt a specific point of view, that of the disenfranchised and, by doing so, help them towards revolution. Bobbio (1997, p. 125) presents a clear view of the differences between the two writers in the following passage:

> For the first [Sartre] the true principle is that there is no revolution without a revolutionary theory and, in consequence, the revolution must happen before in ideas than in facts; for the second [Benda] the opposite principle is true, that is, the reason of the State or, which is the same, the reason of the party/nation/class, must not prevail over the indispensable reasons of truth and justice.[21]

Both Gramsci and Sartre lived the engagement they preached: Gramsci worked as an organizer of the Italian communist movement and published regularly on politically engaged leftist newspapers. He was jailed by the Italian fascist government and wrote most of his now-famous intellectual work in prison (SAID, 1996). Sartre, although having been "disengaged" – though not apolitical - prior to the Second World War, became increasingly active in politics (JACOBELLIS, 2011). This was concomitant to his increasing popularity among the French public[22], and according to Baert (2015, p. 2), he became increasingly known *because* of his activism:

> from the late 1940s onwards, the political issues of the day, rather than philosophy, underscored the public appearances and writings of Sartre, de Beauvoir and Camus, as they, like most other intellectuals in France, became embroiled in the cold war over which they eventually fell out.

Interestingly enough, however, Jacobellis (2011) points out that Sartre's popularity did not stem from the *quality* of his political engagement, but from the intensity and preponderance of his public presence. His first attempt at acting directly in politics was the founding, in 1941, of the collective "Socialism and Freedom" (*Socialisme et Liberté*), which lasted only for a few months (JACOBELLIS, 2011; BAERT, 2015). His most lasting – and perhaps most effective - political contribution came from his role as writer: the creation of the

[21] "Para o primeiro [Sartre] vale o princípio de que não se faz revolução sem uma teoria revolucionária e, em consequência, a revolução deve ocorrer antes nas ideias que nos fatos; para o segundo [Benda] vale o princípio oposto de que a razão do Estado ou, o que é o mesmo, a razão do partido/nação/classe não deve jamais prevalecer sobre as razões imprescindíveis da verdade e da justiça." In the original in Portuguese, our translation.
[22] His popularity was so great that, according to some estimates, around fifty thousand people attended his funeral (BAERT, 2015).

magazine *Le Temps Modernes.* The publication's goal, as described in its own editorial, was to contribute to the "liberation of mankind" (JACOBELLIS, 2011, p. 107). This goal, of course, was in tune with Sartre's conception of change by revelation.

Also known for his political activism – for which he was imprisoned more than once[23] - Norberto Bobbio's work reflects his more moderate political views. Not entirely affiliated with socialism, he defended the empowerment of the masses within a democratic system. As for the role of intellectuals in politics, he defends a posture of *independence but not indifference*:

> I would say that the conduct of the intellectual should be characterized by a strong willingness to participate in the political and social struggles of his time, which would not allow him to alienate himself from what Hegel called "the loud murmur of the history of the world", but, at the same time, by that critical distance which does not allow him to completely identify with a party […] (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 97)

Bobbio defends the validity of intellectual engagement, while at the same time appealing for it to be based on reason, so that it is done in an objective and uninterested way. For that reason, the engagement should be restricted to the sphere of culture – where ideologies are developed and knowledge is produced – and this sphere should be kept separate from the political sphere. It is not, then, a matter of abstaining from politics – as Benda, for instance, would defend – but of continually transcending it. (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 81). Bobbio calls this engagement the 'politics of culture':

> I firmly believe in a politics of culture, that is, as politic of intellectuals as such, distinct from ordinary politics. But I don't believe it is an easy politics, to be practiced every day, in every occasion, without a mature conscience of the different place in which the ends of culture position themselves with regard to the ends of politics. (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 65)

Bobbio sees a number of difficulties in the political action of intellectuals, which he sees as changing depending on the circumstances, on time and place, and therefore being of difficult apprehension. From this fact emanate both moral dilemmas, such as the matter of maintaining intellectual objectivity and integrity, and practical matters, related to the question of *how* to exercise influence over politics. For Bobbio, the ability of the intellectual to exert any influence is based on what he calls *ideological power*. Unlike political power, it is not exercised over bodies or through material possessions, but "over minds through the production and transmission of ideas, of symbols, of world views, of practical teachings, by

[23] Bobbio was imprisoned twice by the Italian fascist government, accused of being part of the clandestine resistance (RICUPERO, 2004).

the use of the word" (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 11). In a democracy, this power is never unified or unidirectional, after all the greatest expression of a democratic system is that it can be manifested in any direction.

For Bobbio, more important than the actual engagement, is the consciousness of one's responsibility when engaging, of the consequences of one's actions. He maintains, "It is not about rejecting politics, but about continuously transcending it" (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 94). There are three conditions so that a moral value can be attributed to a manifestation of a "man of culture" in a political matter: 1) It must be uninterested; 2) It must be done with the conviction that there are no other possibilities to achieve the same result; 3) It must put the intellectual in harm's way". (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 6) And regardless of all efforts, ideological power will never have complete influence over action. It might inspire and guide, but will not dictate political action. Often, it is used as a mean to justify action rather than being its real cause. (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 83)

Most generally intellectual engagement is done by the signing of manifestos, normally directed at political authorities, but which might seek to "enlighten the public opinion on the dangers that threaten the conservation of certain supreme assets, of which society cannot renounce" (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 61). Bobbio affirms that, an intellectual, when signing a manifesto, takes the "quality and function of a judge, someone who decides what is just and what is not". It is therefore indispensable that the intellectual maintains his objectivity, since "impartiality is the supreme virtue of the judge" (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 62).

As for the capacity of these manifestos to actually have any influence over politics, Bobbio is highly skeptic. He highlights that intellectual manifestos are rarely printed in widely circulated newspapers, but tend to be restricted to specialized publications, whose audience is in large part similar to the signatories. He also believes that, while there is a growing number of possible outlets for these manifestos, this does not necessarily translate into a lasting influence. Bobbio suggests that generally this influence will depend on three main factors:

1. The prestige or moral [of the intellectual]
2. The validity of the arguments presented
3. The probability that [the politician] might suffer some type of unpleasant consequence from not following the directives suggested (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 62).

Bobbio concludes, then, despite his own political engagement, with a somber view of the possibilities of intellectuals to effect any real change in public opinion: “Our debates are like fireworks: an intense light, but ephemeral, a loud bang that lasts but an instant, and soon after returns to darkness and silence. The fire gone, another is lit, and the people are more stunned than illuminated”. (BOBBIO, 1997, p. 94)

2.2.3 Karl Mannheim’s Intelligentsia

Mannheim’s view of the role of intellectuals is one that evolved throughout his work. If he started with a fairly positive tone in *Ideology and Utopia* (1954)[24], in his last writings he had a much soberer view of the possibility of the intelligentsia to influence – and perhaps revolutionize – the making of politics (HEEREN, 1971). While he does not defend an engagement of the sort that Sartre or Gramsci propose, he does see a role for intellectuals, especially that particular stratum which he calls the free-floating intelligentsia.

In contrast to Gramsci and Sartre, Mannheim does not believe that intellectuals should belong to or speak for a particular class. He believes intellectuals constitute a particular stratum, dedicated to a particular economic activity but whose “status in society” cannot be easily defined (HEEREN, 1971, p. 2). This is not to say that he sees no connection between class and intellectuals – rather, that different points of view, held by different groups of intellectuals, will represent or be adopted by different social classes. As Heeren (1971, p. 2) describes, there are two alternatives here:

> Several strata may adhere to one intellectual standpoint; for instance, the small shopkeepers and rentiers may unite in a 'conservative' outlook. Or, one social class may hold divergent world views; as an example, different segments of the proletariat may follow separate political parties.

Mannheim’s belief that intellectuals do not have strong connections with any particular class, either collectively or independently, does not mean, either, that they are therefore granted perfect objectivity. For Mannheim, knowledge is inherently connected to the knower’s social experience. Mendel (2006, p. 31) affirms that, according to Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, “the social qualities of the knower shape the characteristics of his/her thought, not only with regard to the genesis of ideas, but also concerning the form and

[24] Published originally in 1929.

content as well as the formulation and intensity of experience". In fact, he sustains that there is no possible objectivity especially when it comes to in the study of politics. The political scientist is a particular case, because he is, inevitably, "a participant because of his political values and interests". Therefore, "the particular manner in which the problem presents itself to him, his most general mode of thought including even his categories, are bound up with general political and social currents". He adds that "However, the fact that our thinking is determined by our social position is not necessarily a source of error. On the contrary, it is often the path to political insight" (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 104)

This impossibility of complete distance from the object of study in the case of Political Science made it extremely difficult to formulate general laws of politics, and Mannheim criticize the attempts, by what he called the "liberal-democratic bourgeoisie" of rationalizing the "irrational elements of politics". Mannheim sees the theory of politics not as something that is arrived at and then never replaced, but rather as a process of constant evolution. Theory, therefore is a three steps process:

1. Theory is a function of reality;
2. This theory leads to a certain type of action;
3. Action changes reality, or in the case of failure, forces us to a revision of the previous theory. (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 113)

Similarly to Benda, Sartre, and Gramsci, Manheim's work and his view of the role of intellectuals was influenced by the political climate of his time. Unlike those authors, however, he did not find inspiration in their opposition, but rather, thought that a "great synthesis", or a "dynamic meditation" between them was imminent: "This synthesis was to take the most important conceptions from the ideologies of Fascism, Communism, liberalism and conservatism and mold them together into a total world view which would serve to unify the conflicting social forces" (HEEREN, 1971, p. 5). The bearers of this synthesis were to be the "free floating intellectuals". "According to Mannheim, the intellectuals are in the exceptional position of being able to see society in its totality and to bring about the necessary synthesis of the prevailing ideologies" (MENDEL, 2006, p. 32). He affirms that "such an experimental outlook, increasingly sensitive to the dynamic nature of society and to its wholeness, is not likely to be developed by a class occupying a middle position but only by a relatively classless stratum which is not too firmly integrated in the social order" (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 137).

The secret to intellectual's "classlessness" is the intellectual endeavor itself. Unlike those employed in "the social process of production" – that is, all those who are not devoted to intellectual pursuits - (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 137), the intellectual, by the acquisition of knowledge, gets to experience, thorough education, the influence of opposing ways of life and class affiliations. This does not mean that they are completely exempt from all influence from their class of origin – Mannheim does not break entirely with Gramsci and Sartre in this respect – but rather that they "are also determined in their outlook by the intellectual medium which contains all those contradictory points of view" (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 140).

This nonattachment open two possible avenues for intellectuals. The first one is the voluntary affiliation with a particular class, which Mannheim sees negatively, as being "uneasy, always been characterized by distrust because of differences in the social and psychological makeup of these groups" (HEREEN, 1971, p. 6). The second path, clearly has a connection with the author's conception of the "great synthesis". He describes this second possibility as "the scrutiny of their own social moorings and the quest for the fulfillment of their mission as the predestined advocate of the intellectual interests of the whole" (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 149). As Heeren (1971) argues, this is the culmination of Mannheim's positivity regarding the role of intellectuals in society as whole and politics more particularly. At one point in *Ideology and Utopia* he goes as far as saying that they "might play the part of watchmen in what otherwise would be a pitch-black night" (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 143).

In a way, his view is almost, itself, a synthesis between Benda and Gramsci and Sartre, two widely different views. On the one hand, he sees an active part for intellectuals in changing society and this does mean mingling with the "laymen" in the "marketplace", contrary to Benda but in agreement with Gramsci and Sartre. He indeed affirms that this kind of position is unattainable when it comes to political knowledge since "pure intellectualism would not tolerate a science which is so intimately tied up with politics" (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 146). On the other hand, this is not done by the adoption of a particular class or a particular ideology, but rather by the development of a view that manages to find that which is better for society as a whole. This middle position of intellectuals should not mean that a

political decision will not be made, but rather that it will be arrived at after much thinking and not due to "a party outlook already firmly established" (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 145)[25].

The impossibility of a complete agreement with Benda's view, in respite of the view of intelligentsia as "free floating" or "classless" is inextricably linked to Mannheim's sociology of knowledge and to his view of politics as a particular field which is simply not amenable to a completely positivist approach:

> When, however, we enter the realm of politics, in which everything is in the process of becoming and where the collective element in us, as knowing subjects, helps to shape the process of becoming, where thought is not contemplation from the point of view of a spectator, but rather, the active participation and reshaping of the process itself, a new type of knowledge seems to emerge, namely, that in which decision and standpoint are inseparably bound up together. (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 152).

To use Gramsci's terminology, Mannheim's intellectual is "traditional" rather than "organic". For Mannheim, however, this is their strength, and he does not suggest that they should abandon this position for the engagement with a particular class, even if he concedes that individual intellectuals may very well have political affiliations. As Mendel (2006, p. 39) aptly points out, the core of Mannheim's conception of the role of intellectuals is that "Mannheim's intelligentsia does not seem to directly participate in society in any other role than as intellectuals." Rather than taking part actively in the class struggle – which Mannheim did see as a defining feature of society – the intellectual should be able to know reality through empathy[26]. Again, a middle ground between complete class engagement and a complete detachment from the political woes of his time. The main difference with regards to Benda being that the goal of intellectual activity is not to be a mere gatekeeper, but rather, to realize the intellectual synthesis, which is invaluable to society and the key to utopia. This is Mannheim's utopia: "only those orientations transcending reality will be referred to by us as utopian which, when they pass over into conduct, tend to shatter, either partially or wholly, the order of things prevailing at the time" (MANNHEIM, 1954, P. 173).

While Mannheim seems to propose a rather active role for intellectuals in politics in *Ideology and Utopia*, Mendel (2006, p.40-41) argues that, considering the whole of his

[25] As a side note it is interesting to point out that Mannheim, in 1929 (when Ideology and Utopia was first published) was making some similar criticisms as to those being made by the authors who point to a growing gap between academia and policymakers in IR. He claims that "in this most recent epoch, the ideal of science has been mathematically and geometrically demonstrable knowledge, while everything qualitative has been admissible only as a derivative of the quantitative".

[26] Empathy is described as "the capacity to look beyond appearances and penetrate to the real meaning of things, the inability to accept ultimate explanations, the anticipation of crises before they become acute, and the chariness of closed systems" (HEREEN, 1971, p. 9).

oeuvre, Mannheim's answer to the question of whether intellectuals are "destined to remain the watchman of society without being able to actively intervene in it" is "somewhat ambivalent". He seems to see an active role for the intelligentsia on moments of change, and a retrenchment to a purely intellectual activity in its aftermath:

> Thus, intellectuals can be a utopian force in the first place, but they cease to be one once their utopia is about to become realized, i.e. once the political group they were affiliated to comes into power and the intellectuals are set free. Then their political role becomes a much more scientific one. Being free-floating they are able to detach themselves from immediate involvement in political affairs and hence to survey and evaluate the different positions. Therefore, they are the ones to provide the necessary knowledge for politics, a task politicians are too involved to fulfil. (MENDEL, 2006, p. 42)

Hereen (1971, p. 8) makes a similar argument, pointing out a rather diminished role for intellectuals in Mannheim's later work, in which he "refers to the intellectuals as somewhat less dogmatic than other social groups, more able to see various sides of an issue" which is obviously a "far cry from his earlier discussion of the intelligentsia's mission in the formulation of a great political synthesis".

The very nonattachment or freedom from class commitments[27] seems to be one of the sources of the ambiguity of Mannheim's position regarding the role of intellectuals. His predicament is easily understandable: if the intelligentsia is not itself a class with a common ideology, how is it capable of political action? How does it define its political ends? The intellectual is "frequently willing to suspend his own being in order to penetrate strange or unfamiliar world views", yet as class, intellectuals do not adopt any of these views.

Mannheim's original answer was through the great synthesis, which in his life failed to materialize, while many intellectuals adhered to the viewpoint of a single class. While most of his work preceded the Second World War, he did witness the affiliation of many intellectual with fascism, whose ascension he perceived as an impediment to the further rationalization of economy and politics, since it placed a premium on a non-rational component of differentiation between individuals: race. His final contemplations as to the role of intellectuals, therefore, is marked by disillusionment, "both as to the outcome of contemporary struggles and as to the triumph" of the intelligentsia (HEREEN, 1971, p. 13).

[27] In some of his later works, he uses the term 'relatively uncommitted intelligentsia' (relativfr eischwebendIen telligenz) (HEREEN, 1971, p. 8).

2.2.4 Two Vocations: the Weberian perspective

Max Weber's Vocation Lectures are probably some of the best-known writings on the role of academics. Unlike authors analyzed previously in this chapter, Weber speaks of academics, rather than intellectuals, a more limited concept. Further commentary on the difference of these concepts is made in chapter 3. For the moment, however, it is worth noting that scholarly activity in Weber's time – meaning the activity carried out by professors in universities – was considerably different from what it is today. His was a time when "disciplinary boundaries were far less rigid than today, when it was still possible to master enormous historical, economic, legal, sociological, and political knowledge, and make contributions to a number of disciplines" (DREJMANIS, 2008, p. 1). As with the previous authors, therefore, I opted to focus on the more general aspects of Weber's view of science and politics.

Although a first reading of *Science and Politics: two vocations* can lead to an interpretation of Weber's position on intellectual engagement as one that comes closer to that characteristic of Benda, it is not as black-and-white on the complete separation of academics from political life. Indeed, in his text on the scientific vocation, Weber (2012, p.21) states that:

> But politics is also not up to the teacher. Above all, and less than ever, when, from the scientific point of view, it deals with politics. Political-practical positioning and scientific analysis of structures and political parties are two very different things.
>
> […]
>
> the genuine teacher will refrain from forcing, from the top of the chair, any position, either expressly or by suggestion - for this would undoubtedly be the most disloyal, if it is a question of letting one speak the facts.

He sees the academics "occupying a unique position with respect to the relation between the economic, political and cultural spheres" (WELLEN, 2001, p.12). This position brings with it specific responsibilities, among them the maintenance - as far as possible - of objectivity. The great challenge of the intellectual, or academic, would be to "maintain an ability to respond critically to evaluative problems," but at the same time avoid becoming "the servile representative of social interests" (WELLEN, 2001, 2).

This view of a particular social place for academics does bring Weber closer to Mannheim, as the later himself admitted:

> Max Weber formulated the problem of political sociology somewhat similarly, although he stated from entirely different premises. His desire for impartiality in politics represents the old democratic tradition. Although his ideation suffers from the assumption of the separability of theory and evaluation, his demand for the creation of a common point of departure for political analysis is a goal worthy of the greatest efforts (MANNHEIM, 1954, p. 145, nota 1).

The point is that while he argues that it is necessary to avoid the politicization of academic work, Weber does not believe that objectivity means that such work cannot be of any use to politics. This is mainly what distinguishes him from Benda. This position becomes clearer when Weber discusses the role and usefulness of science. In addition to having the ability to determine the means to arrive at predetermined goals by others, scientists also

> we can - and we must - [...] tell you: this or that practical taking of position derives logically and honorably, according to its meaning, from this and that last worldview - can come from one or perhaps several - but not others. If you decide for this position, you serve in figurative language this god and you offend the other. If you remain faithful to yourselves, you will come internally to these or those last and significant consequences (WEBER, 2012, p. 28, emphasis added).

Weber's dual concern is, then, one the one hand, to maintain the honesty of intellectual work, but also to maintain its relevance. The first concern is resolved not by the attainment of a complete detachment from the issues of the day, but rather by a complete and constant disclosure of the academic's ideological commitments. According to the Weberian perspective, therefore, it is paramount that readers or students know where the academic stands so that they might possibly infer the influence of his beliefs on the conclusions he draws. The idea is that "even someone who rejects our values should be able to acknowledge the validity of our empirical results *within the context of our perspective*" (JACKSON; KAUFMAN, 2007, p. 96, emphasis added). As for the relevance, Wellen (2001, p. 6) argues that "anyone who reads Weber knows that he does not want the commitment to value-freedom to undermine the reasons intellectuals might have to make their work relevant to the concerns of politics and social criticism".

His dual concern might perhaps be explained by his own lingering hesitation between the complete immersion in academic work and the lure of political action. His wife, Marianne Weber, noted that

> [his] disposition was unmistakably toward an active rather than a contemplative life. Scholarly work…attracted him as an interesting sideline but not as the substance of his life, for political and social interests were equally strong in him, and as a strong-

> willed person he longed for great responsibilities…. [he was] a born fighter and ruler even more than a born thinker. (apud DREJMANIS, 2008, p. 13)

Weber did, in fact, participate actively in politics. In 1918, he joined the founding committee of the German Democratic Party (DDP), in which he was quite active, giving speeches and writing articles. In 1919, he was nominated for the National Assembly, but ended up withdrawing his nomination after becoming discontent with his placement on the party list. In the same period, he worked as a consultant to the German delegation negotiating the Treaty of Versailles and to a commission drafting the Weimar Constitution. In 1920, after some disillusionments, he eventually withdrew from politics, though it is possible he would have returned had he lived to witness the economic and political turmoil his country would still face (DREJMANIS, 2008).

It may seem odd that an author that has written of the academic vocation that those who do not "have the ability to put on blinkers, as it were, and to enter into the idea that the destiny of his soul depends on his being right about this particular conjectural emendation at this point in this manuscript should stay well away from science" and that "without this passion […] one has no vocation for science and should do something different" might have had himself doubts regarding his academic pursuits (WEBER, 2002, p. 44). His own difficulties in political life, however, might aid us in reconciling his writing and his actions. Weber's foray into politics was very clearly driven by a genuine desire to effect positive change – one could argue this was equally the motivation of his academic work – but he soon found he was not able to act completely like a politician. When resigning from the DDP in 1920 he declared that while politicians had to make compromises he was "a scholar by profession…. The scholar does not need to make compromises or to cover folly" (DREJMANIS, 2008, p. 15).

While Weber himself might have perhaps escaped the confines of his own ideal-types, more recently IR professors have attempted to practice their vocation in a Weberian manner. Jackson and Kaufman (2007) article on this experience is helpful in delineating in a more practical manner how this could work. They use as an example what they call "Weberian activism" the manifestation of academics opposed to US foreign policy in relation to Iraq in 2004. This manifestation was made by a group of 851 International Relations - called Security Scholars for a Sensible Foreign Policy, or SSSFP - through an open letter in which the signatories justified their anti-war position. The authors argue that this effort represents an

example of Weberian activism because, although they took a political position, they did so as academics, in a non-partisan way:

> A distinctive feature of the SSSFP project was that the intervention conformed to Weber's precepts on the conceptual separation between (social) and political (science). The letter of the SSSFP, although certainly stemming from a series of value-commitments, was nevertheless more than the mere expression of these values; on the contrary, the statement was based on the disciplined application of a theory of social science to the study of the empirical world. It was, therefore, 'objective' in the Weberian sense ... it was part of a campaign of science and education, not just 'politics' (JACKSON; KAUFMAN, 2007: 96).

It is interesting to note that this effort had an extremely limited impact. Few communication vehicles were interested in disclosing it and therefore had a rather limited circulation. As for its effect on politics, no change in the course of US foreign policy towards Iraq was noted, and the occupation of the country extended for several years after the letter was published. This certainly meets Bobbio's concerns about culture, and the ability of the intellectuals to exert any influence and at the same time maintain their objective stance.

3 ACADEMIC VOCATION: AN ANALYTICAL MODEL

To develop a model of the academic vocation and its different positions regarding academic engagement in politics, I start with a historical analysis of the development of the academic profession and its differentiation vis a vis the intellectual as such. I than present an analysis of Abbott's system of profession, on which the model is largely based.

3.1 FROM INTELLECTUALS TO ACADEMICS: THE PROFESSIONALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE

If we take as a basis, as proposed on the previous chapter, that "[we will] [c]onsider people as intellectuals, in the way they devote themselves in cultivating and formulating knowledge. They have access to a knowledge fund, not exclusively derivative from their personal experience, and they make it progress", what is the difference between an intellectual and an academic? Wilson (1942, p.3), for instance, defines academics as follows: "Broadly stated, the basic functions of [academics] everywhere are the conservation, dissemination, and innovation of knowledge", a similar enough concept to that of intellectuals. However, while an argument could be made that all academics might fit – or aim to fit - into the concept of intellectual offered here, it is not true that all intellectuals must also be academics. While Gramsci, Sartre and Mannheim debated whether intellectuals are a particular social stratum, the modern academic is, at the end of the day, *a profession*.

While most of us rarely pause to wonder, in our daily lives so filled with numerous professions, what *is it* that makes a particular activity one, there is ample literature devoted to this subject. Most of this literature appears in the 20th century, which is probably explained by the fact that professions that resemble what we would define as such today first appeared in the 19th century. The earliest professions – physicians, lawyers, accountants, architects – were "organized in a collegial manner" and generally "stood outside the new commercial and industrial heart of society" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 3), contributing to make them a puzzle for social theorists. Most of this literature identifies the rise of professions as a consequence of the "great transformation" [28] (LARSON, 1977, p. 16), the jump from pre-industrial to industrial society taken initially in Europe. It was the changes brought on by the new market-

[28] The term was originally coined by Karl Polanyi in *The Great Transformation: the political and economic origins of our time*, published in 1944.

oriented economic model it inaugurated that also allowed for the emergence of a new kind of privilege, based not on heritage or property, but on the possession of a special kind of "scarce resources" (LARSON, 1977, p. 17): valued skills and knowledge.

One of the main aspects in the sociology of professions in the Anglophone world is the attempt at a clear differentiation between *professions* and *occupations* (SCHMITZ, 2014)[29]. Two of the first authors, in 1934, to try and conceptualize professions were Carr-Saunder and Williams, who defined it as follows: "professions were organized bodies of experts who applied esoteric knowledge to particular cases" (CARR-SAUNDER; WILLIAMS apud ABBOTT, 1988). Most of the approaches developed before the 1960s – generally known as functionalists - in a similar manner to Carr-Saunder and Williams, analyzed particular cases through a 'naturalist' perspective, which saw the emergence of these professions as a natural process.

Perspectives arising in the 1960s, that sought to counter this view, presented professions as a consequence of a new type of monopoly. They saw professions more as delineated market shares than as natural consequences of the development of a certain social activity, yet professionalization remained a process made of a series of steps that particular activities followed in becoming a profession, only now taken deliberately in the pursuit of a monopoly (ABBOTT, 1988). In 1977, Magali Sarfatti Larson (1977, p. 2) defined professions as "occupations with special power and prestige", that can be recognized by a list of attributes:

> The cognitive dimension is centered on *a body of knowledge and techniques* which the professionals apply in their work, and on the *training* necessary to master such skills; the normative dimension covers the service orientation of professionals, and their *distinctive ethics*, which justify the privilege of self-regulation granted them by society; the evaluative dimension implicitly compares them to other occupations, underscoring the professions' singular characteristics of *autonomy and prestige*. (LARSON, 1977, p.2, emphasis added)

Larson (1977, p. 5) adds that "professions are explicit market organizations attempting the intellectual and organizational domination of areas of social concern". This domination could be achieved through the control of a technique or through the control of abstract knowledge which generates the technique. She also believes that "these uncommon occupations tend to become 'real' communities, whose members share a relatively permanent

[29] As Schmitz (2014) points out, in Brazil the term profession (profissão) is used more or less indiscriminately. He cites as an example the formalization, by law (Lei n. 12.870, de 16/10/2013), of 'cowboy' (vaqueiro) as a profession.

affiliation and identity, personal commitment, specific interests and personal affiliation" (LARSON, 1977, p. 3). The main point Larson makes is that professions – and the prestige they achieve – are not natural, but a social construct that depended, in part, of powerful patrons (LARSON, 1977, p. 6).

Interestingly, Larson (1977) invokes Mannheim's concept of the free-floating intelligentsia when discussing professions' relation to class. The seemingly non-economic basis of the claim to professional legitimacy – resting, as it does, on knowledge – could mean professions are "independent from, or at least neutral vis-à-vis the class structure" (LARSON, 1977, p.8). This, according to Larson, would place them on the stratum of socially-unattached intellectuals Mannheim refers to. The notion that belonging to a profession certifies one as an 'intellectual' is one that Weber, long before Larson, had grappled with. According to Weber, the impetus of professionalization is due, in part, to the labor demand of the bureaucratization process. He sees, then, a tension between the demands of education, that have as a goal the mold educated or cultured men, and bureaucracy, which seeks 'experts' (SCHMITZ, 2014).

This is reminiscent, of course, of the discussion carried out by Bobbio, Merton and Chomsky regarding the differences between intellectuals and what they refer to as 'experts' or 'technicians' (which has been presented in more detail on chapter 2). While an argument could be made that most professions fitting Larson's list of attributes are indeed devoted to work of an intellectual nature (as opposed to manual labor), it would be hard to argue that they fit the most general concept of 'intellectual' adopted here. It seems that although they "have access to a knowledge fund", they do not necessarily devote themselves to making it grow.

As for professions' relations to class, Larson (1977, p. 11) argues that "different professions, and different groups *within* a profession, form different ties with a ruling class which itself consists of changing coalitions". These ties are formed along with the development of a particular activity and its attainment of the status of profession which, as mentioned before, often requires the aid of fractions of a ruling or rising class. This in turn generates a tension similar to what Weber indicates as that between education and bureaucracy: the development of knowledge pulls them towards the role of 'traditional' intellectuals (on Gramscian terms), while the need to maintain professional privileges pushes them to maintain an 'organic' attachment to a given segment of the elites. And regardless of that attachment, professions are part of a privileged segment of society, situated above the

(blue-collar) working class. Larson (1977, p. 13, emphasis added) concludes that "the *appearance of* detachment and pure 'intellectual' commitments is more marked in academic circles than in the consulting professions".

Andrew Abbott (1988, p.7) argues that, despite the differences in focus of distinct approaches in the professionalization literature

> authors of these theories took a surprisingly consistent view of what professions were and what about them must be explained. Certainly all agreed that a profession was an occupational group with some special skill. Usually this was an abstract skill, one that required extensive training. It was not applied in a purely routine fashion, but required revised application case by case. In addition, professions were more or less exclusive.

These similarities are, in large part, Abbott (1988) argues, the consequence of their focus on the same professions, most notably Law and Medicine in the Anglophone world. This, in turn, leads to the inclusion in the concept of profession of activities that resemble these classic examples – for instance, accounting or social work – at the price of the exclusion of those that do not, from auto-repair to the clergy. Despite their differences, then, these theories tell a common story about the process of professionalization, according to which it can be summarized in a series of steps that tend to follow the same order.

Harold Wilensky (1964) presented a fairly summarized version of these steps which has been amply adopted - although at times with minor changes - ever since. The first step is for a certain activity to become the full-time occupation of a number of people, be it nursing the sick or teaching children. The second step is the establishment of formal training. While training does not necessarily begin within a university, sooner or later it will seek a bond with universities, which will lead to "a steady development of standard terms of study, academic degrees, and research programs to expand the base of knowledge" (WILENSKY, 1964, p. 144). This will then lead naturally to the next step: to meet higher standards, longer training will be needed, which leads to full-time teachers. In the case of a successful professionalization this training will become a pre-requisite to the practice of the activity. The fourth step is the creation of a professional association. This stage is marked by a wide debate about the essential professional tasks and qualifications necessary to perform them. During this process, "less technical and less rewarding" tasks start being delegated to "para professionals", for example, doctors start delegating minor tasks to nurses or X-ray technicians (WILENSKY, 1964, p. 144). Following this, we sometimes have a battle to gain lawful recognition of the profession, which means the legal demarcation of the monopoly.

This is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the establishment of a profession, however, as even egg-traders and well-diggers may be licensed (WILENSKY, 1964, p. 145). Finally, a formal code of ethics is developed to embody all the rules developed to delimit and qualify the activities performed by a given profession.

Despite the fact that the authors cited above belong to different schools within the sociology of professions[30], Andrew Abbott (1988, p. 16) argues that their explanations contain similar enough arguments that they might be successfully synthetized into a general concept of professionalization:

> Expert, while-collar occupations evolve towards a particular structural and cultural form of occupational control. The structural form is called profession and consists of a series of organizations for association, for control, and for work (In its strong form, the professionalization concept argues that these organizations develop in a certain order.) Culturally, professions legitimate their control by attaching their expertise to values with general cultural legitimacy, increasingly the values of rationality, efficiency, and science.

While Abbot's main goal is to point out limitations in past approaches and develop his own (which is discussed in section 3.1.1), he does concede that "[a]s sociological concepts go, it is relatively coherent and its terms relatively well-defined" (ABBOTT,1988, p.16), adding that "[i]n the strong (structural) [Wilenky's] form especially, the organizations and their sequence were particularly easy to measure and surprisingly comparable from case to case" (ABBOTT,1988, p.16). This is apparent if we study the case of the academic profession.

The academic profession was actually one of the earliest examples of professionalization, being "established solidly" (in Europe) since the Middle Ages[31] (WILENSKY, 1964, p. 141). While the first universities were dominated by the church, not all faculty were members of the clergy, and they did, indeed, practice teaching as a full-time occupation, as Wilensky establishes as his first step in the road to professionalization. By the late 1400s, universities had started receiving fees from students, and the 16th and 17th centuries were marked by the "educational revolution" that changed the character of universities and greatly expanded access to higher education (GEIGER, 2015). In England, many new colleges were created during this period, which was made possible by large "gifts" to form endowed colleges. While this suggests a connection to the elites, Geiger (2015, p.

[30] Carr-Saunder and Williams are part of the 'functionalist' school, Magali Larson of the monopoly school (though Schmitz argues she is part of what he calls the 'neoweberian' school), and Wilenksy is part of the 'structural' school.

[31] The first university, the University of Paris, dates back to the 12th century. It inspired the formation of the first British universities, Oxford and Cambridge. (GEIGER, 2015).

XV) argues that there was a considerable measure of diversity, at least within the student body:

> By the sixteenth century, college populations spanned a broad social range: high-ranking "fellow-commoners," who paid double fees and dined at the high table with the fellows but seldom took the trouble to graduate; commoners, or regular fee-paying students; and sizars, the equivalent of work-study students who paid reduced fees. This social diversity was product of the remarkable expansion of university attendance in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
>
> […]
>
> Perhaps half of these students came from noble or gentry families, who had assimilated the cultural value of polite learning and an arts education. But the other half of the students were sons of bourgeois, professional, or plebian families, who sought the status of gentleman and secure careers in church or state.

In the United States, the first college, Harvard, was established in 1642, as a result of a 400 pounds gift from the Great and General Court of Massachusetts Bay. It offered initially a AB degree, a three-year degree that had as its main components philosophy, classical languages (Latin and Greek) and literature. The second college, The College of William and Mary, was founded in 1693, and the third, Yale, in 1701 (GEIGER, 2015). These early colleges of the colonial era largely tried to replicate the Oxford and Cambridge models, also maintaining a strong connection to the church. Their main goals were "building character and preparing new generations for civic and religious leadership" (BOYER, 1990, p.3). This meant that the professor-student relation was quite different from what it is today; professors were responsible not only for academic achievements, but equally for the students' moral and spiritual development (BOYER, 1990, p.3).

The role of colleges changed gradually, from the initial task of forming cultured man, with a strong classic education, to forming professionals needed for the development of the American nation. This led to the institution of technical schools and the establishment of professorships or departments dedicated to the natural and hard sciences. In this context was passed the Morrill Act of 1862, or the Land Grant College Act. This legislation "gave federal land to each state, with proceeds from sale of the land to support both education in the liberal arts and training in the skills that ultimately would undergird the emerging agricultural and mechanical revolutions" (BOYER, 1990, p. 5). Two trends emerged simultaneously in this period: the growing diversification of subjects taught that was a result of a renewed perspective on the role of higher education, and a bourgeoning perception of university as a democratizing force, one of the pillars of the American dream. Roger Geiger (2015, p. 329) paints a vivid picture of this new university:

> In the last decades of the [19th] century, one explicitly joining manliness, athletic prowess, Christian character, and worldly success displaced the popular image of a college student as an effete, studious character, memorizing Greek and Latin to prepare for teaching or the ministry.

Additionally, this development reflected an ambition of America "assuming a leading role in the world's intellectual progress" (GEIGER, 2015, p. 92) as a part of a wider view of the United States as taking up a more assertive role in the international system. Part of this project was the development of science, which took place in large measure inside universities. By the late 1800s, half of American scientists were employed by colleges, though government bureaus continued to be perceived as "the setting most suitable for research" (GEIGER, 2015, p. 315) by a majority of the population.

Academia has a peculiarity in that, since the beginning, formal training in the profession was already taking place. Even in medieval colleges students could chose to pursue a longer course (an average of seven years) which would qualify them to become teachers themselves (WILENSKY, 1964). That being said, an important stage in the evolution of this training was the advancement of graduate studies. According to Geiger (2015), it took a fairly long time for graduate studies to "take-off" in the United States. He cites the example of Harvard, which inaugurated its graduate program in 1875, but in 1890 still had an annual average of five PhDs awarded (GEIGER, 2015, p. 320). This resulted, it seems, from a combination of uncertainty regarding the role of academics and outright opposition from those who divined pernicious effects from the adoption of what was still viewed as the "German model". Prominent American humanist Irving Babbitt[32], for instance, argued that the "over-absorption in one subject" required by a doctoral dissertation led to the "maiming and mutilation of the mind" (BOYER, 1990, p. 8). Even so, graduate studies developed, and by the early 1900s they – along with research – were an integral part of the American university, and especially with the boom in enrollments in the post-World War I, they began to be seen as the beginning of a faculty career (GEIGER, 2015).

The next step in Wilensky's guide of professionalization was taken in 1915, with the inauguration of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). It resulted from a concern with academic freedom, which had become a topic of contention after Edward Ross, a professor at Stanford, lost his job because the university's patron, Leland Stanford,

[32] Babbitt was "American critic and teacher, leader of the movement in literary criticism known as the "New Humanism". His criticism of the changes in American education was ample and included not only "vocationalism in education", but also "the confusion in the arts created by Romanticism", the influence of Rousseau's work, among other topics. (ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA)

disagreed with his views on immigrant labor and railroad monopolies. This pushed two other academics, Arthur O. Lovejoy and John Dewey to form the organization (AAUP, online). Still today, academic freedom figures prominently in the AAUP mission:

> The mission of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) is to advance academic freedom and shared governance; to define fundamental professional values and standards for higher education; to promote the economic security of faculty, academic professionals, graduate students, post-doctoral fellows, and all those engaged in teaching and research in higher education; to help the higher education community organize to make our goals a reality; and to ensure higher education's contribution to the common good. Founded in 1915, the AAUP has helped to shape American higher education by developing the standards and procedures that maintain quality in education and academic freedom in this country's colleges and universities (AAUP, online).

The creation of the AAUP manifested a search for stability of the academic profession. Ross' case was not an isolated instance of repression, but part of "a larger controversy over the alleged domination of universities by conservative trustees from the business world versus the role and rights of faculty" (GEIGER, 2015, p. 494). The quest for academic freedom suffered serious setbacks with the United States' entry in the First World War, when new grounds for dismissal were established to encompass any possible offenses to the war effort (for example: attempting to dissuade others from military service). Nevertheless, the 1920s saw academics gaining ground against trustees, in part due to the AAUP's efforts, with increased stability and the delimiting of acceptable grounds for dismissal. At the same time, academia developed its own "para profession" in the form of graduate students, who became responsible for a growing part of the teaching load as faculty started to split its time between teaching and research (BOYER, 1990; GEIGER, 2015).

As for Wilenky's final step, a "Statement on Professional Ethics" was adopted by the AAUP in 1966. The Statement highlights, again, the importance of academic freedom, while also affirming a commitment to a series of responsibilities:

> 1. Professors, guided by a deep conviction of the worth and dignity of the advancement of knowledge, recognize the special responsibilities placed upon them. Their primary responsibility to their subject is to seek and to state the truth as they see it. […] They practice intellectual honesty. Although professors may follow subsidiary interests, these interests must never seriously hamper or compromise their freedom of inquiry.
>
> 2. As teachers, professors encourage the free pursuit of learning in their students. They hold before them the best scholarly and ethical standards of their discipline. Professors demonstrate respect for students as individuals and adhere to their proper roles as intellectual guides and counselors. […]

> 3. As colleagues, professors have obligations that derive from common membership in the community of scholars. Professors do not discriminate against or harass colleagues. […]
>
> 4. As members of an academic institution, professors seek above all to be effective teachers and scholars. Although professors observe the stated regulations of the institution, provided the regulations do not contravene academic freedom, they maintain their right to criticize and seek revision.[…]
>
> 5. As members of their community, professors have the rights and obligations of other citizens.[…] (AAUP, online).

The traditional approach to professionalization has been useful in aiding in the delineation of a professional history of academics, especially in highlighting a series of landmarks that display the struggle to establish clear professional boundaries. It also makes clear the changes in the roles academics are asked to perform in society, that in turn reflect changes in the very raison d'être of higher education. Despite its very obvious utility, as a fairly static approach it has its limitations. Once the end of the road to professionalization is reached, what is left to study? Moreover, how does it help us understand the differences between earlier intellectuals and modern university professors? How can we explain the current demands of the academic profession and the struggles *within* academia they generate? Andrew Abbott's approach, which he presents in *The System of Professions* (1988), provides us with important additional insights in the quest for answers to those questions.

3.1.1 Andrew Abott's System of Professions

Abbott's model, which he presents in *The System of Professions*, is based on the delineation of jurisdiction, a process that, unlike previous authors, he sees not as a series of steps that happen in roughly the same order, but rather as a process that is in constant flux and constituted by interactions between different professions:

> Each profession is bound to a set of tasks by ties of jurisdiction, the strengths and weaknesses of these ties being established in the processes of actual professional work. Since none of these links is absolute or permanent, the professions make up an interacting system, an ecology. Professions compete within this system, and a professions success reflects as much the situations of its competitors and the system structure as it does the professions own efforts. From time to time, tasks are created, abolished, or reshaped by external forces, with consequent jostling and readjustment within the system of professions. (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 33)

The author begins by analyzing what is the work that professions do, what is the task they perform and how this relates to the establishment of their jurisdiction. According to Abbott (1988, p.19-20), a focus on the work performed by the professions is essential because "[i]t is control of work that brings the professions into conflict with each other and makes their histories interdependent. It is differentiation in types of work that often leads to serious differentiation within the professions." It is the link between the profession and the specific kind of work it performs that establishes jurisdiction, therefore "[t]o analyze professional development is to analyze how this link is created in work, how it is anchored by formal and informal social structure, and how the interplay of jurisdictional links between professions determines the history of the individual professions themselves" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 20).

Abbott states that "the tasks of professions are human problems amenable to expert service." (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 35), thought the degree to which tasks are allocated to expert service may vary greatly between tasks and between societies. These tasks might be determined by their objective nature – such as running a railroad – or have a more subjective character – for example, music composition. The objective nature is what prevents a particular task from being reinterpreted by other professions, who might try to claim it. There are several types of objective foundations for professional tasks. The first is technological, such as the one possessed by programmers, coders and computer experts in general. The second source is organizations. This is the case of teaching, for instance, which depends on the existence of organizations of education for its validity. A third source is natural objects and facts: "[t]he body and the universe, water and weather, are all objective aspects of the work of medicine, astronomy, hydrology, and meteorology." (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 39). And finally, there are "slow-changing cultural structures that have an objective character" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 39). Although they may appear so, objective foundations are not necessarily permanent, and changes in these foundations tend to bring about significant changes to a profession – and possibly, even its extinction.

A task also has subjective foundations, which "arise in the current construction of the problem by the profession currently "holding the jurisdiction" of that task." (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 40). Abbott argues that the subjective foundations are three interconnected processes: "In their cultural aspect, the jurisdictional claims that create these subjective qualities have three parts: claims to classify a problem, to reason about it, and to take action on it: in more formal terms, to diagnose, to infer, and to treat." (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 40). For instance, imagine your computer suddenly does not turn on. Failing to solve the problem yourself you will likely call

an expert: he will carry out an examination to determine the root of the problem and, based on his expert knowledge, attempt to solve it.

An example that is not offered by the author, but that might help make the distinction between objective and subjective foundations clear is childbirth. While in most developed countries the task of delivering children – or rather, aiding the mother give birth – falls to doctors, that is not a task that has historically been under the purview of medicine. Midwives were commonly responsible for this task and, recently, the practice is becoming again increasingly common (MACDERMOTH; MATHEWS; DECLERQ, 2012) . The International Confederation of Midwives (ICM, 2017), which exists since the 1920s, has over 300.000 members around the world. Therefore, while doctors have a claim over this particular task, due to the objective nature of certain aspects of it – if there are complications, for instance – they do not have a monopoly over it, since it is becoming increasingly socially acceptable – a subjective criteria – to engage the services of a midwife. This obviously does not mean the end of the medical profession, which has monopoly over many other tasks, but allows for the existence of a second profession dedicated entirely to this one.

Of course, the strength of a jurisdiction claim will also depend on the efficacy of the treatment prescribed, as well as the measurability of the results. As results become less and less measurable, there is less and less need to prefer one treatment to another, and thus a weaker professional hold on the problem area. How could one measure, for instance, the efficacy of something as subjective and as personal as psychotherapy? What would be the standard to decide which treatment is more efficient? Yet at the same time, Abbott argues that "results that are too easily measurable lead to easy evaluation from outside the profession and consequent loss of control. They may also make it easier for competitors to demonstrate treatment superiority if they have it." (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 46) Normally, the more specialized a treatment is, the more a profession can retain control of it.

Another factor to be taken into account is the number of chances at treatment an activity is awarded, which in turn depends on the consequences of failure at the first try. The process that occurs between diagnosis and treatment, when the connection between the two is obscure, is called inference by Abbott, and jurisdiction can be weakened by either too little or too much of it (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 49). The manner in which the inference process is carried out is, again, dependent on the consequences of failure. Not all professions are afforded the luxury of "reasoning by exclusion": military tacticians, for instance, are very unlikely to be

able to attempt more than one plan for the same battle. For this reason, they must work by construction, that is, they "[hypothesize] enemy responses to gambits and consider their impact on his further plans. [and] construct a plan allowing as many winning scenarios as possible" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 49). Somewhat against what would be expected, Abbott argues that "multichance" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 49) professions tend to have more vulnerable claims at jurisdiction, due to their having a higher number of failures derived from a higher number of treatments attempted.

The ideal jurisdictional claim avoids the pitfalls of both too much inference – which may lead to external questioning of the knowledge base of the profession - and too little inference, which in turn makes the process appears so routine it opens up space for jurisdictional claims by other professions (or para professions, as Wilensky might call them). An example that contrasts the same activity in different societies' might be helpful here: while in Brazil anesthesia is administered exclusively by physicians, in the United States this responsibility is shared with certified nurse anesthetists[33] (NBCRNA, 2017). Abbott sees a successful example of a balance in psychotherapy with the Freudian system, which reorganized the practice and its routine/nonroutine aspects: "Freudianism succeeded because the routine aspect of the system made it comprehensible to laymen, while the nonroutine aspect justified the creation of a specialized corps to apply it." (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 52)

The Freudian system was successful, in part, because it developed what was perceived as a scientifically valid knowledge base for its practice. Abstract, formal knowledge systems are an important part of professional jurisdiction. Responsible for this knowledge system, composed by abstraction which might be largely disconnected from the reality of practice, is the academic sector of the profession. The main role of this system is the external validation of the activity in question: "Academic knowledge legitimizes professional work by clarifying its foundations and tracing them to major cultural values. In most modern professions, these have been the values of *rationality, logic, and science*" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 54, emphasis added). Even so, knowledge systems have been developed even in occupations that have a strong subjective base, as is the case of all art forms. It is important to note, however, that Abbott does not argue that the utility of academic knowledge is restricted to the validation of practical activity:

[33] In both cases dentists might apply anesthesia in circumstances appropriate for their practice.

> That abstract knowledge serves to legitimate professional work should not belittle its other functions. The most important of these is the most familiar, the generation of new diagnoses, treatments, and inference methods. Academic knowledge excels at invention precisely because it is organized along abstract lines, rather than syndromic ones. It can make connections that seem nonsensical within practical professional knowledge, but that may reveal underlying regularities that can ultimately reshape practical knowledge altogether. (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 55)

The final factor affecting jurisdiction claims is the clarity with which professional borders are defined towards other professions. While more clarity is usually beneficial to a profession's claim, it might open space for what Abbott calls "seizure by absorption" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 56). This might create a relation of subordination with another profession with a broader if less defined jurisdictional claim.

Having analyzed the main bases of jurisdiction, Abbott proceeds to expound the process of claiming it, how it is performed, and what it entails once obtained. A jurisdictional claim means "a profession asks society to recognize its cognitive structure through exclusive rights" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 59) and it can be made in the legal system or through public opinion (which can result in legal protection in a second moment). In the United States the conquering of public opinion is usually the main road to establishing jurisdiction. This requires the construction of a positive public image especially through the media, via TV appearances, as well as newspaper and magazine columns. Legal jurisdiction usually comes at a later stage (though this is not always the case), but tends to be more durable and very rarely lost. Jurisdiction, once secured, whether by public opinion or legally, comprehends, according to Abbott:

> Along with the right to perform the work as it wishes, a profession normally also claims rights to exclude other workers as deemed necessary, to dominate public definitions of the tasks concerned, and indeed to impose professional definitions of the tasks on competing professions. Public jurisdiction, in short, is a claim of both social and cultural authority (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 60).

One of the main arguments brought forward by Abbott, and which differentiates his work from earlier approaches to professionalization, is the notion that professions constitute an interdependent system (ABBOTT, 1988, p.111). Moreover, this system is continually changing, so that professions are "constantly subdividing under the various pressures of market demands, specialization, and interprofessional competition" (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 86). The System of Professions, as Abbott sees it, is a type of vacancy system, which means a position can only be taken once it has been vacated, the only exception to this being the opening of new jurisdictional areas made possible by external forces. In most cases, however, the gaining of one profession means the relative loss of another.

Changes or “disturbances” (ABBOTT, 1988, p. 90) in the system can be generated by external or internal sources. External sources may be changes in technologies and organizations – for instance, the numerous new developments in computing and information technologies in general in the past few decades – or a potential clientele that has been ignored by an existing activity, leaving room for a new one to appear and “poach” it. External sources may open new task areas or destroy entire jurisdictions, while internal sources usually only weaken or strengthen an existing jurisdiction claim. The main example of an internal source of change is the expansion of a jurisdiction claim propelled by a new set of skills or by an expanded knowledge base. This development within one profession might, of course, generate a response in another, should it feel its own jurisdiction is being threatened.

3.1.2 Academics in the System of Professions

The previous section presented what Abbott believes to be the bases for a profession’s jurisdictional claim. What is left, then, is to analyze how the academic profession is positioned within this system and, further, how it helps us develop an analytical model of academic engagement with politics.

The delineation of a jurisdictional claim of the academic profession starts with a quasi-existential question: what is its task? As have been shown previously, that task has changed over time, along with a change in perception of the role of academics in society. While teaching has always been the primary occupation of professors, today they must divide their time among teaching and the two other pillars of academic activity in the United Sates: research and service. This growing accumulation of tasks has not been without consequences. Boyer (1990, p.1), for instance, argues that “today, on campuses across the nation, there is a recognition that the faculty reward system does not match the full range of academic functions and that professors are often caught between competing obligations”. There is a growing sense that, despite the importance of teaching, professional advancement is increasingly dependent on research output (BOYER, 1990, CAHN, 2002, ALTBACH, 1995).

Tables 2 and 3 (below) present the importance given by academics to each of the tasks they are asked to perform, and the average time allocated to teaching and research[34]:

Table 2 - Professional Responsibilities of Academics

Activity	% of Respondents noted as being "essential" or "very important"
Research	76,4
Teaching	97,1
Service	65,7

Source: adapted by the author from EAGAN et al (2014)

As can be seen, virtually all academics consider teaching to be essential or very important, a rate considerably higher than those who believe research to be of the same importance (a difference of 20%). A majority still considers service to be very important, though not as much as the other two activities. According to Boyer (1990), the importance awarded to service by academics has been declining since the 1970s, due to important changes within the university system. Even though time spent in the classroom has declined since the 1960s (ALTBACH, 1997), teaching does seem to take up more of academics' time than research: most allocate between 5 and 12 hours to teaching every week, and between 1 and 8 hours to research.

Table 3 - Average Time Allocated to Teaching and Research (hours per week)

Hours	Teaching -all	Teaching – Full Professors	Research - all	Research – Full Professors
None	7.2%	9.4%	16.7%	9.9%
1-4	17%	20.1%	32.8%	29.6%
5-8	30.9%	34.2%	18.9%	19.7%
9-12	30.2%	26.3%	11.6%	15.1%
13-16	9.2%	6.1%	6.4%	8.7%
17-20	3.6%	2.4%	5.0%	6.6%
21+	2.0%	1.4%	8.5%	10.3%

Source: adapted by the author from EAGAN et al (2014)

[34] The concept of 'service' is somewhat vague (so much so that I was not able to find a consistent working definition), therefore it was difficult to establish what activities may fall under its umbrella. For this reason, I opted to include only teaching and research, since academics were asked directly about the time they allocated to each.

The culmination of different historical trends has meant professors face pressures from different sources to focus on each of these activities. On the one hand, research has become one of the cornerstones of scholarship, and a robust publication record is a sine qua non condition for tenure in most universities (BOYER, 1990; CUMMINGS; FINKELSTEIN, 2012). On the other, changes in government funding, most particularly after the Amendments to the Higher Education Act of 1972[35], meant student recruitment is of the utmost importance. Cummings and Finkelstein (2012, p. 2) argue that the decline in government funding for higher education, especially since the 1980s, has meant that "academic staffs are under increasing pressure to generate revenue from instructional, research, and service activities".

Using Abbott's approach, we could also argue that each of these activities requires a different effort at jurisdictional claim. Teaching has a strong organizational basis: the university. After all, "[a]lthough medievalists and professors of dairy husbandry are as far apart in their main intellectual interests as bankers and brain surgeons, both of the former have a common locus as employees of the university" (WILSON, 1942, p. 4). While professors may not be the only ones to possess the knowledge they are disseminating, they are imbued in the only organization that has the legal right to certify it. This certification, in turn, is a barrier to the entry in many professions, such as Law, Medicine, Architecture, etc. Its objective foundation is quite solid, then, with competition happening between institutions, that is, *within* the profession:

> Major universities compete for their share of the national income. Institutions supported by the same domain compete with one another. Private and public universities are placed in rival positions, and growth in one place may imply decline elsewhere. As the limits of expansion in higher education are approached, the struggle for a place in the sun is even more intensified. (WILSON, 1942, p. 157)

If there is no apparent competition with other professions for the jurisdiction over higher education, there is still the matter of external validity of the task itself. This validity depends mostly on the value awarded to higher education by society as a whole. Americans have given considerable importance to higher education, especially since the late 1940s, when what had once been viewed as a privilege of the elites, started being accepted as a right of the population in its entirety (BOYER, 1990, p. 11). The United States has one of the highest rates of population with tertiary education and this rate has constantly risen, from 23% in

[35] This Act instituted the Pell Grants. Historically, grant funding had been awarded to institutions, which then passed them to students of their choice. The Pell Grants are awarded directly by the government to the students, who might then choose the university the wish to attend. According to Cummings and Finklestein (2012, p. 2) "This policy shift reengineered the higher education market—putting significantly more power in the hands of consumers (students and their parents) and forcing colleges to compete often fiercely for the best students."

1981, to 47% in 2016[36] (OECD). Nevertheless, recent concerns regarding the rising costs of tuition and the weight of student debts on young adults have affected perceptions on the value of college. A 2011 survey has shown that only 40% of Americans believe the value for the money spent on higher education is excellent or good, while 42% believe it is only fair, and 15% believe it is poor. The same survey showed that only 22% think college education is affordable, a rate that was 39% in 1985 (PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2011). Tuition fees have indeed risen constantly in the past years, though yearly increases have been around 3%. Changes in enrollments, however, have varied significantly depending on the type of institution, with an increase in Public Four-Years College and a severe drop in Private For-Profit Colleges., as can be seen in Graph 1 below:

Graph 1 - Changes in Enrollment and Tuition Fees in American Four-Year Colleges



Source: authors own elaboration based on Trends in Higher Education Report (2017), National Student Clearing House Research Center Reports (2013, 2017).

These differences between public and for-profit universities may be due to a general perception that public universities represent a better investment, which in turn may be related not only to cost but also to the perception of employers about different institutions.

The same survey cited above shows that more people believe the main purpose of college is to "teach specific skills and knowledge that can be used in the workplace" (47%)

[36] The United States has the 10th rate among the 35 OECD countries. The OECD average is 43.1%, the country with the highest rate is South Korea (70%), and the one with the lowest is Mexico (21,8%). (Also according to OECD, Brazil's rate is 16%.)

than to "help an individual grow personally and intellectually" (39%). According to this view, it would make sense to choose a college and degree that will give a better monetary return, and data presented to students to aid them in selecting a university often focus on this[37]. This seems to be part of a longer trend that started with the change in perception of the role of higher education, one that started already in the beginning of the 20th century, and has been deepened both by the decline in funding for universities and changes in the economy as a whole. Cummings and Finkelstein (2012, p. 28) argue that "the last quarter has seen a radical "marketization" of academic fields in the university, that is, academic fields have grown and prospered inside the university in direct proportion to their role and commercial value outside it—in the new knowledge-based economy of the twenty - first century". These changes probably impact fields that have more difficulty in advancing an image of "employability" or market-oriented skills – most likely those in the humanities and social sciences[38].

One of the reasons for this focus on employability and financial gain may be that the "educational outcomes of teaching" are particularly difficult to measure (ALTBACH, 1997, p.5) – using Abbott's terms, it is difficult to measure the efficacy of the treatment. Students normally have the chance to evaluate their professors, but it is difficult to deny the inherently subjective character of those evaluations. Certainly, anyone who has read them has been presented with widely diverging views on the same professor. Nevertheless, there is an increase in demand of "accountability" of teaching practices. In fact, Altbach (1995, p. 8) argues that "the conflict between the traditional autonomy of the scholar and demands for accountability to a variety of internal and external constituencies is one of the central issues of contemporary U.S. higher education".

The client-orientation that seems required by these changes appears at odds with the traditional profile of academics, a "professional orientation", according to Wilensky (1964)[39], that is more concerned with the opinion of their own peers than with that of their "clients" (students). To asses that, Wilensky asked professors whose judgment was most important to

[37] A good example is the College Scorecard by the U.S. Department of Education. It allows students to compare colleges according to average annual cost, graduation rate, and salary after attending. Available at < https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/>.

[38] It is worth noting, however, that earnings from graduates in Engineering and Social Science from the top-ranked university (MIT) in the College Scorecard are the same (US$ 94,200).

[39] Wilensky (1964, p. 151) conceptualizes "professional service" orientation as follows: "Highly identified with profession; oriented toward outside colleague group; wants to give competent, objective, technical service of which outside colleagues would approve; accents full use of skills. Role is technical, demands formal grad. training. Structure is managed by men with professional training and job histories. Org. interests impinge on large no. of outside groups, org. is public relations-sensitive, so it hires specialists in accommodative techniques who can deal with government agencies and others professionally staffed".

them, from a list of "groups that inevitably judge the quality of professional performance". The questions posed were: "Whose judgment should count most when your overall professional performance is assessed?" and "Are there any others on this list whose judgments should count?" (WILENSKY, 1964, p. 152). Table 4 (below) shows the percentage mentioning each reference group as most important.

Table 4 - Harold Wilensky's Index of Professional Orientation - Professors

Reference Group	Percent
Students	9
The Administration	2
The Department Chairman	6
Colleagues in one's own Department	24
Colleagues in one's Discipline, whatever their affiliation	56
Community Leaders active in Educational affairs	0
The college faculty as a whole	1

Source: adapted by the author from WILENSKY (1964)

As can be seen, only 9% of respondents valued the opinion of students above all others. Of course, this survey is decades old, and many changes have taken place since then, among them those changes in student recruiting and government funding presented above. Nevertheless, prestige in academia remains largely attached to the opinion of one's peers: "generally, prestige is defined by how close an institution or an individual professor's working life comes to norm of publication and research, of participation in the 'cosmopolitan' orientation to the discipline, rather than to 'local' teaching and institutionally focused norms" (ALTBACH, 1997, p. 9).

Not only individual professionals, but also institutional prestige is strongly attached to research output. And yet, the jurisdiction over this second task of the academic profession is not as easily claimed as over teaching. For one, it does not have the same organizational objective base. While it is largely associated with the university today, it has never had a monopoly over it. Looking back at the concept of intellectual, it does not require any specific affiliation, and even the concept of academy initially meant associations – like the *Academie*

Française or the Royal Academy - where independent intellectuals could meet and exchange ideas:

> Many who were welcomed as members in these early academies were independent intellectuals, but over time, an increasing proportion had their primary association with a university or college or institute. So, on the one hand, those associated with intellectual work looked to the academy as a locus for the validation of their intellectual achievements; on the other, they looked to the formal organizations of higher learning for a work site and a salary. At some point, the concept of the academy came to be more firmly associated with those employed in the formal organizations and less with the scholarly associations outside the university. (CUMMINGS; FINKLESTEIN, 2012, p. 4)

It is also worth remembering that university itself was not a place where research was conducted until the 19th century:

> But we should remind ourselves just how recently the word "research" actually entered the vocabulary of higher education. The term was first used in England in the 1870s by reformers who wished to make Cambridge and Oxford "not only a place of teaching, but a place of learning," and it was later introduced to American higher education in 1906 by Daniel Coit Gilman. But scholarship in earlier times referred to a variety of creative work carried on in a variety of places, and its integrity was measured by the ability to think, communicate, and learn. (BOYER, 1990, p. 15)

The main point, using Abbott's framework, is that there is no necessary organizational basis for research. Although some disciplines require equipment that make it virtually impossible to carry out research independently, its institutional locus does not necessarily need to be a university, it can as easily be in industry or the government. How is jurisdiction claimed, then, over the production of knowledge? It must be done, it appears, in the arena of public opinion, and the task is not simple, for it comprises at least two arguments: first, the argument that research is important, that it is worthy of society's investment, and second, that it must be done by academics.

Despite a general understanding that we live in a knowledge society, where the economy has come to place increasing emphasis on knowledge products, the level of funding in the U.S. for the underlying research and development effort has remained essentially in the same level in the past decades, at 2.6% of GNP, and the academy's share of these funds has decreased[40] (CUMMINGS; FINKLESTEIN, 2012, p. 2). The vast majority of the investment in academic research in the United States is made by the federal government and universities, with universities' share increasing and the government's decreasing between 2010 and 2016, as can be seen on Graph 2 (below).

[40] It is worth noting, however, that Gross Domestic spending on R&D in the U.S. (2.78% of GDP in 2015) is above the OECD average (2.38%). The highest rate (again) is that of South Korea: 4.29%.

Graph 2 - Funding of Academic Research in the United States



Source: author's own elaboration based on data from the National Science Foundation.

This investment is unequally divided among disciplines, with life sciences receiving the largest share (57%) and social sciences receiving the smallest (3,2%)[41]. It is also worth noting that while in the life sciences, physical sciences, mathematics and engineering the majority of the funding comes from the federal government, in the social sciences most of it comes from universities (NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, 2018). Measures of institutional funding do not include regular faculty time allocated to research[42].

When it comes to justifying investment, some disciplines may have it easier than others. Who would argue against research towards the cure for diseases or, say, longer-lasting cellphone batteries? Even so, most academic research (63%) is basic research[43], which may not always have evident applicability, especially one that is easily explained to laypeople. The social sciences may suffer from the opposite: a general sense that much of what is studied is commonsensical. And, along with that, a difficulty in explaining its 'utility'. A practical consequence of this are attempts to reduce federal funding using the argument of "national

[41] This data is for 2016.
[42] According to the National Science Foundation 2018 report "Institutionally financed research includes organized research projects fully supported with internal funding and all other separately accounted-for institutional funds for research. This category does not include funds spent on research that are not separately accounted for, such as estimates of faculty time budgeted for instruction that is spent on research."
[43] Academic R&D spending is primarily for basic research—in 2016, 63% was spent on basic research, 28% was spent on applied research, and 9% was spent on development (National Science Foundation 2018).

interest". One such attempt was the Frontiers in Innovation, Research, Science and Technology (FIRST) Act of 2014 (H.R. 4186) which would, among other things, "require the National Science Foundation to cut research for social sciences and economics and certify to Congress that each taxpayer-funded grant it issues is in the national interest" (SMITH; MCPHERSON, RAWLING, 2014, 2014)[44].

As Anderson (2003, p. 3) succinctly explains, social science has always had a complicated relationship with the concept of utility:

> The story of the development of the social sciences is a story of repeated oscillations between the embrace of active, indeed assertive, participation in policymaking, and retreat into the ostensibly neutral posture of scientific objectivity […] Born as handmaidens of democracy and industrial capitalism in the formation of the American state, the social sciences soon relinquished this definition of their purpose to pursue an agenda that seemed to be at once more abstract and more inclusive. In creating the illusion that truth and power are separable domains, social scientists claimed the pursuit of truth as their own and relegated the exercise of power to "practitioners." (ANDERSON, 2003, p. 3)

The relationship between academia and State was perhaps even more complicated in the United Sates, where Liberalism and its optimistic view of the possibility of solving social problems through human intervention engendered a particular proximity between social scientists and government. In fact, The American Social Science Association (ASSA) was created in 1965 "by social reformers from government and charitable organizations together with university-based academics" (ANDERSON, 2003, p. 15). From the emergence of social science in the US in the 19th century, through much of the 20th, there was a widely shared conviction that much like the problems of the 'natural world', social problems could be solved through scientific investigation. The purpose of all sciences was to be applied, and there was some distrust of pure research, which was associated with the German university tradition (ANDERSON, 2003, p. 15).

Somewhat ironically, the hefty federal investments in higher education in the first half of the 20th century, which resulted in large measure from this view, contributed indirectly to the eventual distancing between government and academia. These investments allowed for a considerable expansion of higher education, with a large increase in the number of professors. This in turn reinforced the process of specialization and subdivision into disciplines that was already taking place. A combination of these changes with the adoption of increasingly

[44] As of January 2018, H.R. 4186 was still on the Science, Space, and Technology committee. Latest action was on 05/28/2014 - Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by Voice Vote. < https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/4186 >.

‘scientific’ methods resulted in a changed perception of the role and character of academic knowledge. Economists were the first to adopt this stance:

> Now [economists] were experts who understood the uneven workings of an abstraction known as the market, rather than specialists knowledgeable about the social and moral problems of the day. Truth was now invariant, abstract, universal, and power and policy were merely responses or reactions to the truths scientists were to discover. (ANDERSON, 2003, p. 16-17)

This did not mean, however, a permanent estrangement between academics and policymakers. It meant that this relationship would be characterized by fluctuations, distancing and rapprochements. World War II provided the means for one of these, via the war effort, and the post-war Welfare State even more. In 1946 Truman established the Council of Economic Advisors, enshrining economic expertise, and funding for scientific research as a whole grew by a factor of 25 between 1940 and 1990. The “policy science” movement this engendered, however, did not last for long. Problems with both domestic and foreign policies in the 1960s led many social scientists to abandon “active participation in public policy to focus instead on development of their disciplines as ends in themselves” (ANDERSON, 2003, p. 33). As a consequence, a considerable share of academics started to defend that the role of academia was not to aid policymakers, but rather to check them, to serve as social critics.

While many scholars retreated into the “ivory tower” of what was now an extensive system of higher education, many still viewed their role as academics as one that included a more active participation in current social and political problems. In terms of jurisdiction claims, this points to a dual justification of the academic claim over the task of research, which seems to persist since at least the 1940s.

Both of these claims are dependent on images that are projected externally (to those outside of academia), but the image projected is different. The first presents academic work as something useful, that seeks the betterment of society. The second one projects an image of being unique, of being different not only from other work in general, but from other intellectual work. This claim is based not so much on utility, as it is on the notion of scientificity and particularly of scientific objectivity. This does not mean it isn’t or it doesn’t try to be useful, but rather that its claim is based mostly on other factors, including an aura of inaccessibility to outsiders: “While the nature of the knowledge base is the main reason for the aura of mystery, mysteriousness may also be deliberately used as a tactical device, a means of building prestige and power” (WILENSKY, 1964, p. 149).

3.2 THE ACADEMIC VOCATION: AN ANALYTICAL MODEL

How do vocation perceptions combine with the place of academic work within the system of professions to create a particular structure of professional demands, more particularly in the field of International Relations? In this section, I attempt to formulate ideal-types that combine these elements and guide the empirical analyses in chapters 4 and 5. These ideal-types are a combination of the ideological underpinnings of academic engagement (that is, the self-perception of the social role of academics) with the practical constraints of the profession. The two resulting ideal-types are those of the clerk (borrowing Julien Benda's term) and the engaged intellectual.

3.2.1 Weberian Ideal-Types

The methodology chosen for the accomplishment of the present research is analyticism, or the development of Weberian ideal-types. Patrick Jackson (2011, p. 142) describes it as "a strategy involving instrumental super-simplification of real and complex situations; these deliberate simplifications, or ideal types, are then used to formulate analytical narratives of specific cases that explain particular results. " These ideal types are formalized and idealized by the combination of recognition of the social context with empirical observations (JACKSON, 2011, 145). As Weber (1973, p 138) explains,

> An ideal type is obtained by the unilateral accentuation of one or more points of view and by the chaining of a large number of isolated, diffused, and discrete phenomena that can occur in a greater or lesser number and even completely lacking, and which are ordered according to unilaterally accentuated points of view, in order to form a homogeneous framework of thought.

That is, an ideal type is not a faithful representation of reality, but a construction based on the principle of exclusion. The exclusion of other elements aims to accentuate the element of interest of the researcher, with the aim of establishing a "future comparison between the objective process and the hypothesized one" (WEBER, 1973, p.23).

These ideal types are "consistently applied to specific empirical cases to produce [...] facts". The purpose of the case study is not, however, to falsify the analytic model, but rather

to reveal "useful or intriguing things about the objects to which it is applied" (JACKSON, 2011, 145). The difference between the ideal types and the case, therefore, may represent an interesting or intriguing fact. In fact, Weber (1973) proposes that the exclusion of elements can contribute to verify their weight in the explanation of the phenomenon studied. He argues that the ideal type, by not corresponding to reality "has fulfilled its logical role precisely by making manifest its own unreality" (WEBER, 1973, p.). Susan Heckman (1983, p. 34) adds that "the fact that the ideal type, like all concepts, is 'unreal', is therefore a function of the fact that no concept can fully reproduce concrete reality."

Ideal-types can be categorized according to their distinct characteristics, being of the "historical" type, "general sociological", "pure types of social action" and "structural" types (HECKMAN, 1983). In this dissertation, I will use the pure types of social action. The hypothesis of this dissertation, derived from the literature review, emphasizes the transition in the dominant model of production of scientific knowledge - more specifically, what is accepted as scientific knowledge - as the origin of the distance between academia and politics. This change in the model denotes a change in the conception of the role of the academic, that is, in the principles that guide the work performed in the academy.

Heckman (1983, p. 44) defines the ideal type of social action as "the different ways in which action is oriented, or the 'motivational context' of action". The ideal type of this variety is constructed by selecting certain aspects of action motivation, which are then synthesized into an ideal type. Weber (1961) developed ideal types of social action according to its orientation. According to him social actions are oriented according to a system of individual objectives; according to absolute values, be they ethical, religious, etc ., according to an affective or emotional orientation; or according to tradition or habit. Here we are interested in the second type, that of absolute-orientation, which Weber (1961, p.173) describes as follows: “In terms of rational guidance by an absolute value, involving a conscious belief in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, behavioral way, entirely by itself and independently of any prospects of external success”.

The orientation we are dealing with here is the orientation of academic work according to the perception of the role of the academic in society. That is, the perception of the role of the academic will guide the way s/he relates to politics – should/ he engage in politics or main a distance from political matters? The different ideal types developed will reflect these

different conceptions, and will seek to explain the way they guide action, that is, what actions can be expected from the adoption of each conception.

3.2.2 Ideal-types of Academic Vocation in International Relations

The ideal-types of academic engagement proposed here are two: the clerk and the engaged academic. Starting with their perception of the role of academics in society, the clerk follows the tradition of Julien Benda. Their motivation as academics is to guard and develop knowledge, the use of this knowledge is not their concern. This does not mean that their work cannot be used for practical means, but rather that they see the concern with its application as belonging to a different social sphere. The clerk, according to Benda, it is worth recalling, "tries to think correctly and find the truth, without worrying about what will happen on the face of the earth". While this does not imply ignoring politics as an *object of study*, it implies a distancing from the practical matter of policymaking. One would expect choice of subjects to not be dictated by current events or external demands, but rather to derive from a scale of importance resulting from the academic's own values and interests.

The other ideal-type, the engaged academic, has as its main concern changing society. The engaged scholar works with the application of the knowledge he is creating in mind. This position follows that of Gramsci, Bobbio and Sartre, as well as that of Mannheim and even Weber to a degree. While Gramsci and Sartre had a particular political goal in mind for intellectual engagement, that is not the idea of engagement here. Rather, what is retained is the notion of a particular duty of the academic with regard to society. This sense of duty will be central in guiding the engaged academic's work in all its stages.

Figure 1 (below) illustrates the two ideal-types

Figure 1 - The Academic Vocation: an analytical model



Source: author's own elaboration

How to these motivations influence action within the academic profession? Considering the possibilities for a scholar in the field of International Relations, I propose it affects it in two main areas. The first one is in their career paths, more particularly in their direct engagement with politics, that is, working for or consulting for the government. While the engaged intellectual will see in this a chance to put his knowledge into action and exert

some influence over policy, the clerk will see a direct connection with politics as a corruption of the morality of academic work, most particularly of scientific objectivity.

The second area where different motivations affect professional actions is in how an academic directs the fruits of his research – and here we find a direct connection with the claims of jurisdiction we analyzed above. The clerk will not make his claim based on usefulness, but rather on the particular social role that academics have, and the particular knowledge they produce. This will likely be linked to the idea of scientificity, in two main ways. Firstly, but distinguishing academic work from non-expert knowledge. This will affect the content of their work, as Desch explains below:

> Disciplinary organizational interest can encourage scholars to separate themselves from non-specialists by using language and approaches that are inaccessible to the laity. Many social science disciplines such as political science deal with issues that are not otherwise inherently difficult for educated laypersons to engage. To maintain their autonomy and claim to expertise they need to construct higher barriers to entry. Sophisticated social science methods (modeling, statistics, or abstruse jargon) offer an ideal barrier to entry for the non-professional because they take considerable investment in time and effort to learn. (DESCH, 2015, P. 381)

Secondly, through the distinction between academics and other groups that might provide similar work – in IR this is especially the case vis-à-vis think-tanks and research institutes. The main argument here is that of objectivity and non-partisanship. While think-tanks are not necessarily partisan, they often are. Moreover, they have different incentive structures and funding sources from academia, which may influence their work (DREZNER, 2015).

This will probably also affect the outlets chosen for their research. Clerks will focus on academic journals, since these are the most prestigious outlets within the profession, that is, on the eyes of those who can judge his work: other academics. Engaged intellectuals, on the other hand, will want their work to have influence, so they will want to make it available to those who might act on the knowledge they are providing. That does not mean they will not publish on academic journals, since they are vital for success in the academic profession, but rather that they will also seek outlets with a wider audience. As part of making his work accessible, they will likely be less inclined to use language and approaches that are inaccessible to the lay man.

As can be seen on Figure 1, I have included public intellectuals as a subtype of engaged academics. The reason they constitute a separate subcategory is that they are not

necessarily academics, that is, they do not need to be part of a higher education institution. As Diggins (2003) explains, they see their role as that of speaker to a wider audience outside of academia:

> The earlier public intellectual wrote for a general readership and often became a notable speaker addressing topics of popular interest. Many of these figures worked in journalism and believed that accessible communication was as important as rigorous analysis. The academic scholar, however, chose to specialize and write in a prose weighted with technical jargon and on subjects that only a handful of specialists find interesting. (DIGGINS, p. 92)

If they are academics, they have most of the same characteristics of other engaged academics, though the types of publications they chose will tend to target the general public (newspapers, for example), rather than policymakers. Because I am mostly interested in the relation between academics and politics in this dissertation, I will not focus particularly on public intellectuals.

4 THE GOLDEN AGE: ACADEMIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II (1945-1960)

The historiography of the discipline traditionally locates its emergence shortly after the end of the First World War, in the year 1919, with the creation of the Woodrow Wilson Chair in International Relations at the University of Aberystwyth, in Wales, the date of its establishment being closely linked to its initial concern, centered on the study of war and the possibility of conflict eradication. Esther Barbé (2001, p.29) identifies a strong normative character in the discipline in this period, a character that, she argues, has never been abandoned: "The theoretical approaches in the field of International Relations are associated with the needs of humanity at all times [...] Or rather, the problems perceived as such by that part of humanity that creates the research agenda."

This first chapter of disciplinary history is predominantly European. The so-called First Great Debate, between "idealists" and "realists" dominates accounts of the period. As Schmidt (1998) shows, the tale of this Debate was in large part written by realists themselves, starting with one of its fathers, E.H. Carr. *The Twenty Years Crisis* includes one of the first narratives about IR in the inter-war period, and one of the first depictions of its purpose – though from a critical point of view. Carr (1981, p.) depicts the "rise from a great and disastrous war; and the overwhelming purpose which dominated and inspired the pioneers of the new science was to obviate a recurrence of this disease of the international body politic", which resulted mainly, according to him, in an un-scientific and utopian view of international affairs. While a more thorough study of scholarship in the period has demonstrated that, in fact "scholars in the field were not addressing the subject matter of international relations based on a conception of how things ought to be or how they wished them to be. The situation was actually quite the reverse." (SCHMIDT, 1998, p. 187), it is undeniable that the realist view was and remains pervasive. And, in being so, has had an influence of itself over the development of IR.

In spite of its European genesis, it was in the United States that International Relations first achieved a more effective rooting. The development of the field started in the beginning of the 20th century, and gained strength specially in the 1930s with the establishment of the first specialized schools, the Walter Hines Page School at Johns Hopkins University, in 1930, and the Yale Institute of International Studies, in 1935 (SCHMIDT, 1998). The Second World

War and its immediate aftermath marked a period of particular rapprochement between the social sciences and the state in the United States. In the post-war period this situation remained for some time, having a connection with the establishment of the state of social welfare and the expansion of the role of government. However, there would soon be a demobilization of "federal social science," while at the same time disciplinary boundaries and theoretical and methodological foundations were being debated within the academy (ANDERSON, 2003). The field of International Relations, however, was in high demand, which was driven by "dramatic international events and the growth in the number of enrollments following demobilization" (GUILHOT, 2008, p. 284). Hoffmann (1977) argues that three factors worked together to strengthen the discipline in the United States: intellectual predispositions, political circumstances and institutional opportunities.

The first fact refers to what Hoffmann (1977, p. 45) calls "Applied Enlightenment": the "belief that all problems can be solved, and that the way of solving them is the application of the scientific method". This belief was applied even to social problems, so that the social sciences are seen, in large part, as the way to develop tools that can solve them. The political circumstances cited by the author are twofold: first, a relative "democratization" of foreign policy in the United States, and then the growing American prominence in the international arena and the abandonment of its isolationist stance. Finally, institutional opportunities refer to two factors that are in fact very particular to the United States: the existence of a direct connection between academia and the political milieu, and private foundations (such as Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller) that have had an important role in funding institutions and individual researchers.

To these factors, which were in large part engendered by World War II, we can add yet another: the influx of intellectuals from Europe who have influenced the American academy in all areas. This is the case with scholars like Karl Deutsch, Stanley Hoffmann, Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, and Arnold Wolfers who were "so intimately connected with the founding and institutionalization of International Relations in the United States that it is often forgotten that they were all émigrés" (ROSCH, 2014, p.2). Smith (1987, p.194) describes them as "a group of academics who were concerned with large-scale issues" and who "sought the key to a better world."

Although Weaver (1998) argues that the specialization of social sciences in different disciplines has occurred – due to institutional factors - more easily in the United States than in

Europe, at the end of the 1940s the boundaries of the International Relations discipline, which belonged to the departments of Political Science, were still unclear. Unification was debated around a theory or methodology versus the assumption that the existing unity was purely ontological, and that IR was inevitably a multidisciplinary field. Political Science itself had a similar debate in which there were doubts regarding the development of a unifying theory - as was perceived to exist in economics - and the possibility of applying methodologies similar to those found in the natural sciences to the study of politics. This debate had as its winner, as it were, the behavioralist approach.

In International Relations, the debate was even more complex. It contained at least three distinct interest groups. It was still at stake what can be understood as a continuation of the so-called "First Debate" of the discipline. At this point, it was not exactly about antagonistic visions regarding the character of the International System, but about the inclusion of the study of international law and international organizations at the core of the discipline (GUILHOT, 2008). As Schmidt (1998) points out, up until the realist dominance in the 1950s, International organization was not viewed as a subfield of a discipline centered around international politics, but was very much at the core of IR. One of the main effects of realist discourse dominance in the historiography of the discipline has been a virtual erasure of these scholars, whose “distinctiveness […] lies not in their idealism but in their explicit attempt to mitigate the international anarchy that many political scientists recognized as one of the fundamental causes of World War I” (SCHMIDT, 1998, p. 191).

At the heart of this inter-disciplinary clash were well-known names like Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Thompson and Paul Nitze, who, while defending the scientificity of realism against the normative character of "idealism", repudiated the supposed values-exemption of behavioralism and its ambition for the improvement of society through science. Their view of a “science of international politics” was very much on par with that put forward by Carr (1981, pp. 12-13), an intermediate position between what they called “utopists”, for whom “desire prevails over thought […] and the focus is exclusively on the ends to be achieved”, and those who believed that a complete separation between ends and means is possible in the social sciences.

These classic realist authors did not believe in the possibility of a complete rationalization of international politics. They also perceived the framing of the behavioralist option as one that would inevitably keep them in the orbit of the social sciences and especially

of Political Science (GUILHOT, 2008). Thus, they defended unity around a theory of international politics which would promote the desired independence and insulate the discipline. Guilhot (2008, p. 283) states that the emergence of a distinct field of IR was therefore "a process led by academics who sought to articulate a distinct view of politics, but could do so only through greater disciplinary differentiation vis-a-vis Political Science" and was therefore "a symptomatic rejection of the evolution of American Political Science" (GUILHOT, 2008, p. 298). Hoffman summarizes the perceived role of theory in IR as follows:

> Far more disturbing is the confusion that concerns the proper method and purposes of the discipline. First, we find a multitude of contributions from other fields, a conglomeration of partial approaches. Most fields have something to offer. But a flea market is not a discipline. We must try to make these contributions relevant by asking the right questions. In other words, there must be a core, which is missing at present. One of the functions of theory in the social sciences is precisely to provide such a core.' Collecting facts is not enough; it is not helpful to gather answers when no questions have been asked first. Without theory, we will have to take whatever other disciplines we see fit to dump onto our plate, and we will have indigestion from smorgasbord. With adequate theory, we will help ourselves more selectively. (HOFFMAN, 1959, p. 348).

We can observe, therefore, the elements that have been associated to constitute International Relations as a distinct field in the United States - although one never completely dissociated from Political Science. Here we use Bordieu's definition of field as "the universe in which agents and institutions that produce, reproduce or diffuse art, literature and science are inserted." The field is, according to this definition, an intermediate universe between "text and context" - that is, between intellectual production and the external pressures of the social context - and which obeys its own "more or less specific social laws". Bordieu (2003) uses two main concepts to analyze the characteristics of a field: its degree of autonomy / heteronomy and the structure of the relationships among the agents of the field.

The autonomy of the field is characterized by the "nature of external pressures" and the forms under which resistance to these pressures manifests itself (BORDIEU, 2003, pp. 21-22). Heteronomy, its inverse, "is manifested essentially by the fact that external problems, especially political problems, are expressed directly there" (BORDIEU, 2003, pp. 22). Roughly, one can characterize the field of International Relations as one of high heteronomy, if one takes into account the effects of political issues on its development, and in particular on the emphasis given to different subjects in the research agenda. With regard to the financial aspect of autonomy, the need for economic resources is not as high as in other fields,

certainly. It does, however, exist, and in this respect it is important to note the influence of private foundations in IR.

The establishment in the United States, in the 1930s and 1940s, of research in the area of International Relations within universities was largely promoted through the funding from private foundations (WEAVER, 1998). These foundations acted as "a bridge between academia and Washington" (HOFFMAN, 1977). As external pressure (although in the form of "positive incentives") they certainly acted to promote research that sought to be relevant to policymakers. And, as Hoffman (1977, p. 48) puts it, "what academics were offering, policymakers wanted. In fact, there is a remarkable chronological convergence between their needs and the performance of academics."

The structure of relations between agents of the field, in turn, is internally delimited, being determined by the distribution of "scientific capital". Bordieu (2003, pp. 24-25) states that "in the field of scientific research, researchers or dominant research define what is, at a given moment in time, the set of important objects, that is, the set of questions that matter to researchers. " In the field of IR, in the post-Second World War, undoubtedly the realist theorists stand out as major definers (supported by the external context) of the research agenda - an agenda that was decidedly tied to its theoretical construction project.

The 1940s certainly marked a transition, so much so that William T. R. Fox (1949, p. 67) argued that "what is today in the United States conventionally known as international relations is a subject different in content and emphasis from its counterpart of even two decades ago". The new emphasis on international politics rather than organizations seemed to be reflected even in the offering of textbooks of the period (SONDERMANN, 1957). Nevertheless, Schimdt argues that the differences between "idealists" and realists are not as stark as they are portrayed by authors like Fox:

> Although many of the realists rejected both the focus on, and the concern with, mitigating anarchy, they nevertheless in many cases shared the same analytical and conceptual scheme that earlier scholars in the field had developed. And while a focus on power and war was at the forefront of the realist research agenda, there was often lurking beneath the surface a concern with how to achieve peace in an international environment in which there was no central authority. The great divide that has been depicted between the interwar scholars and the first generation of realist scholars cannot withstand much critical scrutiny when the actual discourse of this period is carefully reconstructed. (SCHMIDT, 1998, pp. 192-193).

Despite this normative streak, post-war realism was arguably more pessimistic then the international law/international organization approach had been. Not only did it focus on

power politics, its authors "deliberately sought to accentuate the disordering effects associated with the struggle for power and prestige in the international system" (SCHMIDT, 1998, p. 214). Part of the rationale presented by realist authors was that policymakers would be unable to make wise decisions if the scholarship on which they based these decisions was built on an inverted logic – starting with what should be rather than what was (CARR, 1981). Realism's epistemological position, however, was never completely clear or unified, and its internal debate regarding the role of theory within the field and, more broadly, its social role, are central to IR's development in the 1940s and 1950s.

4.1. THE ROLE OF THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

As Hoffman (1977) has argued, philanthropic foundations are a distinctively American enterprise. They combine several traits of American liberalism: a positive view of the possibility of bettering humankind, a preference for private rather than public funding, a belief in public service and national interest (PARMAR, 2002). Most of them emerged in the early 1900s. That is the case of the Rockefeller foundation, which was created in 1913 with the intent of "[confronting] scientifically (and, if possible, solve) the problems of modern industrial society" (PARMAR, 2002, p. 236). Since the beginning, Rockefeller and other foundations have invested in education and research, having considerable influence in the "battle of ideas", by "mobilizing intellectuals to conduct certain lines of inquiry, at the expense of others, through a highly discriminating process of vetting" (PARMAR, 2002, p. 238).

Private Foundations played a central role in funding the institutions dedicated to the study of international relations in the United States - and, as a consequence, effectively influenced the contours of the developing field. Foundations' intentions with this financing were framed in the Applied Enlightenment presented by Hoffman (1977), the desire to develop research that led to effective solutions to the contemporary problems of the country. Parmar (2011, p.185) points out that

> The progressive roots of Rockefeller and other philanthropies are fundamental to understanding his sense of historical mission. Progressivism is characterized by elite attempts to understand and manage massive social, economic, and cultural transformations within the United States and to promote American power in the global context.

The Rockefeller Foundation was not the only foundation to provide support to International Relations, and the early 1900s were dominated by two other efforts to encourage studies in the field: The World Peace Foundation, founded by Edward Ginn[45], and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Both initiatives focused on the study of international law and organization and, as their names make clear, had a distinctively normative character. A letter by Carnegies to the Trustees details his ambitions for the Endowment:

> When . . . war is discarded as disgraceful to civilized men, the Trustees will please then consider what is the next most degrading evil or evils whose banishment—or what new elevating element or elements if introduced or fostered, or both combined—would most advance the progress, elevation and happiness of man, and so on from century to century without end, my Trustees of each age shall determine how they can best aid man in his upward march to higher and higher stages of development unceasingly; for now we know that man was created, not with an instinct for his own degradation, but imbued with the desire and the power for improvement to which, perchance, there may be no limit short of perfection even here in this life upon earth. (Mr. Carnegie's letter to the Trustees read at their first meeting, December 14, 1910 apud FOX, 1949, p. 68).

However, in the 1940s and 1950s, it was Rockefeller that played a predominant role, due to its role in funding institutes within recognized universities such as Johns Hopkins, the University of Chicago, Yale (and later Princeton) and Columbia, as well as individual researchers[46]. More than that, the Foundation was intimately linked to the group of realist scholars who sought to carry out the project of developing a theory of International Relations and that represented the most relevant intellectual pole of the area at the time.

Support for the IR program was initiated by the Laura Sperman Rockefeller Memorial in the early 1920s, but was incorporated by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1929. As early as 1931, the Foundation's internal correspondence spoke on an initial allocation of $ 750,000.00 (US$ 12 million in updated figures) for the field[47]. In 1935, however, there was

[45] Ginn is the founder of Ginn&Co publisher, it's currently owned by Pearson PLC.
[46] Rockefeller also funded think-thanks, most notably the Council on Foreign Relations, which is responsible for, among other things, the publication of F*oreign Affairs*. Due to my main concern being with academic work within universities I won't be focusing on other initiatives. For more details on them see Parmar (2002).
[47] SM Gunn to EE Day, 31 de December de 1931, Folder 60, Box 7, Series 910, Research Group (RG) 3 Administration, Program and Policy - International Relations - 1933-1941: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

talk of an amount of US $ 500,000.00 (US$ 8 million in updated amounts)[48]. Although IR was seen as a "complicated" field, it was also recognized as essential[49].

The belief that academic knowledge could influence policymaking is made clear in the related documents, as well as the realization that the way to make this happen would be by connecting the academic and political spheres:

> It was generally agreed that the 1919 Peace Conference largely failed because political decisions were made by statesmen responsible for conducting negotiations entirely independently of the recommendations and expert councils of their respective delegations. [...] If the counselor has the confidence of the heads of state, he will be in a position to influence more directly and more effectively the policies of his government[50].

Despite Rockefeller's involvement with the IR field since the 1930s, it is mainly from the second half of the 1940s, especially when Dean Rusk - future Secretary of State and close friend of Kenneth Thompson and Hans Morgenthau - becomes responsible for the area, that the Foundation's project begins to be more clearly delineated. An internal document entitled "The Program for International Studies" describes well the Foundation's involvement and objectives for International Relations at the time:

> From 1935-46 the policy was to support international relations agencies around the world - and to maximize the number of such agencies - based on the theory that study, meetings, discussion of problems would maximize the chance of peace. This policy was modified in principle by the decision to withdraw from all institutions with the exception of some selected for promoting strategic opportunities for the growth of a more rational approach to international relations or a wider knowledge of those peoples with whom we are engaged as architects or great allies.[51]

This becomes evident in the focus on some research institutes, from then on, that would receive donations of larger amounts. Three cases stand out in this regard: the funding of the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins, the transfer of the

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[48] Memo de SHW para Tracy B Kittredge, 06 December 1935, Folder 60, Box 7, Series 910, Research Group (RG) 3 Administration, Program and Policy - International Relations - 1933-1941: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

[49] Memo de SHW para Tracy B Kittredge, 06 December 1935, Folder 60, Box 7, Series 910, Research Group (RG) 3 Administration, Program and Policy - International Relations - 1933-1941: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

[50] Memo Underlying Problems presented by the International Relations Program, 16 June de 1936, Tracy B Kittredge, Folder 60, Box 7, Series 910, Research Group (RG) 3 Administration, Program and Policy - International Relations - 1933-1941: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

[51] Memo Underlying Problems presented by the International Relations Program, 16 June de 1936, Tracy B Kittredge, Folder 60, Box 7, Series 910, Research Group (RG) 3 Administration, Program and Policy - International Relations - 1933-1941: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

Institute for International Studies from Yale to Princeton, and support for the program at the University of Chicago.

About US$1,400,000 was donated to SAIS by Rockefeller in the 1950s, being that a large part was constituted by a grant towards the "research on the theory and practice of foreign policy under the direction of Paul H. Nitze"[52]. The funding of SAIS, which is located in Washington D.C., is in line with the foundation's goal of encouraging proximity between academia and power, and a 1961 report affirms that "friendly observers in the United States and abroad have often called attention to the urgent need for a strong research center at the seat of government in Washington"[53]. In correspondence with Paul Nitze (who had been director of the Policy Planning Staff and was one of the founders of SAIS) Dean Rusk explains this attempt clearly:

> We believe that the problems that concern us have arisen in part from the speed with which the United States' position changed and partly from the unhappy detachment that continues to separate the academic world from the practical world of international affairs in both business and government. (p.1)
>
> […]
>
> In making the union between the academic and the practical it has been the policy of the School from the beginning to encourage its permanent academic body on the one hand to contribute to the Government with its knowledge and on the other, through contacts with the government to keep abreast of the events. (p. 3)[54]

The Institute for International Studies was already receiving resources from Rockefeller when it was based in Yale. In 1951, it was transferred to Princeton, where it became the Center of International Studies, affiliated with the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. In the report sent to RF trustees, the Center describes its objectives as follows: "Its primary function is to provide the kind of knowledge and techniques that will help policymakers solve their dilemmas."[55] A correspondence between Jacob Viner and Joseph Willits (both working at the Rockefeller Foundation) speaks even more openly about the center's relationship with the government: "I do not know in detail

[52] Folder 4499, Box 526, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.2 Johns Hopkins University: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.
[53] Folder 4499, Box 526, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.2 Johns Hopkins University: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.
[54] Folder 4502, Box 516, Series 200S, Research Group (RG) 1.2 Johns Hopkins University: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.
[55] Folder 4685, Box 548, Series 200S, Research Group (RG) 1.2 Princeton University: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

your relationship with the State Department, although I know it's important. In addition to the State Department, the National War College has relied heavily on the institute. "[56]

Another university that benefitted from the Foundation's grants was the University of Chicago, most particularly in the figure of Hans Morgenthau, who not only received grants but was also a member of the Board of Directors of the Rockefeller's program in International Relations. The university's proposed research project was entitled "A proposed contribution toward making American Foreign Policy better understood by both citizens and government officials"[57]. It diagnosed as America's most "vital problem" the lack of "intellectual clarity within the government and among the people at large with regard to the objectives of American foreign policy, the means to be employed, and the historic continuity" of this policy. Its aims, therefore, was to provide "intellectual leadership in the service of American security and world peace" through a "concentrated intellectual effort to relieve the confusion". The most interesting part of the document might be the justification for academics to take on this leadership role, which speaks directly to our discussion of professional jurisdiction in the previous chapter:

> Such intellectual leadership is unlikely to be found either among government officials, under constant political pressures, or in those who zeal for peace […] but whose approach is primarily emotional. […] Leadership of such qualities has to be found, if it can be found at all, among those who are free of both bias and pressure and who have sufficient background of scholarship […] This void ought to be filled by the leaders of thought in the great universities in this country[58].

Returning to A Program for International Studies, the same document makes clear that theory should become the focus of research. The objective of the program is described as "the development of more men and women with advanced skills in dealing with social issues such as scientists, academics and administrators" (p.2) and describes as areas of research that require urgency: a) the search of a theory of international politics and the reexamination of the general principles of foreign policy, and b) the normative aspects of international politics. The theory is obviously not seen as an end in itself but as a guide to be used by policymakers: "it is of the utmost importance that the theoretical efforts are solid from a scientific and rational point of view and that the theory is not divorced of practice"(p.35).

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[56] Folder 4684, Box 548, Series 200S, Research Group (RG) 1.2 Princeton University: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.
[57] Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.
[58] Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

In this sense, it is impossible not to highlight the Conference on International Policy organized by the Rockefeller Foundation in 1954. The conference brought together a number of academics (William T. R Fox, Hans Morgenthau, Reinhold Niebuhr, Arnold Wolfers), policymakers (Robert Bowie, Paul Nitze), foundation staff (Dean Rusk, Dorothy Fosdick), and journalists (Walter Lippman, James Reston) to discuss the issue of IR theory. The program of the Conference included the following topics: I Theory and Practice; II Types of Theory; III The Future of Theoretical Research (GUILHOT, 2011, p.240). In addition to the discussions, each of the participating academics presented an article on the topic in question. As Parmar (2011, 183) suggests, the great importance of the Conference was to demonstrate the perception that "ideas were seen as something that matters," that "the expertise [of intellectuals] was valued and acknowledged at high levels of power in United States" and that "intellectuals and their institutions made a difference".

This theme is taken up by Kenneth Thompson in another paper in which he discusses the state of theory in Political Science[59]:

> Political Science has generally not been able to make that distinction which is the precondition for the development of any true science: the distinction between what is worth knowing intellectually and what is useful for practice. (p.4)
>
> […]
>
> The inadequacy of the quantitative method to the object of study of political science is demonstrated by the limitation of its success to those types of political behavior that by their very nature lend themselves to some measure of quantification, such as voting, and the infertility of attempts to apply the method to phenomena that are determined by historical individuality and moral choice. (p.7)
>
> […]
>
> A theory of politics presents not only a guide to understanding, but also an ideal for action. It presents a map of the political scene not only to understand this scene, but also to show the shortest and most certain way to a certain goal. (p.18)

It seems evident, from the documents analyzed, that the Rockefeller Foundation saw in the development of the field of International Relations in the United States a means to inform the making of American Foreign Policy. Nevertheless, a thorough revision of the involvement of the foundation made in the early 1960s raised questions regarding the ability of academic work to influence policy. A lengthy passage is worth quoting here, not only because it

[59] Document signed by Kenneth Thompson, no date or title, Folder 61, Box 7, Series 910, Research Group (RG) 3 Administration, Program and Policy - International Relations - 1933-1941: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

highlights this objective, but because it calls to mind so many of the arguments that are brought forward in current discussions on the subject:

> The influence of non-official research on foreign policy is limited by the lack of information publicly available, and also by the fact that in many if not most foreign policy issues, decisions must be made before time can be provided for the carrying out of studies justifying the title of research. Further, the Department of State employs its own large research staff which possesses access both to classified and unclassified information, and the reports from the Foreign Service will soon be augmented by those of the new central intelligence authority; its consequent tendency is to discount the policy judgements and the weighing of alternative policies presented by outsiders. This does not mean, of course, that the Department does not use all available information in determining policy, or that it is not indebted to the lone researcher for analysis and information; it does suggest, however, that in the urgency of policymaking, the precise questions at issue will generally be answered without the assistance which non-official research resources might possibly offer.[60]

While this doesn't signify a capitulation of the whole project, it signals a diminished enthusiasm and perhaps some exasperation with the (in)ability of academics to sell their work to a wider audience. A memo from the same period, while trying to debate the possibilities of academics engaging directly in policy debates, lets transpire some of the concerns with those abilities: "A scholarly witness, *dignified but not intellectually arrogant*, helpful and honest, going no further than the facts or consensus of the group would warrant […] would inaugurate a great national tradition and service"[61]. The author argues that such an endeavor would, however, require "training for the social scientists in filtering down, across, and up – training in the communication of what social scientists [think] they have to offer."[62] It is impossible to determine whether these concerns are a result of negative experiences of the writer or simply the manifestation of traditional stereotypes of academics, but it is interesting to note these concerns already existed during a time when there was a clear preoccupation with influencing policymakers.

Interestingly, the early 1960s also mark the beginning of the decline of what we call today Classical Realism, to differentiate it from the structural, Waltzian branch of the realist

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[60] International Relations Program by Gerald Freund, Folder 67, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group (RG) 3 Administration, Program and Policy - International Relations - 1933-1941: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States. (Emphasis added)

[61] Discussion memo: two samples for testing priorities, contributions and communication of International Relations Research. Folder 4769, Box 403, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 11 Rockefeller Foundation Records, Projects: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

[62] Discussion memo: two samples for testing priorities, contributions and communication of International Relations Research. Folder 4769, Box 403, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 11 Rockefeller Foundation Records, Projects: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

tree. The last decade and a half had been the apex of the traditional approach, which had been propelled by a combination of internal and external factors: the Second World War and the decline of the League of Nations, the immigration of scholars like Morgenthau to the U.S., the American government's growing interest in science, the advancement (or threat) of behavioralism in Political Science. Funding by the Rockefeller Foundation was integral to making realism the dominant force in IR, and it resulted from a view that it could have an important practical application in American foreign policy.

4.2 ACADEMIC MOTIVATION IN THE POST-SECOND WORLD WAR

It is impossible to dissociate the role International Relations scholar saw for themselves as academics – that is, what we call here motivation - from the wider discussion on the role of science and of theory in the social world. This discussion, Guilhot (2008, p. 285) argues, focused on two main points of contest, "the role of values, and the problem of the rationality of politics". These points are central to our discussion. On the one hand, a complete dissociation o values from research – that is, value relativism - would mean it would necessarily be devoted to political means, and completely noncommittal to defining political goals (GUILHOT, 2008). This would make of academics, experts, unconcerned with the consequences brought by the practical application of their work.

This conception of science was predominant in the post-World War II (GUILHOT, 2008), but was increasingly criticized by those who saw in it the moral blindness that led to the involvement of many scholars with authoritarian regimes, notably Nazism in Germany. The most notable critics were probably the authors of the Frankfurt School. Their critical theory is quite complex, but the passage below gives a good idea of their view of positivism:

> Positivism, which finally did not shrink from laying hands on the idlest fancy of all, thought itself, eliminated the last intervening agency between individual action and the social norm. The technical process, to which the subject has been reified after the eradication of that process from consciousness, is as free from the ambiguous meaning of mythical thought as from meaning altogether, since reason itself has become merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus. (HORKHEIMER; ADORNO, 2002, p. 23).

The Frankfurt School's strain of critique, however, only gained traction within the field of International Relations in the 1980s (in the midst of the "Third Debate"). Despite

similarities, Realist criticism came from a more conservative position. The objection to value relativism was combined with an incredulity towards the possibility of a completely rational politics. This stemmed from a fairly pessimistic view of humankind and the limits of reason to control its darkest impulses. There is no greater example of this view than Morgenthau's description of the *animus dominandi,* man's untamable desire for power, which would only be satisfied "if the last man became an object of his domination" (MORGENTHAU, 1949, p. 155). Power, according to this view, was not something to be rationalized and quantified. Classical realism did not offer a conceptualization of power that would be measurable because it commonly included – despite differences between authors – subjective elements.

If reason had its limits, then, what could provide "transcendental guidance" (MORGENTHAU, 1972, p. 19) for both scholars and policymakers? According to Guilhot (2010), the answer is to be found in the "theological underpinnings" of American realism. One of its greatest influences, particularly over Morgenthau's work, is Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian Realism, a combination of a somewhat somber view of political reality, Christian morals as a guide for action and a critical position vis-à-vis liberalism and scientificism (GUILHOT, 2010, PAVLISCHEK, 2008). Though it is not always evident in their theoretical works, this moral component is crucial to understand realism's larger epistemological stance:

> Realists found in a loosely articulated political theology the bulwark against the dangers associated with the claims of moral self-sufficiency characteristic of a political modernity in which they discerned a worrying replacement of politics with technology, a fundamental indifference for values, and the incapacity to discriminate and make political decisions. (GUILHOT, 2010, p. 247)

This view on the limits of rationalization over politics also opened space for the wisdom of policy practitioners, not only in political action, but even in the development of theory. It also meant that theory was not seen as "scientific principles", as timeless laws to be discovered by scholars, but more as a set "prudential maxims" to inform action (GUILHOT, 2008, p. 282). Practice imbued statesmen with a kind of knowledge that could not be acquired by other means, that could not be replace by science. Scholars and practitioners, philosophers and kings, each had their separate roles to play.

In a way, classical realism was a deeply "illiberal" enterprise (GUILHOT, 2010, p. 244), which puts it at odds with Rockefeller's and other Foundations' goals. What explains the Foundation's continued support for this group of IR scholars is in large part the nature of the Program on International Relations, which was established in 1953–1954 and headed by Kenneth Thompson. It was "based on a de facto alliance with Hans Morgenthau, whose views

of the field of IR and of the need for a theory it entirely endorsed" (GUILHOT, 2008, p. 290). It was a specificity of this Program, which does not mean that Rockefeller did not invest in different views, and the foundation actually provided large sums for behavioralist projects in Political Science (HAUPTMANN, 2006).

The post-war realist theoretical endeavor, then, had to tread a fine line, where it sought to be useful to policymakers, but at the same time escape positivist notions of what it meant to be useful. It justified its existence both by claiming its role of "intellectual leadership"[63], and by presenting itself as a resistance to technocratic behavioralism, which left no space for the art of diplomacy and policymaking in all its subjectivity and context-contingency.

Below, I explore in further detail this position and what it meant for academic engagement. I focus mostly on the realist pole which, as I have exposed above, was the dominant force in IR in the 1950s. I address firstly the views of Hans Morgenthau on the subject and subsequently the discussions that took place on the aforementioned 1954 conference on International Relations Theory, funded by the Rockefeller Foundation.

4.2.1 Hans Morgenthau and the role of Science

Stanley Hoffman (1977, p. 44) states that "if our discipline has a founding father, it is Morgenthau." He started to fall out of favor with IR academia in the 1960s, when more formal methodologies gained traction, but recent years have witnessed a revival of his popularity (GUILHOT, 2010). He was certainly the biggest name in realist circles of his time, and possibly the only one to retain a place in current IR theory curricula.

Morgenthau was born in Germany in 1904, and died in the United States in 1980. He emigrated in 1930, after the rise of Nazism (Morgenthau was Jewish), when he was already a professor. His studies in Germany started in Law, and his doctoral dissertation (defended in 1928) was titled "The judicial function in the international realm; its nature and its limitations" (FREI, 2001, p. 37). His interests had already started to change, however, in the late 1920s, when he moved to Frankfurt and came into contact with a group of intellectuals

[63] Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

that included, among others, Marx Horkheimer, Franz Oppenheimer, Karl Mannheim, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Mercuse (FREI, 2001).

Despite this illustrious company, according to one of his biographers, Cristoph Frei, his main intellectual influence (especially in his youth) was Nietzsche. In him, he found a perennial source of inspiration, a "diagnostic mind who sets down how things really are", yet at the same time "remains a teacher of the relativity of all knowledge, of its limitations and contingencies […] of the tragic limitations of human life itself" (FREI, 2010, pp. 106-107). The fact that he hardly advertised this inspiration is very likely due to the political climate (and the reaction to anything German) he encountered when he emigrated to the United States.

Coming from Europe, like many other academics at the time, Morgenthau fortuitously (at least for himself) carried with him an ambition that was in accordance with that of those in charge of the Program in International Relations at the Rockefeller Foundation: the desire to develop a theory of international politics. It differed, however, from those who wished to replicate the exact methods of the natural sciences in the social domain:

> Immersed in an intellectual tradition that emphasized the difference between the social sciences and the natural sciences, he was determined both to erect an empirical science opposed to utopias and international jurists and political ideologues, and to assert the unity of empirical research and philosophical questioning within the correct social order. He wanted to be normative, but to base his norms on the reality of politics, not on the aspirations of politicians or the constructs of jurists. (HOFFMAN, 1977, p.44)

His main ideas regarding the role of scholars and their relation to power are mainly exposed in two books, *Scientific Man versus Power Politics*, first published in 1946, and *Science: servant or master?*, published in 1971. The opening paragraph of the first gives a good idea of the dilemma Morgenthau (1947, p. 9) seeks to explore: "Two moods determine the attitude of our civilization to the social world: confidence in the power of reason, as represented by modern Science, to solve the social problems of our age and despair at the ever-renewed failure of scientific reason to solve them".

Scientific Man is in part a fruit of Morgenthau's "bewilderment about American political culture and, as he perceived it, its cheerful optimism about the betterment of politics, society, and humanity in general" (BEHR, 2016, p. 33), which clearly clashed with his Nietzsche-inspired realism. His critique of positivism in the book is so fierce that he later

commented he was glad it had been published after he was granted tenure at the University of Chicago, since he feared it might have cost him his position (BEHR, 2016).

Morgenthau, like other realists of the time, did not believe in the total objectivity of science, nor in a capacity of theory to dictate practice completely. Academic work is always influenced by a scholar's "personal equation"[64], the perspective by which he looks at society, while practice is inevitably influenced by factors external to the capacity for theorizing: the irrationality of certain actors, the ad hoc combination of historical facts, the capacity of statesmen. However, there remains the belief that states can "minimize evil and make the world better," or at least prevent it from deteriorating into "constant conflicts and injustices" (JERVIS, 2011, p.34). While he sees a role for theory in informing practice, he believes this role is limited by the very nature of politics:

> Politics is an art and not a science, and what is required for its mastery is not the rationality of the engineer but the wisdom and the moral strength of the statesman. The social world, deaf to the appeal to reason pure and simple, yields only to that intricate combination of moral and material pressures which the art of the statesman creates and maintains. (MORGENTHAU, 1947, p. 16)

On the one hand, Morgenthau defended the "special obligation" of scholars to "take a stand" and "render meaningful value judgements on public affairs", on the other he questioned the limits of intellectual's abilities to influence politics. He describes Mannheim, for example, as a "brilliant but politically naïve scholar" (FREI, 2001, pp. 149-150). There is also an intrinsic clash within the intellectual, for Morgenthau (1972), between the pursuit of his usefulness to society and the danger of subservience to politics. For him, the two domains have distinct concerns: while science must be concerned with truth, politics is concerned with power.

Science: servant or master? is dedicated to Reinhold Neibuhr, and his influence is clear throughout the book. Its main theme is the place of morality in science, and how its absence in scholarship can contribute to the "moral decadence of society" (MORGENTHAU, 1972, p. 12). The struggle presented by Morgenthau in the book is that of a science that has to justify its existence by being useful, yet at the same time must contend with moral issues that might pit it against those in power. Morgenthau emphasizes the goal of significance in academic work in passages like the one below:

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[64] "The Moral Standards of the Social Scientist" by Hans J. Morgenthau, Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

> A policy theory that is meaningful must be geared to political practice. The theoretical thought about politics is by implication also a thought for politics. It necessarily contains a normative element. *It is only significant if relevant to political action*. However, this relevance is at the mercy of the will of the actor (MORGENTHAU 1972, p. 42, emphasis added).

At the same time, he is concerned that this goal of usefulness may lead to an oversight of moral obligations. He argues that, by judging the value of science by its utility, the matter becomes not practical, but ethical; not how to know something, but what is worth knowing. He adds that "the refusal to make morally relevant use of […] intellectual ability is the real deficiency of the scientific man" (MORGENTHAU, 1972, p. 10). By abandoning ethical considerations, science might not only be useful, but be *used by* those who have practical concerns and are not necessarily seeking the truth. A science of politics must always question "the deeper meaning and value of political theories and institutions", it is its duty to wonder about "the justification of man's domination over man, about the demarcation between the individual sphere and the social sphere – […] all those questions that have always been at the center of a comprehensive theory of the state" (FREI, 2001, p. 153).

Morgenthau delves again into his perceived shortcomings of positivist science and into the dangers of value-relativism:

> When confronted with issues such as this, the Higher Learning takes refuge in the claim that is value free and neutral as to the Transcendent meaning and uses of science. But this claim is, and is bound to be, without substance. For all science, by distinguishing between what is and what is not worth knowing, derives from the generally implicit and inarticulate System of Values. (MORGENTHAU, 1972, p. 16).

This view is connected with his preoccupation with a possible decay of Western values (GUILHOT, 2010). While he saw problems with democratic oversight in matters of security and foreign policy, he also worried about the "political apathy" of American population, which he believed stemmed in large part from the difficulty of the average man in accompanying the latest scientific advances. This, he argues, gives inordinate power to the "scientific elites", the only ones with the capacity to comprehend the increasingly "esoteric" modern scientific knowledge. This control of knowledge turns these elites into "political actors of the first importance" (MORGENTHAU, 1972, p. 99). And, in an odd inversion of values, because policymakers cannot understand the science itself, the success of scientific arguments will depend more on the political skills of their proponents than on their scientific soundness. The result is a complete change on the function and character of scientific elites:

> They no longer advise merely on the basis of expert knowledge, but they are also the champions of policies promoted with unrivaled authority and frequently determined by the virtue of it. In the eyes both of the political authorities and the public at large, the scientific elites appear as the guardians of the *arcana imperii*, the secret remedies for public ills (MORGENTHAU, 1972, p. 101).

While the relation between scholars and policymakers can be useful for society, it has its dangers. For academics, the only way to counter them is by adhering to moral values that must, at the very least, include a non-wavering commitment to the truth. There is, therefore, a double duty of the intellectual: on the one hand, to always seek the "objective" truth about his object of study (in this case, politics), and on the other hand to keep abreast of the great political questions of his time (COZETTE, 2008). He should not, therefore, remain alienated in the "ivory tower" of the academy, but put his knowledge at the service of the improvement of society, despite its limitations.

Roughly, it can be said that Morgenthau's theoretical approach is in the middle between the Enlightened Applied Project and his faith in the practical application of a totally objective science to social problems and the belief in the need for complete isolation between science and politics. This is evident in Morgenthau's own relation to political establishment: although he maintained some indirect connection through the Rockefeller Foundation and consulted during a brief period during the Truman administration, as well as sought to develop work that would be useful to policymakers, he had an uneasy relationship with the government (COX, 2007). Though that might have stemmed from a particularly unpleasant experience: In 1953, Morgenthau offered his service to Washington in a negotiation with the Spanish government – he had resided in Spain before coming to the U.S and felt he could be useful. His offer was denied, which clearly wounded his pride. He wrote of the experience:

> It was such a humiliating experience that I swore an oath that I shall never offer my services to the government again. If they want me, they can come to me…It was really plain stupid because I had probably a unique entrance to the Spaniards who trusted me as a personal friend, and I knew more about it than probably anybody else in this country. (apud FREI, 2001, p. 57)

Nevertheless, his comments on the moral standards of social science include some thoughts on its duty to speak truth to power, even when it does not want to hear: "for a social science which is faithful to its moral commitment of telling the truth about society cannot help telling a society what it does not want to hear" [65]. He sees a tension between the natural

[65] The Moral Standards of the Social Scientist" by Hans J. Morgenthau, Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

desire of all men to be popular among his peers, and this duty, which will necessarily make of social science "at the very least […] an unpopular undertaking", and at its very best, "a subversive and revolutionary force within society" [66]. Social science, then, must be either unpopular, for speaking difficult truths, or respected because it "performs useful functions for society"[67]. If it is neither "it is likely that it has retreated into a sphere that lies beyond the positive or negative interest of society."[68]

There is evidence that Morgenthau lived what he preached. He kept in touch with policymakers, and always sought to make his work useful, but he always criticized those policies with which he disagreed, what did not always make him popular. He criticized, for example, the missionary impulse of American foreign policy and called for a pragmatist policy based on the national interest. He disdained the moralizing anticommunists of his time, and also criticized any American interventions that he felt had other grounds than the strictest interpretation of national interest, as was the case with Vietnam.

Morgenthau's view of the role of scholars is an interesting combination of duties – to truth, to society, to policymakers, to higher moral values. In a way, much like his theory of politics, it is a "series of maxims" (GUILHOT, 2008) rather than a direct guide to action, a series of comments on what is wrong. Its spiritual components can at times make an odd reading for modern academics, but they cannot be ignored and are an integral part of his worldview. The passage below, I believe, encapsulates his main ideas:

> This task to preserve the specifically human in man's existence and, through it, the divine, makes of the scholar indeed the "supreme, genuine man". In this period of history only the scholar fulfills man's true mission: not the scholar who seeks new knowledge for its own sake; but the one whose consciousness, opened by the shock of suffering wonderment, stretches out toward the infinite to merge with it in thought. In the dialogue with the infinite, he is in this epoch the only one to realize in the mission of science also the mission of man. (MORGENTHAU, 1972, p.72).

[66] "The Moral Standards of the Social Scientist" by Hans J. Morgenthau, Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.
[67] "The Moral Standards of the Social Scientist" by Hans J. Morgenthau, Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.
[68] "The Moral Standards of the Social Scientist" by Hans J. Morgenthau, Folder 4874, Box 411, Series 200, Research Group (RG) 1.1 University of Chicago: Rockefeller Foundation Archive, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, NY, United States.

4.2.2 The 1954 Conference on International Theory

On May 7th and 8th of 1954, a number of the most influential academics of the field of International Relations – Arnold Wolfers, Reinhold Niebuhr, Hans Morgenthau, William T. R Fox, Paul Nitze – gathered in Washington D.C. with policymakers – Robert Bowie and Dorothy Fosdick of the Policy Planning Staff – and other influential figures –Don K. Price, James B. Reston, Walter Lippman - to discuss the future of theory in the field and its relations with political practice. The meeting was funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, and organized by Dean Rusk, then president of the Foundation, and Kenneth Thompson, who was serving as a consultant in the its division of Social Sciences. While the meeting did not generate the ultimate theory of international politics – and actually only resulted in "fifty pages of unfocused discussion, misunderstandings, equivocal notions, disagreements about fundamental concepts, and much soul searching that remains inconclusive down to the very end" (GUILHOT, 2011, p. 11) – it is a window into what went on inside some of the most renown names in International Relations of that time.

The main purpose they set for themselves, and which was the main subject of the short papers that Morgenthau, Niebuhr, Nitze, Wolfers and Fox sent in advance, was the role of theory. Most of them described it as a useful simplification, as a way to administer and filter the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of international politics. They presented their view of theory as something between the work practitioners have, dealing with all the details of every occurrence, and the excessive simplification of behavioral theories. Most of them present rather negative views of positivism, though Paul Nitze is by far its most ardent critic:

> I have little patience with those behaviorist theories which maintain that there is no such thing as a better or worse decision in foreign affairs and that the proper subject for the student of international affairs is merely what decisions were in fact made and why. Almost invariably value judgment remains in this type of analysis but in an implicit rather than explicit form. It would seem much better to get necessary value judgements out into the open where they can be looked at than to have them obscured in a pseudo-scientific approach[69].

The only opposition to this view seemed to be Arnold Wolfers, who, despite enumerating some limitations of the behavioral approach in social sciences, defends that its

[69] "The implications of theory for Practice in the conduct of Foreign Affairs" by Paul Nitze. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 277-280.

benefits had "proved invaluable"[70]. He also argued that the work of the theorist was to elaborate hypothesis regarding the relationship between specified variables, as well as the development of useful concepts and even criticized the attention to "ambiguous concepts" such as "national interest"[71]. His views on quantitative work are also worth mentioning. He is the only one to explicitly address the subject, and his views are strikingly similar to those of some contemporary authors:

> There was danger that the quest for maximum reliability and communicability such as only quantification can provide, would discourage studies on phenomena which were not amenable to such measurement and on the other hand lead to the exertion of effort on the quantitative verification of hypotheses so trivial that they deserved no interest.[72]

They divided their discussion on theory in two main topics: normative theory and general theory of politics. The debate on normative theory also included a debate on the concept of "national interest". Most agreed that it went beyond the interest of a particular group, though they also had a hard time defining it. Niebuhr argued that countries, and especially the United States in its role of hegemon, should find a way to extend this interest to include the "general good"[73], and most saw in free trade as example of selfish interest that benefitted the whole. Dorothy Fosdick, however, cautioned that, by acting in a self-sacrificing manner, a state could add "another factor of unpredictability to the international affairs world"[74] and Morgenthau added that this could not work on a theoretical level, because it would be impossible to reconcile a foreign policy determined by national interest and one determined by principles "which transcend national interest.[75]"

[70] "Theory of International Politics: its merits and advancement" by Arnold Wolfers. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284.
[71] "Theory of International Politics: its merits and advancement" by Arnold Wolfers. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284.
[72] "Theory of International Politics: its merits and advancement" by Arnold Wolfers. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284.
[73] "Theory of International Politics: its merits and advancement" by Arnold Wolfers. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284.
[74]"Theory of International Politics: its merits and advancement" by Arnold Wolfers. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284..
[75] "Theory of International Politics: its merits and advancement" by Arnold Wolfers. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284.

Yet at the same time, they – this group of twelve like-minded people – could not agree on the moral basis of normative theory. For the most part, they seemed to be chasing their own tales, as this small sample of their dialogue on the subject shows:

> DEAN RUSK: […] We must have the parts in harmony with the hole. Harmony of the hole is not good if it does not include the parts, i.e., liberty and equality, and yet, liberty and equality are not good if they destroy the harmony of the whole.
>
> […]
>
> REINHOLD NIEBUHR: The harmony of the whole is not good if it does not include liberty and equality.
>
> ARNOLD WOLFERS: And liberty and equality are not good if they destroy the good of the whole.
>
> PAUL NITZE: Tyranny is preferable to chaos[76].

While most of those present saw an important role for morals in the making of foreign policy, they seemed to have a hard time reconciling the ambiguity of morality with the generalizations they saw as an integral part of the theoretical endeavor. William T. R. Fox closes their debate on normative theory not with an answer, but with a series of questions that remain open: "What are the norms to be put into a normative value theory? What is the cost of one set of values against another? […] What is the relevance of a particular prescription to the world as it exists, and a whole host of other activities which would clarify one's values?"[77]

Paul Nitze, who had been the director of the Policy Planning Staff from 1949-1953, draws from his own experience to argue that theory can, and in fact has been useful to policy practitioners. Returning to the concept of theory presented previously, he argues that many of the problems policymakers face are "of such a degree of complexity that they cannot be intelligently discussed […] without simplifications, abstractions and assumptions"[78]. He even argues that without the "tools of theory and political philosophy", it would be impossible to act in a "rational manner"[79]. Despite his own defense of theory, Nitze claims that many of his

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[76] Conference on International Politics. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284.

[77] Conference on International Politics. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 281-284.

[78] "The implications of theory for Practice in the conduct of Foreign Affairs" by Paul Nitze. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 277-280.

[79] "The implications of theory for Practice in the conduct of Foreign Affairs" by Paul Nitze. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 277-280.

colleagues have a distrust of theory, preferring to act based on past experiences, and he himself makes some strong remarks on the current states of political theory:

> Frankly, it was our opinion [at the Policy Planning Staff] that much of the contemporary academic work in the theory of international politics fell between two stools. It did not have sufficient depth in philosophic insight to give much light on the question of the long-range content of our national purpose and on the other hand much of it failed to meet the test of being relevant to the realm of possible action[80].

Nitze, along with many of those present, also made an argument for the importance of the knowledge of practitioners in formulating theories. Niebuhr, in fact, positively compares the "wise statesmen" with the social scientists of his time, who believe that the social world could be understood in the same manner as the natural world, making their studies useless for political practice[81]. Nitze, for his part, argued that practitioners had "original and valid insights" into their field of action, derived from "concentrated experience"[82].

All in all, there are some points of agreement which seem to emerge from the meeting: firstly, theory should be made of generalizations that are used to filter information, but it should not be so abstract that it is completely useless in concrete situations policymakers will face – in this belief, of course, it is implied that theory *should be* useful to policymakers. There is a general distrust of behavioral advances, and its "particular conception of what is scientific". There is agreement that morality should be present in theory, and that it should guide policy actions, though the group seems unable to agree on the contents of this morality or on the notion of national interest. Finally, there is both an agreement that theory – despite its utility – has its limits in guiding action, and that practitioners can make their own contributions to the field.

[80] "The implications of theory for Practice in the conduct of Foreign Affairs" by Paul Nitze. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 277-280.
[81] "The Moral Issue in International Relations" by Reinhold Niebuhr. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 277-280.
[82] "The implications of theory for Practice in the conduct of Foreign Affairs" by Paul Nitze. Folder 69, Box 8, Series 910, Research Group 3.1, Rockefeller Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. Published in GUILHOT, 2011, pp. 277-280.

4.3 ACADEMICS AND POLICYMAKING IN THE "GOLDEN AGE"

One of the main reasons the 1945-1960 period is seen as the "golden age" of academic engagement is due to a series of famous practitioners-academics, like George Kennan and Paul Nitze. Apart from these names, however, there is little data on less known academic's involvement in policymaking. This has led me to restrict my analysis somewhat to the "policy side", where the Department of State archives made this possible. There isn't, of course, any way to search for "academics" in the thousands of documents available, so I decided to concentrate my efforts where I felt it would be most likely to find them: the Policy Planning Staff.

The Policy Planning Staff was created in 1947 by George Kennan. Since then, it has been known as an in-house think-thank of the State Department, that has as its mission to "take a longer term, strategic view of global trends and frame recommendations for the Secretary of State to advance U.S. interests and American values" (STATE DEPARTMENT, online). While it is not an equivalent to the Council of Economic Advisors, which is always staffed with academics, it is perhaps the closest thing in foreign policy. For this reason, I decided to focus this part of the analysis on the "S/P", as it is known, analyzing especially its members and their relationship with the academic world.

4.3.1 The Policy Planning Staff

The Policy Planning Staff is part of a wide array of bureaus that make up the U.S. Department of State (see ANNEX A). Its Director, however, reports directly to the Secretary of State, can communicate with him more or less directly, and "memoranda and policy proposals may go to the secretary without review or clearance from the geographic or functional bureaus" (PUGLIARESI; BERLINER, 1989). Most members of the Staff come from the senior ranks of Foreign Service, other government agencies, academia and the private sector, and are chosen base on their expertise on a respective field. The Staff's mission seems to be a combination of academic and practical expertise and functions:

> I conceive S/P's general function as being the 7th Floor substantive staff for you and the other principals-a kind of Kitchen Cabinet. It should aim for a blend of policy formulation and planning. On the one hand, it should not become yet one more

> aspirant for operational control over policy implementation, vying with the bureaus. But neither should it become simply a long-range planning unit, producing intellectually interesting but basically irrelevant studies. (PUGLIARESI; BERLINER, 1989, p. 382).

George Kennan was both the creator and first Director of S/P. The first members of the Staff – only five – were a diverse group: a military officer, a government economist, an academic, a Foreign Service officer, and the former personal assistant to a Secretary of State. As time went by, however, Foreign Service officers became the majority of members[83]. Table 5 (bellow) shows all the members that participated of the Staff during the Truman Administrations. There is no official list of former members, so this one was put together by consulting all the documents at the State Department Archives that contained the terms "Policy Planning Staff" or "S/P". The main occupation of each one is fruit of further research, which can be found on Appendix A[84]. This also means that there might be gaps in the information, and despite my best efforts I cannot guarantee that there are no names missing.

Table 5 - Policy Planning Staff Members, Truman Administration

Name	Main occupation
George Kennan – Director	Foreign service officer, academic
Paul Nitze - Director	Academic, statesman
Francis T. Williamson – Director	Academic, foreign service officer
George H. Butler - Deputy Director	Foreign service officer
John H Ferguson – Deputy Director	Private Sector
Philip H. Watts – Executive Secretary	Foreign service officer
Carlton Savage – Executive Secretary	Foreign service officer, academic
Bernard A. Gufler	Foreign service officer
Charles Burton Marshall	Academic
Charles C. Stelle	Foreign service officer

[83] I use Foreign Service Officer as an umbrella term to include a variety of careers within the State Department. The main idea here is to differentiate them from those that came from either civil society or other departments.
[84] Since there is virtually no information available regarding S/P I decided to organize it in the form of short biographies of each member and include it as an appendix so that other researchers may access it.

Dorothy Fosdick	Political advisor
Edmund A Guillon	Foreign service officer, academic
Foy D. Kohler	Foreign service officer
Frank Hopkins Oran	Foreign service officer
George Lewis Jones Jr.	Foreign service officer
George Wadsworth	Foreign service officer
Harry H. Scwhartz	Foreign service officer
Henry S. Villard	Foreign service officer
James L. Berry	Foreign service officer
John Paton Davies Jr	Foreign service officer
Kenneth C. Krentz	Foreign service officer
Leon Fuller	Foreign service officer
Louis J. Halle	Academic, Foreign service officer
Robert G Hooker Jr	Foreign service officer
Robert Prather Joyce	Foreign service officer
Robert Tufts	Foreign service officer
Walter J. Levy – consultant	Private Sector
Walter Kelly Schwinn	Foreign service officer

Source: State Department Archives[85]

[85] Minutes of a Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of States, November 3rd, 1949, 3 p.m. **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, vol I**. eds. Peterson, Neal H. et al (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 573; Minutes of the 148th Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, Tuesday, October 11, 1949, 11 a. m. to 1 p. m., Department of State, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I,** eds. Peterson, Neal H. et al (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2** eds. Peterson, Neal H. and Lisle A. Rose. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I,** eds. Keefer, Edward C. and Mabon, David W. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985); Memorandum by Henry S. Villard of the Policy Planning Staff to the

Note: I included information on those who either were academics prior to entering the foreign service or became academics after leaving. The order of the words represents this.

As can be seen, despite some attempts at diversification, the vast majority of members were Foreign Service Officers. Academics are present, though in a very small number, and some of the participants became academics after leaving the government (denoted by Foreign service officer, *followed by* academic). It is also interesting to notice that many of the members, even if they never became officially affiliated with a university, produced some intellectual work, in the form of books and journal articles. Graph 3, below, shows that more than half of the 28 members published in at least one of those outlets:

Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V**, eds. Bernbaum, John A. et al (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982); Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1** eds. Claussen, Paul et al (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western European Security, Volume V, Part** 1 eds. Bernbaum, John A.. et al (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 2,** eds. Peterson, Neal H. and Lisle A. Rose. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984); Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Linder), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X,** eds. Raether, Carl. and Sampson, Charles S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989); Memorandum by Leon Fuller of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Nitze), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1**, **,** eds. Raether, Carl. and Sampson, Charles S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986); Paper Prepared by Charles Burton Marshall and John H. Ferguson of the Policy Planning Staff, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 1,** eds. Baehler, David M. et al. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X,** eds. Raether, Carl. and Sampson, Charles S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The American Republics, Volume IV,** eds. Kane, Stephen N. and Sanford, William F. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983).

Graph 3 - Publications by members of the Policy Planning Staff (Truman Administration)



Source: see Appendix A.

Kennan's Policy Planning Staff is still considered the golden standard of efficacy, and S/P had a large influence over American foreign policy of the time, including on the "development of U.S. policy in postwar Germany and Japan, as well as predicting the break between Tito and Stalin in 1948 and guiding the subsequent U.S. policy response" PUGLIARESI; BERLINER, 1989, p.383). Much of this might be due to Kennan's proximity with then Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, though the external context – the beginning of the Cold War - probably also had considerable influence. There was a concern with being ahead of the soviets which lent greater importance to strategic planning, the main goal of the Staff.

In 1949, however, Marshall was replaced by Dean Acheson, with whom Kennan did not have such a strong rapport. Feeling shut off, he ended up resigning in 1950. Paul Nitze, who was his close friend, took over. Although S/P made contributions to foreign policy in many important issues, such as the "Korean War, German rearmament, the Iranian oil dispute, the impact of thermonuclear weapons, and periodic foreign exchange crises" (PUGLIARESI; BERLINER, 1989, p.385), it didn't have quite the same influence as it had had with Kennan. Nevertheless, Kennan and Nitze (the Haw and the Dove), remain known as two of the most important historical figures in American foreign policy:

> a couple of generations ago, two men emerged in the foreign-policy establishment who exercised influence over 50 years of debate: Paul Nitze and George Kennan. Nitze, with his bureaucratic skills and nimbleness, worked under every president from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George H.W. Bush. Kennan conceived of the policy of containment that guided America after WW II — and then spent the next five decades as a powerful, disillusioned voice combating what containment had become. (THOMPSON, 2009, online)

Under President Eisenhower, Robert Bowie became Director of Policy Planning. Much like Kennan in the past, Bowie had a close relationship with the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Bowie had taught at Harvard for a decade before joining the Staff, and was never a Foreign Service officer, as Kennan had been, or a statesman like Nitze became. He was the founder and first director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard (now the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs). Most of the other members of the Staff during his tenure, however, were Foreign Service officers, as can be seen on Table 6 (below).

Table 6 - Policy Planning Staff Members, Eisenhower Administration

Name	Main occupation
Gerard C. Smith - Director	Private Sector, Foreign service officer
Robert R. Bowie - Director	Academic, Foreign service officer
Alexander M. Bickel	Foreign service officer, academic
Charles Stelle	Foreign service officer
Charles Yost	Foreign service officer, academic
Edmund Guillon	Foreign service officer, academic
Edward E.Rice	Foreign service officer
Elbert G. Mathews	Foreign service officer
Evan M. Wilson	Foreign service officer
Fraser Wilkins	Foreign service officer
Evan M. Wilson	Foreign service officer
George A. Morgan	Foreign service officer
Harry Schwartz	Foreign service officer

Henry Brodie	Foreign service officer
Henry C. Ramsey	Government Economist
Henry D. Owen	Foreign service officer
Howard E. Furnas	Foreign service officer
Jacob D. Beam	Foreign service officer
Jeffrey C. Kitchen	Foreign service officer
John C. Campbell	Foreign service officer
Nathan Spencer Barnes	Foreign service officer
Philip H. Watts	Foreign service officer
Ralph S. Block	Army officer
Richard H. Davis	Foreign service officer
Robert C. Strong	Foreign service officer
Robert F. Packard	Foreign service officer
Robert McClintock	Foreign service officer
William Leonhart	Foreign service officer

Source: State Department Archives[86]

[86] Minutes of a Meeting of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of States, November 3rd, 1949, 3 p.m. **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, vol I**. eds. Peterson, Neal H. et al (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 573; List of Person, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX**, eds. Baehler, David M., Samson, Charles (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993); Memorandum by Edmund A. Gullion to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 2,** eds. Peterson, Neal H. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982); Memorandum From Edward E. Rice of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI,** eds. Glennon, John P. . (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991); Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX,** eds. Schwar, Harriet D. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993); Memorandum From William Leonhart of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Kalijarvi), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII,** eds. Claussen, Paul et al. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991); Memorandum From Evan M. Wilson of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director (Smith), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII,** ed. Keefer, Edward C. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI,** eds. Glennon, John P. . (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991); Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to the Under Secretary of State (Dillon), **Foreign Relations of the**

Despite the presence of very few academics, as had been the case with members of S/P under Truman, many of them had publications. Only eleven of the 28 members did not publish either books, articles on Foreign Affairs or in academic journals, as can be seen on Graph 4 (below).

Graph 4 - Publications by members of the Policy Planning Staff (Eisenhower Administration)



Source: see Appendix A.

When he became President, Kennedy renamed S/P as Policy Planning *Council* at the start of his administration, and increased the scope of its work to include the drafting of

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United States, 1958–1960, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume IV, eds. Coffman, Suzanne E., Keefer, Edward C., Schwar, Harriet D. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992); Memorandum from Richard H. Davis of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Staff (Bowie), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV** eds. Landa, Ronald, Miller, Aron D., Sampson, Charles S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989); Memorandum From Robert McClintock of the Policy Planning Staff to the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Bowie), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI,** eds. McMahon, Robert J., Schwar, Harriet D., Smith, Louis J. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989); Memorandum for the Record by Robert F. Packard of the Policy Planning Staff, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Cuba, Volume VI,** eds. Glennon, John P. . (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X,** eds. Raether, Carl. and Sampson, Charles S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1989); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Africa and South Asia, Volume XI, Part 1** eds. Claussen, Paul et al. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII,** eds. Glennon, John P. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1991).

National Strategy Papers and the Secretary of State speeches. He named economist W. W. Rostow as its Director, now called Chairman. Rostow's S/P was influential despite the redistribution of tasks that gave less prominence to the Department of State during the Kennedy years. This was in part due to Rostow's previous relationship with the President. Pugliaresi and Berliner (1989, p. 387), suggest that "the office was heavily involved in operations and more attention was given to economic issues. It was also during Rostow's time that the office made its first and only attempt at getting heavily involved in the budgeting of foreign affairs programs".

Kennedy's Policy Planning Staff is the one with the highest number of academics among its members: 6 out 17, more than a third (see Table 7, below). It also had members from the private sector and the army, with only about half of its members being foreign service officers - a sharp contrast with Eisenhower's S/P, where 23 out of 28 members originated from the State Department.

Table 7 - Policy Planning Staff Members, Kennedy Administration

Name	Main occupation
George C. McGhee - Director	Private Sector, Political advisor
Walt W. Rostow - Director	Academic
Henry D. Owen – Deputy Director	Foreign service officer
Maurice J. Mountain – Deputy Director	Army, academic
Robert H. Johnson – Deputy Director	Academic
Evan M. Wilson	Foreign service officer
Gerard C. Smith	Private sector, Foreign service officer
Henry C. Ramsey	Government Economist
Howard Wriggins	Academic, Foreign service officer
John Curtis	Foreign service officer
John W. Ford	Foreign service officer
Joseph A. Yager	Foreign service officer
Robert Packard	Foreign service officer
William J. Jordan	Journalist
William R. Duggan	Foreign service officer, academic
William R. Polk	Academic
William Webb	Foreign service officer

Source: State Department Archives [87]

Kennedy's Policy Planning Staff also had more publications than either of the others. As can be seen on the Graph below, only four of its members didn't publish a book or journal article, ten published a book, and 13 published in Foreign Affairs or other academic journals (or both).

Graph 5 - Publications by members of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennedy Administration)



Source: see Appendix A.

[87] Memorandum for the Record, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics,** eds. Keefer, Edward C, Schwar, Harriet D, Fain III, W. Taylor. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996); Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Johnson) to the Director (Rostow), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962,** eds. Glennon, John P., Baehrer, David M., Sampson, Charles S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1990); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XII, American Republics,** eds. Keefer, Edward C, Schwar, Harriet D, Fain III, W. Taylor. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996); **List of Persons, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961,** eds. Glennon, John P., Baehrer, David M., Sampson, Charles S. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1990), Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy** eds. Mabon, David W. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1990); Memorandum From William R. Polk of the Policy Planning Council to the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XVIII, Near East, 1962–1963**, ed. Noring, Nina J. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995); Record of the Policy Planning Staff Meeting, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union**, ed. Sampson, Charles S., Joyce, John Michael. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998); Record of Meeting of the Policy Planning Council, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union**, ed. Sampson, Charles S., Joyce, John Michael. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada,** ed. Sampson, Charles S., Miller, James E. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994); List of Persons, **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia,** eds. Keefer, Edward C, Schwar, Harriet D, Mabon, David W. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996); Memorandum From William H. Brubeck of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), **Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XXI, Africa**, ed. Howland, Nina D. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995).

The early Cold War was possibly the time when the Policy Planning Staff had the most influence over American foreign policy. "Under the first heads of S/P—Kennan, Paul Nitze, and Robert Bowie—the policy planning staff played a pivotal role in developing the Marshall Plan, NATO, the Korean War strategy, nuclear policy, the response to the Suez crisis, and plans for the European economic recovery" (DREZNER, 2009, p. 12). It cannot be said that academics didn't influence S/P, since most of the Directors it had during this period were or became academics. Nevertheless, among the rest of its members, academics were in a small number. It is interesting to notice, however, that many of them published books or journals, which points not only to an intellectual inclination of the group, but also possibly to a greater openness at the time from the part of journals, in accepting submissions form non-academics.

As for academics' involvement with policymaking in general, this seems to point towards an engagement -when it happened - that took place in a more informal way. While they did not work for the government, authors like Morgenthau had personal relationships with influential policymakers like Kennan, or were brought together in events like the one hosted by Rockefeller in 1954.

4.4 ACADEMIC SPEECH IN THE "GOLDEN AGE"

In analyzing "academic speech", as proposed in chapter 3, this dissertation looks into a main aspect of academic publications: its intended audience. There is no exact way, however, to determine the intended audience of academic writing. I decided, then, to address this matter in two distinct ways. The first one is by analyzing how accessible academic texts are to different publics. I do this by assessing the readability of publications using two formulas: Flesch Reading Easy and New Dale-Chall. The second way is by determining whether academics publish in policy-oriented vehicles. For this, I chose Foreign Affairs, since it has been published since the 1940s and all its editions are available on-line. Both methods have many limitations, that I will address below, but they seemed like interesting approximations that could generate interesting insights. As materials to be analyzed I chose articles from two

academic journals that were already published at the time: International Organization and World Politics. I analyzed all the articles published in the period 1950-1959. For comparison, I also calculated the readability of articles published in Foreign Affairs – randomly selected, covering the entire period of 1950-1959 – and political op-eds from the New York Times – randomly selected, current[88].

Readability is generally understood as "the ease of comprehension because of style of writing" (FRY, 2002, p. 286). While there is an inherently subjective element to reading comprehension, there is also a widely accepted notion that some factors tend to affect it: "namely content, stylistic elements, format and organization. […] These elements include factors such as vocabulary load, sentence structure, idea density, and human interest, which have all been found to be significantly related to reading difficulty" (JANAN; WRAY; 2012, p. 3). This notion is at the root of the development of readability formulas, which started in the early 1900s. Most formulas take into account either syntactic difficulty or semantic difficulty. I chose to use two formulas that address each of these different components.

Many criticisms can be made of reading formulas, for instance that they are "not able to measure other factors that make a text difficult, such as the degree of discourse cohesion, the number of inferences demanded, the number of items to remember, the complexity of ideas, rhetorical structure, dialect and required background knowledge." (JANAN; WRAY; 2012, p. 6). These are all valid criticisms that need to be taken into account, and formulas are, after all, a simplified way of looking at a complex issue. That being said, they are still considered a valid tool, and used with many different purposes, from choosing texts for schoolchildren to accessing the readability of medical information booklets and college textbooks. (FRY, 2002, JANAN; WRAY; 2012). Many formulas are geared towards assessing grade level, I chose Flesch and New Dale-Chall because they are *not.*

Flesch Reading Ease (FRE) score is one of the earliest formulae for measuring the level of comprehension difficulty of texts. Its first version was developed in 1943 by Rudolf Flesch, who later refined until he reached what is currently used. Despite its old age, FRE is still one of the most used readability yardsticks, in part due to its relative simplicity, which makes it amenable to automatization. While earlier versions used four categories to measure readability (Average Sentence Length in Words, Average word length in syllables, Average

[88] New York Times articles from the 1950s are only accessible as image files, which made it impossible to feed them into the program that calculated the results.

Percentage of "Personal Words ", and Average Percentage of "Personal Sentences") the newest version focuses on sentence and word lengths (FLESCH, 1948). Below is the current formula:

$$0.39\left(\frac{total\ words}{total\ sentences}\right) + 11.8\left(\frac{total\ syllabus}{total\ words}\right) - 15.59$$

The formula generates a score between 0 and 100, where a higher score means the text is easier to understand. For example, the children's story the Three Little Pigs scores 90, while Wendt's 1992 article *Anarchy is What States Make of It* scores 30.5. Flesch (1948) offers the following pattern of Reading Ease Scores:

Table 8 - Flesch Reading Ease Score

Reading Ease Score	Description of Style	Typical Magazine
0 to 30	Very Difficult	Scientific
30 to 50	Difficult	Academic
50 to 60	Fairly Difficult	Quality
60 to 70	Standard	Digests
70 to 80	Fairly Easy	Slick Fiction
80 to 90	Easy	Pulp Fiction
90 to 100	Very Easy	Comics

Source: adapted by the author from Flesch (1948)

According to Flesch's own criteria, then, one would expect articles in academic journals in the field of International Relations to fall somewhere between 30 and 50. As can be seen on Graph 3 (below), that is precisely what happens: all yearly averages are between 35 and 45, quite in the middle of the 'academic' range. There are some changes on the score from year to year, but as can be observed, there is no clear upward or downward trend in either journal.

Graph 6 - Average Flesch Reading Ease in International Organization and World Politics articles (1950-1959)



Source: author's own elaboration based on International Organization and World Politics articles.

Dale-Chall doesn't focus on the length of words or sentences, but rather on the number of unfamiliar or difficult words. For this, the authors of the formula compiled a list of 3,000 words that are familiar to most fourth-grade students, it then calculates how many words absent from the list are found in a given text. It provides a result between 0 and 10, where a higher score means a higher level of difficulty. To use my previous examples, The *Three Little Pigs* scores 2.5, while Wendt's article scored 7.5. Graph 4 (below) shows the average yearly scores for International Organization and World Politics. Scores for both journals remained between 6.2 and 6.7 a fairly difficult to difficult range and, again there is no noticeable downward or upward trend.

Graph 7 - Average Dale-Chall in International Organization and World Politics articles (1950-1959)



Source: author's own elaboration based on International Organization and World Politics articles.

Graph 8 (below) shows the comparison of Flesch socres for International Organization World Politics (average for the 1950-1959 period), Foreign Affairs (average for the 1950-1959 period) and New York Times (20 current political op-eds)

Graph 8 - Flesch Reading Ease Analysis for International Organization, World Politics, Foreign Affairs and New York Times articles (1950-1959 average)



Source: author's own elaboration based on International Organization, World Policy, Foreign Affairs and New York Times articles.

International Organization and World Politics had an average score of 40.9 and 42.1, respectively, while Foreign Affairs had a score of exactly 40. This puts all three publications right in the middle of the "academic" range in Flesch's table. The New York Times op-eds had a higher score, 50.5, which puts them in what Flesch called the "Quality" stratum, meaning they are fairly difficult texts but not at the academic level. According to this measurement, then, articles published in more academic-oriented articles in this period had about the same level of difficulty as the more policy-oriented Foreign Affairs.

Graph 6 (below) shows the results of the Dale-Chall measurement scale for the same texts analyzed with Flesch. It shows a small difference between the three types of publication:

Graph 9 - New Dale-Chall Analysis for International Organization, World Politics, Foreign Affairs and New York Times articles (1950-1959 average)



Source: author's own elaboration based on International Organization, World Policy, Foreign Affairs and New York Times articles.

As can be seen, there is 0.1 difference between International Organization and World Politics, and a 0.2 difference between each of the others. The largest difference is between International Organization and The New York Times: 0.5. It seems remarkable that this difference is half the difference that exists between the IO average and Wendt's score of 7.5. This seems to suggest the readability level of academic articles from this period is closer to that of The New York Times op-eds than to a particularly complex article like Wendt's.

Finally, I sought to assess whether the authors who published in academic journals also tried to make their work more visible to policymakers by publishing in the more policy-oriented Foreign Affairs. To do this I compiled a list of all the authors who published in International Organization and World Politics in the 1950-1959 period and compared it to a list of all the authors who published in Foreign Affairs in the same time frame. The results are presented in Graph 10 (below).

Graph 10 - Publications on Foreign Affairs by Authors who published in International Organization and World Politics (1950-1959)



Source: author's own elaboration based on International Organization, World Policy, Foreign articles.

The results show that the vast majority of authors who published in the more academic articles did not publish in Foreign Affairs. Of the 98 authors who published in International Organization in this period, only three also published in Foreign Affairs. The number is slightly higher for World Politics: ten out of 121.

5 THE GREAT GAP? ACADEMICS AND POLITICS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2001-2016)

The discipline of International Relations in the United States in the twenty-first century is considerably different from what it was in the 1950s. For starters, it is much larger: the number of professors, students, publications and conferences dedicated to international affairs in all its aspects have increased manifold. According to Kenneth Waltz (2012), in 1930 there were only 24 professors of international politics in the country, and two-thirds of them were dedicated to the study and teaching of international law and organization. In 2016, the International Studies Association had over 1,000 members in the United States alone, and over 7,000 worldwide (ISA, online). Between then and now, much has taken place, including the "Second Debate", which has come, gone, and been replaced by the next "Great Debate".

The "realist gambit", as Nicholas Guilhot (2008) calls it, to develop a theory of international politics that could rival the behavioralist wave that was taking over Political Science "ultimately failed" (GUILHOT, 2008, p. 300). While Kenneth Thompson and Dean Rusk at the Rockefeller Foundation were betting on the realist project, the Ford Foundation was using its (very) deep pockets to shape American Political Science. The Ford Foundation's program in the Behavioral Sciences disbursed around US$24 million between 1951 and 1957 to steer not only Political Science, but the Social Sciences as a whole towards the intended direction. This was by far the largest source of external funding for the social sciences in the 1960s. Adding to that, it largely invested in new initiatives or even new research centers, guaranteeing that the effects of the program were felt even after it was shut down in 1957 (HAUPTMANN, 2012).

The conception that motivated the mentors of the Ford Program was that social sciences should strive to reach the same level of scientificity as the natural and exact sciences. The goal was for a social scientist to approach social problems as a physician approaches a disease: "diagnosing particular modes of malfunctioning". They believe that this was the "general spirit of modern social science", which they saw as "specifically technical", without any particular political or moral agenda: "It does not have a program for reconstructing the social world" (HAUPTMANN, 2012, p. 164).

In International Relations, similar hopes were raised around the possibility of developing ever-increasing objective criteria for political decisions, perhaps arriving at a "fully automated foreign policy" (GUILHOT, 2017, p. 184). Much of the new literature was dedicated to the subject of decision-making, guided by a modern impetus to make decisions as independent from the ambiguities and flaws of human nature as possible. This notion was basically everything Hans Morgenthau had argued against in *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* and *Science: servant or master?:* it was a vision of a soulless foreign policy, guided by the "scientific elites" he had so sternly criticized, rather than by wise statesmen he had admired. This vision, however, was never achieved – Kaplan himself conceded that a theory of international politics could not have "the explanatory or the predictive power of a 'hard' science" (GUILHOT, 2017, p. 206).

Morgenthau, it seems, was not alone in his discontent with the course International Relations was taking. The International Studies Association (ISA), according to the institutional history provided by ISA itself, was created in part as a dissent from behavioralism:

> ISA was formed in the late 1950s in response to dissatisfaction with the standard content of the American Political Science Association and its leadership. The Association, for understandable reasons, was dominated by American politics. As the "behavioral revolution" strengthened its position in the Association, later to be tagged as successful, the direction of the Association became increasingly American in orientation. For a critical component of the ideology of behavioralists, as some of the liked to be called, was hard data, which was, of course most easily accessible in the U.S. Another aspect of behaviorism was its micro orientation, breaking down processes and institutions into their smallest part, which logically progresses to individuals. International studies in contrast, deals with wholes, indeed the international system or world and as such requires analyzing micro phenomena in macro contexts. (ISA, online)

Despite the rise of game-theory and rational-choice, as well as the relative abandonment of the more philosophical and theological-inspired aspects of realism, behavioralism in International Relations was not as strict as it was in other areas of the social sciences. Guilhot (2017, p. 190) argues that "a closer look at the new scientism of international relations theory reveals that it had not much to do with the tendency to model the social sciences after physics or to assume that history was riven by discoverable "laws." He adds that this distinction was lost on some of the "old-guard", though one could argue that it might have been lost on some of the new one, too.

It is worth noting that the second debate was in large part an intra-realist one and while there was intense disagreement over epistemological matters, there seemed to exist an

agreement over the uniqueness of international relations and the need for a particular approach to study it. While IR remained more or less tethered to Political Science in the United States, one would be pressed to argue against the notion that it is its own field, as blurred as its contours may be.

Realism remained very much at the center of the discipline through the 1960s and 1970s, though with a different focus, since behavioralism "was essentially concerned with method, and when it comes to looking at the assumptions of the approaches, the link to Realism is obvious" (SMITH, 1987, p. 196) - and it remains alive and even well in 2018, despite the numerous times it was pronounced dead. A student of T.R. Fox had a big role in reinvigorating realism in the late 1970s. Kenneth Waltz's publication of *Theory of International Politics* gave birth to "neorealism", a structural version of the old tradition.

A leaner version of realism, striped of the philosophical and historical aspects that had made it unpopular in the past two decades, Waltz's realism gained recognition fast. Guilhot (2008, p. 300) claims that Waltz's most enduring legacy to the discipline was the abandonment of the "psychological, anthropological, or normative elements regarding human nature" which were "discarded in favor of systemic-structural notions producing the same effects". While there exists a general sense that neorealism is at fault for the predominance of positivism and for the premium put on quantitative methodologies in American IR, its progenitor has a critical view of the latter. In an interview with James Fearon in 2012, when asked about changes he had observed in IR in his 60 years as an academic, he answered:

> I think that students and teachers now move away from the fundamentally important international political developments in order to use data sets and that sort of thing. And the real questions of power and the relations of states are emphasized less than they used to be. And these other kinds of questions that are answerable sometimes by applying mathematical and other formal methods take over the political sense in the search for precision. (WALTZ, 2012, p. 10)

This is not a criticism of quantitative methodologies in themselves, of course, it's a similar argument to that presented by Mearsheimer and Walt (2012): the problem is not the methodology, but the focus on small quantifiable pieces of the puzzle rather than the puzzle in its entirety. Waltz is not mistaken in claiming quantifiable methods are increasingly used in IR research. While they were the exception rather than the norm in the 1950s, in the 1980s a quarter of articles published in the most influential journals in the field used this kind of methodology. And the upwards trend continued, as can be seen on Graph 8 (below).

Graph 11 - Quantitative methodologies in IR journals (1980-2000)



Source: author's own elaboration based on data from the TRIP survey (online)

Liberalism, which had been execrated by classical realists in the post-World War II, also reemerged in the 1970s after receiving a facelift. Much like realism, it reincarnated in a "neo" version, whose main proponents were Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Though the authors of neoliberalism, or Institutional liberalism, were critical of some more utopic trends of classical liberalism, it maintained a more normative commitment than realism. Koehane (2012, p. 196) argues that "the social purpose of Institutional Liberalism is to promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of a more peaceful, prosperous and free world". Nevertheless, it adopted a number of realist assumptions, the similarity of the two approaches was such that Steven Smith (1987) refers to it as the neo-neo synthesis.

As Waltz was publishing *Theory of International Politics*, the field was already entering its "Third Debate"[89]. Following the two previous "Great Debates" – idealists v. realists and traditionalists v. behaviouralists – this debate posited positivists against post-

[89] Also sometimes called the "Fourth Debate" by those who believe there was a third "inter-paradigm" debate.

positivists of a number of different perspectives[90]. The discussion once more focused not on a substantive matters, but was primarily centered around matters of epistemology, be it around the wisdom of dividing theories around "isms" (LAKE, 2012; RATHBUN 2012), the applicability of Lakatos or Kuhn to IR theories (ELMAN & ELMAN, 2003), the possibility of theoretical eclecticism (SIL; KATZENSTEIN, 2010; CHECKEL 2012), or the merits and shortcomings of positivism and its alternatives.

The questioning of positivism and its applicability to the social sciences is not specific to IR. Like the "Second Debate", which mirrored – albeit with some delay - the rise of behaviorism in the Social Sciences as a whole in the United States, the "Third Debate" is also part of a larger trend. As is common in IR, however, it was also influenced by contemporary international issues, in this case the end of the Cold War and the inability of mainstream theories to either predict or explain it. Yosef Lapid, whose article *The Third Debate: on the prospects of international theory in a post-positivist era*, published in 1989, played a role in officially inaugurating it, affirms that

> It is hardly disputable that the demise of the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative behavioral science recently has forced scholars from nearly all the social disciplines to reexamine the ontological, epistemological and axiological foundations of their scientific endeavors (LAPID, 1989: 236).

Lapid's piece is confident in the "collapse of positivist orthodoxy" and in the prospect of an "intellectual transition" (1989, p. 238). To the quoted above he adds that "Despite many valiant efforts, scholars were ultimately forced to concede the manifest absence of cumulative progress defined in the rigorous terms of the empiricist-positivist blueprint" (LAPID, 1989, p. 245). Almost thirty years later, however, neither is positivism dead, nor is there a consensus on what should replace it.

In fact, research conducted by the TRIP (Teaching, Research and International Policy) Project shows that "the strong commitment to positivist research among American IR scholars has grown stronger over time" (MALINIAK et al 2007, p. 2). An analysis of articles published in the 12 top ranked journals in IR and Political Science shows that in 2006 almost 90% of articles were based on a positivist epistemology[91]. Nevertheless, it is still undeniable

[90] The organization of the discipline around these Debates is contested and has been discussed at length elsewhere . See, for example: Weaver 1996, Smith 1995.

[91] The authors define an article as positivist "if they implicitly or explicitly assume that theoretical or empirical propositions are testable, make causal claims, seek to explain and predict phenomena, assume that research is supported by empirical means, and aspire to the use of a scientific method. Generally, these articles present and develop theory, derive hypotheses from their theory, and test them using data (empirical observations from the world). However, we code an article as positivist, even when it does not explicitly employ the scientific method,

that during this same period, IR saw the emergence of a plurality of perspectives that sought to both criticize traditional approaches and fill gaps left by mainstream theories which had become increasingly sparse in their quest for scientific status. These gaps represented what were deemed the "margins, silences and bottom rungs" (ENLOE, 1996) of the discipline: neglected objects of study and points of view, marginalized epistemologies, geographical peripheries.

These new perspectives differed in terms of their "radicalism" and, as Weaver (1996) has pointed out, there has been some movement towards the middle, both from "rationalists" - perhaps in an attempt to move beyond "simplistic hypothesis testing" (MEARSHEIMER; WALT, 2013) – and from "post-radical reflectivists". Dunne, Hensen and Wight (2013, p. 406), editors of the *European Journal of International Relations*, provide as evidence of a possible transcendence of the Third Debate the fact that "First, we saw less and less inter-theoretic debate across paradigms (or isms) [and] Second, pieces engaging solely in theoretical development are now largely rare".

Another critique that fell under the umbrella of the Third Debate was one directed at the American or Western predominance in the discipline, especially when it came to IR theory. This critique came mostly in two fronts: the first presents the empirical evidence of this predominance and seeks to explain it. This literature was inaugurated by Stanley Hoffman's famous 1977 article *An American Social Science: International Relations*. It was followed by pieces such as Ole Weaver's *The Sociology of a Not-So-International Discipline* (1998), which demonstrated empirically the virtual monopoly of American, and to a much lesser extent, European authors, over the main IR journals. The second front focuses on the effects of this predominance of authors from the "center" (as opposed to the "periphery") on the kind of knowledge that is produced in IR. The main argument of this literature is that IR theories have an implicit perspective resulting from the historical and geographical contexts of its theorists (AYOOB, 1998). This means that IR theories tend to privilege subjects which are of interest to the "center" – such as inter-state war or Great Power politics – but not necessarily a primary concern of the periphery. Furthermore, even central concepts of the

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if scientific principles are used to judge the validity of a study or the author is defending a concept of social science that uses these methods to establish knowledge claims. We also code an article as positivist if it describes a scientific research project—such as POLITY, COW, KEDS, or TRIP—and/ or explains coding rules and evidence collection procedures. Although these articles do not test hypotheses, make causal claims, or use evidence to make inferences, they clearly are part of a positivist research agenda." (Maliniak et al 2007: 40)

discipline, such as anarchy and sovereignty, do not necessarily "fit" the reality of many peripheral states.

The Third Debate seems to have generated a kind of fatigue with epistemological discussions within International Relations and many have expressed the desire to move the discipline forward, beyond the positivist-post positivist antagonism and towards a research agenda more focused on solving 'real world' dilemmas. In terms of paradigmatic debates, a sort of détente appears to have been reached, where different perspectives coexist despite their critical views of each other. Realism and Liberalism remain in the core of the field, and Constructivism, more particularly the variety developed by Alexander Wendt, was incorporated into the mainstream. Other, more radical approaches, such as Feminism, Post-Structuralism and Post-colonialism are accepted but remain in the disciplinary margins.

To illustrate this, Graph 12 (below) shows the result of the TRIP survey (online) to the question "Which of the following best describes your approach to the study of IR? If you do not think of your work as falling within one of these paradigms or schools of thought, please select the category into which most other scholars would place your work."

Graph 12 - Paradigmatic preferences in American IR



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

As can be seen, the field is relatively diverse, though more than half of respondents identify with one of the three core paradigms. Most noteworthy, perhaps, is the fact that around 30% answered that they do not use paradigms. All in all, it is a fairly "diverse terrain" in this regard, even if not in others. The impetus to build a more "global" IR has not generated as much change as could be hoped. Andrew Hurrel (2016, online) argues that, despite professions of good intentions towards increasing diversity in the field "too often, conferences are held and the critiques are repeated but little seems to change. Indeed, the political introspection of western societies and the internally-driven academic agenda of western International Relations may well be getting worse".

The diversity of the field, at least in paradigmatic terms, makes it harder to identify its dominant pole. In the 1945-1960 period, despite the existence of dissent – from positivism-inclined scholars or from liberals – Classical Realism was easily identifiable as the moving force in IR. This, as was discussed in the previous chapter, had as much to do with external factors – funding, political climate – as it had to do with internal debates, but the fact remains that there was a dominance. Currently, it would be impossible to have any debate regarding the field as whole without engaging at the very least the three mainstream approaches (Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism). Thankfully, there are more resources that allow us to look at the entire IR discipline in the U.S., most notably the TRIP Survey. Whenever this is not possible or wherever I feel there was a need to develop the subject further, I have chosen to focus on those scholars that have been considered the most influential by IR academia.

5.1 ACADEMIC MOTIVATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The TRIP survey of 2011 has generated some interesting insights regarding the motivation of American IR scholars as an aggregate and their views on the goal of research. The first survey question that seems pertinent here is precisely about motivation: "Which of the following best describes what motivates your research?" (MALINIAK et al, 2011), The results are presented on Graph 13, below:

Graph 13 - Motivation of Research for IR scholars



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

Graph 13 shows that there are basically two main motivations for research: an issue area of interest to the researcher (or for which he received a grant, etc) and policy relevance/current events. Although policy relevance and current events certainly have some relation, it is not clear why they are only one category. A scholar might seek for policy relevance in his/her work even if it does not have a direct relation to particular events. It would have been interesting if authors had had the chance to choose multiple alternatives, since it is likely that issue area is more or less always a concern. In any case, it seems remarkable that over a third of respondents claimed to take policy relevance or current events into consideration, it certainly does not point towards a discipline that is completely isolated from the policy world.

TRIP also asked scholars "Which statement comes closest to representing your views on the ideal relationship between the academy and the policy community?". Graph 14 below shows the results:

Graph 14 - Opinions on the relations between the Policy community and Academia



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

The two options presented to respondents were "There should be a higher wall of separation between the academic and policy communities" and "There should be a larger number of links between the academic and policy communities". As can be seen, the vast majority (92%) of IR scholars believes there should exist a closer relation between academics and policymakers. This might imply that academics view current relations as insufficient, though the absence of a third option (i. e. "Relationship between the academic and policy communities should remain as it is") makes it difficult to state that with confidence. In any case, it shows a trend towards more engagement rather than less.

In 2014, the TRIP survey asked American IR academics to "list fours scholars whose work had the greatest influence on the field of IR in the past 20 years". The results of the survey are presented below on Graph 15 (below).

Graph 15 - The 10 Most Influential Academics in International Relations



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

If there were any doubts that Constructivism had been incorporated into the mainstream of the discipline the fact that Alexander Wendt is considered to be the most influential intellectual in the field should end them. There are no classical realists on the list, though that might be due to the fact that they all ended their careers much more than 20 years ago. Most of the scholars listed are better known for their contributions to one of the mainstream paradigms and none of them are identified with the more "fringe" perspectives (feminism, post-colonialism, post-structuralism, etc). While it may not pertain directly to the object of this research, it seems worth commenting on the fact that there is only one woman on the list – it seems that while IR academia as whole has become more diverse, IR theory remains a largely masculine domain[92].

In this next section I will focus on the perspectives of these ten authors on the question of policy relevance and of the objectives of theory more broadly. Some of them (Alexander

[92] According to data provided by the International Studies Association, about 42% of its members are women. Among student members, women slightly outnumber men. Among full professors, however, women are less than 30%. In the "Theory" group, women represent 35% of members.

Wendt, James Fearon, Joseph Nye, and Robert Jervis) were kind enough to take a few minutes from their busy days to answer two questions on the subject, the other positions are based entirely on available publications and interviews. I feel that given their different theoretical and epistemological positions they represent a good "sample" of IR.

5.1.1 Joseph Nye and the quest for policy-relevance in International Relations

Joseph Nye has been one of the main driving forces behind the "gap debate" in International Relations. Nye has worked in the government on three separate occasions: from 1977 to 1979, he served as Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology and chaired the National Security Council Group on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons; in 1993 and 1994, he was chair of the National Intelligence Council, which coordinates intelligence estimates for the President; and in 1994 and 1995, he served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Personal Website). He is also one of the main voices arguing for more policy-relevance and more exchange between academia and the government.

Despite being one of the authors who has published the most on the subject of the policy-academia gap (see, for example, NYE 2008a, 2008b, 2009), Nye has not dwelt much on the question of *why* academics should seek to engage policymakers. That appears to be because, to him, it seems rather evident that there should be an engagement, and rather than discuss the moral and philosophical foundations of this subject, and create yet another inward debate in the discipline, it is more useful to try and find ways to bring academic work closer to policymakers and to bring policymakers insights into academic theory.

His arguments in favor of engagement with policy are mainly two: that theory can lead to better foreign policy, and that policy experience can also lead scholars to produce better theory. On the first argument, following Keynes, he posits that theory will be relevant to practice, whether practitioners realize it or not. Nye (2008b, p. 648) argues that "[t]he question is not whether theory is relevant to practice, but which theories and how aware practical people are of the origins and limitations of the theories they inevitably use". In a more normative vain, he adds that there is an academic duty, which is to "help to improve policy ideas when they can" (NYE, 2008b, p. 651). Here he approaches arguments for the

engaged academic, that is, the main motivation of academic work would be to improve society through active action towards the desired goals.

Many of Nye's arguments seem to resonate with academics who have decided to cross the university/policy world divide. For example, when I asked Professor Jennifer Poole, who had worked at the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA) whether she considered policy relevance important for her research she answered having real world relevance was actually one of her main motivations in entering academia in the first place: "Doctors become doctors because they want to help people get rid of disease […] one of the reasons I got a PhD was because I was interested in government policy […] for me it has always been important that my research have policy implications"[93].

The main argument put forward by Nye (2008b, p. 651), that "the gap between theory and policy has grown in recent decades and may have costs for policy" also finds assent among academics who have engaged with policymaking. Professor Ash Jain commented that during the period he worked for the Department of State Policy Planning Staff he didn't have "much opportunity to delve much into the international affairs academic literature"[94] and that he only kept up with the most policy-oriented publications, like Foreign Policy and Foreign Affairs.

The reasons presented by Nye (2008b, p.654) for this gap are mainly "The growing specialization of knowledge, the increasing scientific methodological orientation of academic disciplines, and development of new institutional transmission belts". Basically, the argument is that the navel-gazing posture adopted by academia as an institution, even if not all academics act like that, has turned it into an unlikely source of inspiration for policymakers, who are much more likely to look for advice that is already geared towards them, like that provided by think-tanks and research institutes. One of the reasons for this is that academic research has turned more and more towards models and quantitative work that is not easily comprehensible to outsiders. Both Professor Jennifer Poole and Professor Nora Bensahel commented on this fact. Bensahel also added that there are disincentives for those who intend to pursue a more policy-oriented research agenda, yet still remain I the academic world[95]. Professor Robert Kelley, however, think that isn't necessarily true, since "what is pressuring higher education institutions right now is that it has to have some kind of impact", but adds

[93] POOL, Jennifer. Interview I. [mar. 2016]. Interviewer: Fernanda Barth Barasuol. Washington, D.C., 2016.
[94] JAIN, Ash. Interview I. [may. 2016]. Interviewer: Fernanda Barth Barasuol. Washington, D.C., 2016.
[95] BENSAHEL, Nora. Interview I. [apr. 2016]. Interviewer: Fernanda Barth Barasuol. Washington, D.C., 2016.

that much of what is produced with policy-relevance in mind never makes it to policymakers[96].

Nye seems to speak for a group of academic-policymakers who feel that the restrictive metrics of what is considered academic success can be particularly detrimental to those who are more interested in developing policy analysis and recommendations than theoretical models. Like Nye, they see in their knowledge a tool for the betterment of society, and in policy the best channel to achieve that. Regardless of one's view of their own role as academics or of academia as a whole, it does give pause that some scholars apparently feel constrained on their choices of what to study.

5.1.2 Robert Jervis on the difficulties and value of policy relevance

Robert Jervis was also kind enough to answer some brief questions on the subject of policy relevance. Answering whether he thinks that academic work should be policy relevant, he answers that "it depends on the goals and values of the individual scholar as well as the nature of the research."[97] He argues against the notion that policy relevance implies the kind of research that is targeted at influencing policy, using Waltz's theory as an example:

> […] while I think Waltz's Theory of IR is valuable to people in the policy world as developing methods of analytical thinking, I don't see it as having--or aiming for--impact on policymaking. His arguments on the virtues of proliferation, on the other hand, had obvious relevance (although no one in Washington took them seriously, and Waltz did not expect them to)[98].

Jervis has written on the difficulties of engaging policymakers (JERVIS, 2008), but overall, he seems to have a fairly positive position. The very fact that he wrote about it – in an article that is in part a tribute to Alexander George – points to an interest in the subject. Jervis believes that much academic work has "at least indirect implications for policymakers" since it deals with important current issues such as the causes of stability, expansionism, and civil unrest and the effects of alternative policies"[99].

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[96] KELLEY, Robert. Interview I. [may. 2016]. Interviewer: Fernanda Barth Barasuol. Washington, D.C., 2016.
[97] JERVIS, Robert. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 25th, 2017.
[98] JERVIS, Robert. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 25th, 2017.
[99] JERVIS, Robert. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 25th, 2017.

One of the main difficulties analyzed by Jervis is the tensions between description and prescription that seem to be inherent to theories of international politics. While most theories include a least a measure of prescription – he cites Morgenthau's realism as an example – even those that attempt to be impartial fall into the prescriptive path, since by describing how other decision makers behave, it will inevitably least to prescription. Furthermore, there is the ever-present difficulty in maintaining complete objectivity – that is, preventing personal beliefs and values from influencing empirical analysis. Jervis believes that "even if they are not advising governments or writing op-eds, most students of international politics and foreign policy do wish to make the world safer and better" (JERVIS, 2008, 572), which necessarily implies some notion of what would a better world look like and what should be done to achieve it. He concludes, then, that "at least part of the gap between theory and practice can never be bridged impartially" (JERVIS, 2008, p. 574).

Most of the other difficulties analyzed by Jervis (2008) stem from the different cultures of academia and the policy world, as well as from the traits of decision-makers and the hurdles of bureaucracy. Nevertheless, the main takeaway is that while he sees difficulties in engaging policymakers he believes that "in many areas the task is merely difficult rather than impossible. While scholars do not have ready-made answers, let alone all the answers, at its best scholarship can contribute to more effective policies" (JERVIS, 2008, p. 590)

5.1.3 Robert Keohane's cautionary tale

Robert Keohane is the editor, with Judith Goldstein, of a book entitled *Ideas and Foreign Policy: beliefs, institutions and political change.* In it, several authors discuss how specific sets of ideas – socialism, Keynesianism – affected political outcomes, while Goldstein and Keohane provided the analytical framework. The editors' main argument is that

> ideas influence policies when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actor's clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes or strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions. (GOLDSTEIN, KEOHANE, 1993, p. 3)

The book is not a defense of academic engagement, but it does point to the author's belief that ideas have influence over social reality. When addressing directly the topic of the relation between academics and policymakers, however, Keohane chose to focus on the

dangers of the liason, rather than its benefits – which, to be fair, had been addressed by Joseph Nye in the same symposium (NYE, 2009). He starts by stressing his own lack of engagement with policy, which he attributes to a matter of taste: "I am intrigued by intellectual and scientific puzzles. I am not a 'policy wonk' —for entertainment, my taste runs more to Shakespeare and contemporary multicultural novels than discussions of the details of policy" (KEOHANE, 2009, p. 124).

Keohane's assertions are focused on the academic – on the benefits and dangers of engagement *for the academic*, more than its effects on policies. On the upside of engagement, Keohane cites the possibility to put one's theoretical beliefs to the test of reality, the challenge of considering the means of implementation of one's ideas (and its consequences), the chance to broaden the academic's horizons, and the linkage of ethical and empirical issues, which might result in stronger scholarship.

The first danger of engagement pointed out by Keohane is that of distraction. Unlike policymakers, scholars need to devote a significantly long time to one issue, in order to develop ideas to their full potential. An academic cannot produce creative scholarship while at the same time "pondering how to network effectively at their political party's national convention or what op-ed to write on a topic that will bring them to the attention of influential leaders" (KEOHANE, 2009, p. 126). This distraction may remain even after the scholar returns to academia, due to a difficulty to return to old habits of solitary contemplation.

The next problem he addresses is that of defensive arrogance. According to Keohane, arrogance is not only common, but actually useful in policy circles, and the academic may grow accustomed to behaving in this way. It might seem somewhat ironic for anyone outside of academia to read a professor's comments on how someone has been "socialized not to admit ignorance and therefore express confidence in answering questions to which no one really has answers" (KEOHANE, 2009, p. 126) and there is a danger of an academic becoming contaged by this culture, but apparently it is one of the pitfalls of policy engagement.

The last, and one could argue, most serious danger from academic engagement posited by Keohane is that of the abandonment of core academic values of intellectual integrity, that is the compromising of one's beliefs due to a desire to gain or remain in power. By doing so, he argues, "the academic has become the political equivalent of a prostitute and should lose all status and respect in the university" (KEOHANE, 2009, p. 127). These are strong words,

and Koehane's defense of academic duty to "speak truth to power" (KEOHANE, 2009, p. 127) seems to be the point he feels most strongly about. While he claims to see the importance and the advantages of engaging directly with policy, it seems to be something that he finds acceptable, rather than essential.

It may be worth here remembering Keohane's words on the purpose of Institutional Liberalism: "The social purpose of Institutional Liberalism is to promote beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of a more peaceful, prosperous and free world" (KEOHANE, 2012). There is a place for normativity in theory and a desire to see an "improvement of the human condition" (KEOHANE, 2012), what remains somewhat unclear is the role of scholar in effecting this change.

5.1.4 James Fearon and the ways to inform policy

James Fearon was one of the authors who kindly answered some questions for this research, and provided materials stating his position on the subject. On whether he thought academic research should be policy-relevant he answered he believed "academics should in general do research that could have an impact on policy. In other words, we should ask questions that are of normative importance, that bear strongly on human (and planetary) welfare"[100]. Human and planetary seem to be key words here, since they speak of the well-being of the population, rather than the government. It is interesting to note the terminology here is closer to Keohane than to the Classical Realists, who were in large part debating the idea of national interest and what was included in that.

Fearon's choice of words is probably also related to his view on how the American foreign policy apparatus operates and how (or whether) it's possible to influence it. He argues that "much of the debate on this question in journals and at conference panels over the last [ten-plus] years has really, in my view, been a surrogate for methodological griping"[101]. The biggest problem with the debate is the fact that it has not seriously tackled the effects on the inner-workings of the State Department on the possibility of policy relevance:

[100] FEARON, James. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 28th, 2017.
[101] FEARON, James. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 28th, 2017.

> This reflects an absurd view of how foreign policy decision-making actually works (in the U.S. at least). One reason that I don't think the argument among academics in IR about "policy relevance" has been very serious is how little effort there has been to discuss how the foreign policymaking process in the US actually works, in order to ask the question, where and how in this process is it actually possible that academic work would inform decision-making[102].

By his calculations, the vast majority of foreign policy decisions are made by a very small group of four to six people who are incredibly busy and highly unlikely to ever engage with academic work. If academic arguments make their way to political discourse, it is very likely to be used as nothing more than ammunition to defend decisions that have in fact already been made. But because policy relevance and influence are always seen as good things, not much attention is given to the actual outcomes of this influence.

A more interesting way to influence policy would be to try and engage the general public, particularly in a way aimed at denouncing possible mistakes in policymaking. The ideal vehicles for this would be blogs or op-eds, which might actually be read by policymakers as well. Fearon's position seems to be close to Keohane's stance on speaking truth to power. However, Fearon doesn't express concerns regarding the loss of academic integrity, but a more pragmatic view of what might actually generate results in term of policy outcomes, which he sees as the indirect approach via the public policy sphere.

5.1.5 Alexander Wendt questions the meaning of policy-relevance

Alexander Wendt was one of the authors who kindly answered some questions for this research. Regarding whether or not research should aim to influence policy, Wendt answered that yes, it should, but that he did not believe this meant "*all* academic work must be "policy-relevant" and that "most of it in [his] view need have no connection to policy at all"[103]. While Wendt believes that "policymakers should be informed by the best academic scholarship (both explanatory and normative) in relevant areas when they make their decisions"[104], this does not necessarily imply either that most academics should aim at policy influence or that IR has become less influent than it used to be. In fact, Wendt argues that "IR theory has *never*

[102] FEARON, James. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 28th, 2017.
[103] WENDT, Alexander. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 15th, 2017.
[104] WENDT, Alexander. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 15th, 2017.

been very relevant to policymakers, especially when such theory takes a purely explanatory form"[105].

In an earlier essay, titled "What is International Relations for?", Wendt adopts an intermediary position between positivism and critical theory, which he terms "post critical", and which seems similar to the one he adopts on his answers to the questions regarding policy relevance. The debate between positivists and critical theorists has been, in part, related to the purpose of social theory: is it to influence the policymakers, therefore making incremental changes in the system already in place, or is it to bring emancipation to the "policy-takers"? (WENDT, 2001). These differences imply, according to Wendt, a difference between a short-term focus for positivists, and long term for critical perspectives. His own perspective, however, would combine "emancipation, which can occur only by deep transformation of the existing order over the long run, with the positivist willingness to think scientifically about that task" (WENDT, 2001, p. 208).

One of the reasons for IR's irrelevance for policy-makers had been that "what policymakers need to know is not what is going to explain whatever they end up doing (since that is completely backward-looking), but rather they need to know what they *should* do, going forward into the future"[106]. This task could not be addressed either by positivists, whose commitment to a particular view of what science should be prevents them from indulging in the normative exercise this would require, nor by critical theorists, who eschew explanatory objectives and liberal "social-engineering" goals (WENDT, 2001).

Wendt believes both that it is "in our nature to try and influence the world around us" (WENDT, 2001, p. 211) and that policymakers are constantly making decisions towards our future, whether academics provide them with a knowledge basis for those decisions or not. He proposes, then, that the goal should be that of "steering", which combines a measure of intentionality towards a common future and an acquiescence that there is much humanity cannot control:

> Most of what happens in social life over the medium to long run is not intended by anyone, policytakers or -makers. Thus, the most that we can expect of steering is to channel, nudge, or guide evolution along in certain directions in an effort to avoid really bad outcomes and perhaps bring about a few good ones. Rather than

[105] WENDT, Alexander. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 25th, 2017.
[106] WENDT, Alexander. **PhD Dissertation on Academics and American Foreign Policy**. [personal message] Message received by febarasuol@gmail.com on April 15th, 2017.

> determine particular events, the objective could be only to influence broad, developmental tendencies. (WENDT, 2001, p. 211)

This perspective combines positive explanatory science and normative emancipatory intent, it is a kind of instrumental rationality, but applied to the self, its ultimate goal being "a science (broadly defined) for purposive control over the constitutional evolution of the world system" (WENDT, 2001, p. 207). Wendt's perspective is not easy to define in practical terms (*how* exactly would this steering happen?), and it is likely he did not intend it to be. Nevertheless, it shows a measure of belief in academic work as a tool that could (should?) be used to influence reality.

5.1.6 John J. Mearsheimer and the objectives of (Realist) Theory

Mearsheimer has not published any works dedicated exclusively to the matter of policy relevance in International Relations. That is not say however, that it is not a subject of concern for him. In an interview in 2006, when asked to reflect on "the state of International Relations and Political Science as a pedagogical and civic enterprise" he claimed that this was "a huge topic, and one I think about a lot" (MEARSHEIMER, 2006, p. 241). It is clear from his statements in this interviews that Mearsheimer believes theory and reality should be closely related, both in the sense that reality should inform a theory's premises and that theory should seek to have real-world relevance.

Mearsheimer views theory in essentially positivist terms, according to which the main goal of a theorist is to "identify the causal mechanisms that explain recurring behavior and how they relate to each other" (MEARSHEIMER; WALT, 2013, p. 430). Unlike authors such as Kenneth Waltz, Mearsheimer views a closer link between theory and empirical reality[107], he claims, for example, that the yardstick by which Realism will be measured is "how well it explains state behavior", and that while it provides valuable insights into what will happen it will resist the test of time - and of its many detractors (MEARSHEIMER, 2002).

The role of theory has been a subject of concern for Mearsheimer, it appears. In 2013, he published an article with Stephen Walt in which he claimed the predominance of "simplistic hypothesis testing" was the "road to ruin" of the discipline (MEARSHEIMER;

[107] He maintains this is one of the main differences between his approach and Waltz's (MEARSHEIMER, 2006). In his article with Walt he terms this approach "scientific realism", which he opposes to "instrumentalism" (MEARSHEIMER; WALT, 2013).

WALT, 2013, p. 429). Additionally, in the aforementioned interview, he forwards an opinion very similar to Nye's regarding the increasing policy-irrelevance of academic work in IR and the reasons behind it:

> In the 25 years since I received my PhD, the Political Science profession in the United States has gone to great lengths to distance itself from the real world. Any scholar who is seriously interested in engaging with the policy world or speaking to a wide public audience is viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by his or her colleagues. Heaven forbid that one should appear on television or write an op-ed for a major newspaper. Political scientists have developed a self-enclosed world where they talk mainly to each other and their students, and dismiss those who have any inclination to be a public intellectual. In effect, the profession is engaged in self-marginalization. (MEARSHEIMER, 2006, p. 242)

Although, unlike Nye, he has not engaged directly with policymaking, Mearsheimer has tried to engage indirectly by writing many pieces for Foreign Affairs and op-eds for the New York Times [108] on various subjects. He has also criticized what he sees as the predominant view in both academia and policy circles, which presents theory and policy as completely separate endeavors: "Those immersed in the policy world tend to think that academics do theory and they do policy, while academics tend to think that they do theory and people in Washington do policy. And never do the two meet." (MEARSHEIMER, 2006, p. 242)

Alexander Wendt defined the main goal of positivists as policy-relevance: "IR should try to explain how the international system works so that policymakers can use that knowledge to preserve the aspects of it we like and change those we don't" (WENDT, 2001, p. 205). Mearsheimer's view seems to fit this description, even if he has not defended it as amply as Nye has. He sees theory as having three main goals: description, explaining reality and helping us make sense of it; prediction, "which is essential for the conduct of our daily lives, for policymaking, and for advancing social science" (MEARSHEIMER; WALT, 2013, p. 436), and prescription, the provision of informed advice on the best course of action, which he has provided on many topics on many occasions.

[108] He did consult for RAND in the mid-1980s, for one year.

5.1.7 Kenneth N. Waltz

Kenneth N. Waltz is best known as the "father" of structural realism. Whether one agrees or not with his positions, admires or despises his theory, it is hard to deny *Theory of International Politics* has had a major impact in the field of International Relations. And Waltz does admit that he fits the image of the (mostly) disengaged theorist. When asked whether he was ever tempted to try his luck in the policy world he answered "No, not really. I like scholarly work. I like to deal in ideas and the application of ideas. I feel very much at home in that part of the world" (WALTZ; FEARON 2012, p. 5).

That is not to say that he has never attempted to write more policy-focused work, Waltz himself cites as examples of such an endeavor "The Politics of Peace" (on the Vietnam War) and "The Stability of the Bipolar World" (WALTZ; FEARON 2012). That being said, those efforts represented a small portion of his overall work (WALTZ; FEARON 2012). This might have something to do with Waltz's approach to theorizing, which was less concerned with corresponding his theoretical assumptions to reality - what mattered the most was whether the conclusions one could draw from the theory proved correct. His brand of realism is indeed known for being sparse and elegant, features which have drawn both admiration and criticism.

Waltz's lack of personal engagement with policymaking does not mean he does not see it as part of the academic role. In *Theory of International Politics*, he claims that "a theory has explanatory and predictive power" (WALTZ, 1979, p. 69), a claim similar to that made by Mearsheimer. However, he follows it with this caveat: "A theory of international politics will, for example, explain why war recur, and it will indicate some of the conditions that make war more or less likely; but it will not predict the outbreak of particular wars." This, of course, is due to Waltz's structural approach, and not necessarily connected to any particular views on his own role as an academic.

Waltz's position on academic engagement is difficult to ascertain. This is probably because he did not concern himself particularly with the subject. His first interest as an academic, for example, before he turned to international politics, was political philosophy (WALTZ, 2011). When asked whether it's good that "some people […] are dedicated to policy and other people dedicated to theory", that is, that those are mainly two separate domains, he answered that "Whether or not it's good, that's what happens. And obviously,

theory is what attracted me and what I did most of. But I did stray into practical questions now and then" (WALTZ; FEARON 2012, p. 5). Whether he believed that it should be the goal of all or most academics, Waltz was clearly motivated by the puzzle and the answers he could create for it, rather than by whatever application these answers would find.

5.1.8 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: quantitative engagement

Bueno de Mesquita's academic work and personal convictions go against the general notion that there is an inevitable tension between quantitative work and policy-relevance. As he divulges on his CV, Bueno de Mesquita has served as a consultant to "several federal agencies and private corporations on national security, foreign affairs, strategic planning, bargaining, litigation management, mergers and acquisitions, fraud detection and prediction, contract negotiations, and political and policy forecasting" as well as having "supervised teams of consultants on a variety of projects in the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, France, Australia, Japan, and elsewhere in Europe and Asia" (BUENO DE MESQUITA, online).

Bueno de Mesquita (2009) sees the role of academic scholarship in the field of International Relations as being primarily that of understanding the world, but he believes that "as we develop better understanding we also develop better prospects of being able to improve outcomes, especially with regard to avoiding violence and finding ways to settle disputes peacefully." Interestingly, he combines what would be claim of jurisdiction (to use Abbott's terms) based on utility, with one based on expertise that is inaccessible to the laity.

Firstly, he argues that the best way academic work can aid policymakers is through "the scientific method" since it is "the most reliable way to create convergence between understanding, explanation, and (often probabilistic) prediction" (BUENO DE MESQUITA, 2009, online). Furthermore, he argues that, contra what Nye (among others) have proposed, policymakers and the "intelligence community" in general are increasingly seeking just the type of mathematically-oriented work Bueno de Mesquita develops. The logical and mathematical basis of his work, he argues, is what makes it different from mere opinions of practitioners, and therefore of particular interest to them:

> Analytic rigor and methods for testing alternative tactical and strategic responses to issues as distinct from seat-of-the-pants guess work by practitioners. Fortunately,

> practitioners are increasingly taking advantage of academically-developed analytic methods to improve the quality of pre-decision making assessments. (PAGVI, 2012)

5.1.9 Martha Finnemore: an engaged constructivist

Martha Finnemore joked during an address at the University of Denver that she was known as the "norms lady" and that she had spent much of her academic career convincing her colleagues that her main object of study indeed existed. As her approach, constructivism, became mainstream in IR, Finnemore began to be sought after by policymakers and her work on norms in cyber issues has attempted to influence policy. Policy influence might have been one of Finnemore's main goals, since she was at the University of Denver to receive a "Engaged Scholar award recognizing her for her policy-engaged work throughout her career" (UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, online).

That being said, Finnemore has not published anything on her views on the role of academics or her motivations. When asked by Foreign Policy how she believed academics could best help policymakers she offered the following answer:

> Scholars can more easily take a long-term and big-picture perspective on world events. They can be helpful in identifying trends and patterns that may be hard to see in the often-frenetic world of policymaking. The challenge is to turn big-picture thoughts into useful recommendations (PAGVI, 2012, online).

5.1.10 Samuel Huntington's controversial influence

Samuel Huntington is a controversial scholar, to say the least – he was compared to Mussolini in the first review of his book *The Soldier and The State* (KAPLAN, 2001). That being said, he is also a widely known scholar, including among policy circles: 90% of the policymakers who answered Avey and Desch's (2013) survey were familiar with Huntington's book *Clash of Civlizations* – though a smaller share, 37%, was either "very confident" or "somewhat confident" in the accuracy of his thesis[109].

[109] The question posed by the authors was "How confident are you in the accuracy of Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis that civilizations, not states, are likely to be the most important actors in the future of world politics?" (AVEY; DESCH, 2013, p. 12).

While Huntington did not write on his motivation as an academic, or on the role of academics in general, he did engage directly with policymaking. In 1977 and 1978, he served in the Carter White House as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council, and in the 1980s, he was a member of the Presidential Commission on Long-Term Integrated Strategy. He also wrote many policy-focused articles, including a, again, controversial article on Foreign Affairs where he defended American intervention in Vietnam[110]. Although he was first and foremost an academic, he probably faced most of his opposition inside academia. Nevertheless, "though often publicly denounced, have had a pervasive influence among people who count" (KAPLAN, 2001, online).

5.2 ACADEMIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

The TRIP survey approaches academic engagement on two fronts: issue advocacy and consulting. Issue advocacy approximates scholars from the public intellectual ideal, since it is not necessarily targeted at policymakers, but the lobbying of a particular point-of-view vis-à-vis the general public. The question posed by the survey was "On average, how often do you engage in advocacy around international issues on which you have expert knowledge?". The results are presented in Graph 16 (below).

[110] It is worth remembering that a considerable part of the IR academic community opposed American action in Vietnam, including realists Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan (the original developer of the Containment doctrine) and Kenneth Waltz.

Graph 16 - Issue Advocacy by IR scholars



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

As can be seen, most scholars do engage in issue advocacy (56%), though only 11% do it four or more times a year, and 43% don't do it at all. Considering the positions shown regarding policy relevance and the relationship with the policy community, this seems to indicate a larger preoccupation with affecting policy directly – through policymakers – than indirectly, through public opinion.

Graph 17 (below) shows how many IR scholars have either worked or consulted with public and private institutions. The question asked was "In the past two years, have you consulted or worked in a paid or unpaid capacity for any of the following?"

Graph 17 - Work and Consulting by IR Scholars



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

The Graph above shows that almost 60% of IR academics have either consulted or worked for the government, an International Organization, an NGO, and interest group, a think-thank or a private foundation. One quarter of respondents have either worked or consulted for the government. Again, this show a majoritarian will to engage directly with policy, going against the idea of a self-enclosed discipline.

Graph 18 below shows the answer to the question: "Since you began your academic career, have you responded to any major world event by increasing or decreasing your research in an issue area related to that event?"

Graph 18 - Influence of current events on research



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

The data seem to validate the idea that IR as a field is extremely porous to external events. While this seem to indicate the intention of policy relevance – it is worth remembering that policy relevance and current issues had been presented on the same alternative before – it is worth questioning how relevant academic work can be post-facto (as per Wendt's arguments).

5.2.1 The Policy Planning Staff

The Policy Planning staff has lost some of its relevance since the days of George Kennan, particularly due to an increase in the concentration of foreign policy decisions in the White House in detriment of the State Department. Nevertheless, as the in-house think-thank it is still a place where academics might find a place inside the policymaking machine. Table 9 (below) shows the members of Bush's S/P and their main occupation.

Table 9 - Members of the Policy Planning Staff, Bush Administration

Members	Main occupation
David F. Gordon - Director	Academic, foreign service
Edward Lacey – Deputy director	Foreign service
Amanda Lantazano	Foreign service
Ash Jain	Academic, political advisor
B. Todd Deatherage	Foreign service
Brian Phipps	Foreign service
Daniel Twining	Think-tank
Dean Puttman	Foreign service
Greg Behrman	Academic
Janelle Larter	Speech writer
Jillian Burns	Foreign service
James Green	Foreign service
Jared Cohen	Foreign service
Nazanin Ash	USAID
Matt Stremlau	Researcher
Mara Tchalakov	Intelligence officer
Richard Sokolsky	Foreign service
Whit Wolman	Foreign service

Source: State Department

While most of the members, as could be expected, were from the Department of State itself, an unneglectable number came from either academia or other institutions devoted to research. Bush's Policy Planning Director did have academic credentials – he is currently a professor at Georgetown University and he had previously taught at University of Michigan and Michigan State University, the College of William and Mary, Princeton University, Georgetown University and the University of Nairobi. When he joined the Department of State, however, he came from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).

Table 10 - Members of the Policy Planning Staff, Obama administration

Members	Main occupation
John Finer - Director	Journalist, government official
Siddhart Mohandas – Deputy Director	Academic, Department of Defense
Edward J. Lacey	Foreign service officer
Tamara Klajn	Foreign service officer
Max Bergmann	Foreign service officer
Dan Biers	Foreign service officer
Michael Camilleri	Academic, International Organizations
Charles Edel	Academic, army
Edward Fishman	Foreign service officer
Sumana Guha	Foreign service officer
Erik Iverson	Foreign service officer
Shehzi Kahn	Foreign service officer
Michael Kimmage	Academic
Ian Klaus	Foreign service officer
Clara Knudsen	Foreign service officer
Adam Lusin	Foreign service officer
Arsian Malik	International organizations, Foreign service officer
Rich Outzen	Foreign service officer
Sahar Nowrauzzadeh	Foreign service officer
Samuel Parker	Foreign service officer
Chad Peterson	Foreign service officer
Roopa Rangaswamy	Foreign service officer
Reed Schuler	Foreign service officer
Jonathan Stromseth	International Organization, academic
Bart Szewczyk	Academic, lawyer
Jon Temim	Think-tank

Source: State Department

The situation is pretty similar with Obama's Policy Planning Staff. A majority of members came from the foreign policy apparatus itself, though eight out of the 26 (a little over a third) came from outside. Of those, seven came either from academia or think-tanks and research institutes. One of the members, Michael Kimmage, served as a Franklin Fellow. This fellowship provides the opportunity for "senior and mid-level professionals" to serve a "one-year unpaid fellowship at the Department of State or at USAID" (DEPARTMENT OF STATE, online)[111].

5.2.2 The Bridging the Gap Initiative

As the brief literature review in the Introduction of this dissertation shows, there is widespread concern among academics that academia is losing its relevance and that the gap between scholars and policymakers has become too wide. As a response to that situation, a concrete effort has arisen in the form of the Bridging the Gap Initiative, a program that has as its main goal to "[strengthen] the relationship between scholars of international relations/ comparative politics and the broader foreign-policy community" (JENTLESON, 2015, p. 108).

The Initiative was developed initially by Bruce Jentleson from Duke University, Steve Weber, from the University of California, Berkeleym and Jim Goldgeier, from George Washington University (he later left GWU to become Dean of the School of International Service at American University) (JENTLESON, 2015). The funding came primarily from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, which donated five million dollars to the project in 2014. The money went to five universities selected by Carnegie for their emphasis on "face-to-face interaction among practitioners, academics, and students" and with "programs that take into account policymaking experience when hiring, and that are revising tenure and promotion rules to create incentives for faculty to participate in policy work" (CARNEGIE, 2014, online).

Professor Goldgeier described the Initiative as having a "bottom-up approach" focused on providing the adequate training for graduate students and faculty who had an interest in

[111] The Department of State had another fellowship in the area of foreign policy, the Diplomacy Fellowship, which has been recently suspended due to the overall review process being conducted by the Trump administration.

developing policy-relevant work[112]. The developers define policy-relevant as "research, analysis, writing, and related activities that advance knowledge with an explicit priority of addressing policy questions" (JENTLESON, 2015, p. 108). They emphasize that it does not mean a-theoretical work, but the focus is on developing or applying middle-range theories to solve practical problems, rather than engaging in purely abstract paradigmatic debates.

Bridging the Gap acts on two main fronts to bring academia and policymakers closer: by encouraging policy-relevant work and by promoting the interaction of academics and policymakers. They have been pursuing these goals in four main ways:

> (1) bringing together scholars who have been leaders in advancing policy-relevant international-relations research; (2) providing assistance to junior scholars who seek to engage in policy-relevant research or pursue careers in the policy world; (3) connecting scholars with policy makers from the diplomatic, defense, and intelligence communities; and (4) collaborating with other projects and colleagues with similar objectives. (JENTLESON, 2015, p. 108)

Despite perceived resistance from part of academia to the quest for policy-relevance, Goldgeier says the Initiative had a very good reception at universities, since it addresses concerns regarding the justification the relevance of research in the eyes of society: "universities in the United States are under so much pressure, from alumni, from parents, from students, from government, to show that they are doing something that is relevant to society, that they are not just doing this closed activity that doesn't matter."[113]

A next step for the Initiative according to Professor Goldgeier would be to address the policy side, more particularly to aid policymakers to find academic research that might be of interest to them. He argues more often than not, policymakers simply look for answers in what is produced by think-tanks, since that is catered to them and written with policymakers in mind. However, he argues that this ends up narrowing the scope of what policymakers read and they end up "missing all this interesting work that is being done in academia.[114]"

[112]GOLDGEIER, Jim. Interview I. [apr. 2016]. Interviewer: Fernanda Barth Barasuol. Washington, D.C., 2016.
[113] GOLDGEIER, Jim. Interview I. [apr. 2016]. Interviewer: Fernanda Barth Barasuol. Washington, D.C., 2016.
[114] GOLDGEIER, Jim. Interview I. [apr. 2016]. Interviewer: Fernanda Barth Barasuol. Washington, D.C., 2016.

5.3 ACADEMIC SPEECH IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

According to the ideal-types being used here, one would expect academics in the current period to gear their "speech", that is, the outputs of their research, towards other academics. That is, they would have a limited interest in reaching other audiences. The TRIP survey can aid in assessing this through a number of survey questions, as well as a recent analysis of academic publication in the field.

Firstly, TRIP asked academics whether their research was primarily basic or applied. The question asked was "Does your research tend to be basic or applied? By basic research, we mean research for the sake of knowledge, without any specific policy application in mind. Conversely, applied research is done with specific policy applications in mind." Graph 19 (below) shows the results:

Graph 19 - Basic and Applied Research in IR



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

As can be seen, more respondents claim that their research is either primarily basic or more basic than applied (48%), than claim it's either primarily applied or more applied than basic (34%). This represents a similar share to the one of respondents who claimed to be primarily motivated by policy relevance in their choice of topics to study.

Much like the number of institutions, the number of academic journals has multiplied since the 1960s. Publishing in peer-review journals has become possibly the single most important factor to advance in the academic career and these journals are currently the main outlet for academic research. The TRIP survey has analyzed articles published in 12 top IR journals in terms of methodology, subject, etc. One of the topics analyzed was the presence of policy prescription in these articles. Graph 20 (below) shows the evolution of policy prescription in journal articles from 1999-2010:

Graph 20 - Policy Prescription in IR publications (2000-2009)



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

As can be seen, only under 10% of articles published in the period have presented some form of policy prescription. There is a small uptick in the 2001-2003 period. It seems likely this has a connection to 9-11, given the considerable share of academics who have claimed to alter their research due to external events (see graph 18).

One of the main reasons pointed by several academics in the "gap debate" to the decrease in interest in academic work by policymakers is the increase in the use of quantitative methods. At the same time, they point to a decrease in policy analysis, which is seen by policymakers as the most useful type of academic work (AVEY; DESCH). Graph 21 (below) shows the evolution of both policy prescription and quantitative analysis in the same period and for the same publications:

Graph 21 - Quantitative Methods and Policy Analysis in IR publications (2000-2009)



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

As can be seen there has been a steady increase in the use of quantitative methodologies in the period. If in 2000, around 35% of articles used quantitative methods, in 2009 the share was around 50%. It is worth remembering that this figure was around 25% in the 1980s, meaning it doubled in the past 2-3 decades. Policy analysis, on the other hand, has been present in a very small number of articles. The peak was in the 2001-2003 period when it reached about 5%. Given similar changes in policy prescription it seems likely they have the same source, probably external events.

The increase in quantitative methodologies has been a strong trend in the field of IR as whole. However, it seemed interesting to investigate whether there was a significant discrepancy in their use across different journals. The results are shown in Graph 22 (below):

Graph 22 - Quantitative Methods and Policy Analysis in Selected Journals



Source: author's own elaboration based data from the TRIP survey (online)

Note: The journals shown above are: American Journal of Political Science, American Political Science Review, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Politics, Journal of Peace Research, Security studies and World Politics.

As can be seen the differences between journals are indeed significant. While the American Journal of Political Science and the Journal of Politics have more than 80% of articles published using quantitative methodologies, International Studies and Security Studies have around 10%. Apart from these outliers, however, the rest has an average of 50% of articles using quantitative methods.

As mentioned before, a considerable share of academics engaged in the "gap debate" point to quantitative methodologies as a force against policy relevance. Two authors, however, have argued against this notion. The first is James Fearon, whose position we have analyzed in the previous section. The other is Tanisha Fazal, who published a paper aimed at

investigating this hypothesis by “looking at the relationship between research methods on the one hand and the supply of and demand for policy-relevant research on the other” (FAZAL, 2016, p. 34). Fazal argues that there is no reason why quantitative methods would make research any less (or more) relevant for policymakers.

Additionally, she claims that policymakers are increasingly trained to comprehend quantitative research, and that researchers, for their turn, have looked for different avenues to disseminate their findings. Fazal (2016, p. 37) concludes that “it seems at least as likely that generational changes in the academy, coupled with who is plugged into which networks, are key determinants of successful outreach to the policy world”

Despite these finding, it is still valid to argue that quantitative methods can definitely be a type of barrier to those who are not trained in them. Therefore, the increase in the use of these methods may indeed make academic articles less palatable to outsiders. Another aspect to take into consideration, as in the previous chapter, is the overall readability of the text. Graph 23 (below) show the analysis of a sample of International Organization and World Politics articles from the 2000-2009 period using Flesch Reading Ease:

Graph 23 - Flesch Reading Ease in International Organization, World Politics, Foreign Affairs and New York Times articles (2000-2009 average)



Source: author’s own elaboration

According to Flesch's schematic (presented in chapter 4), IR articles are now in the "scientific" stratum, the one with the highest difficulty level. They have become considerably more difficult to apprehend – at least by this metric – than Foreign Affairs articles and New York Times op-eds. Graph 24 (below) shows the analysis of the same articles using the Dale-Chall formula. This formula analyses texts based especially on the use of "difficult" or unusual words (for a lengthier explanation, please see Chapter 4).

Graph 24 - New Dale-Chall in International Organization, World Politics, Foreign Affairs and New York Times articles (2000-2009 average)



Source: author's own elaboration

Dale-Chall doesn't show as much of a difference between journal articles and Foreign Affairs and New York Times pieces as Flesch did, though academic articles are still relatively more difficult. In this case International Organization's articles appear to be more difficult than World Politics', while using Flesch's the opposite happened. As mentioned before, these measures have their limitations, but the combined trend seems to point towards current journals articles relatively less accessible to non-academics.

The combination of quantitative methods and an increase in reading difficulty certainly point towards academic articles becoming less accessible to lay men, including those with some background knowledge of international issues, as one can assume is the case of

policymakers. Nevertheless, academics might still choose to make their work accessible by publishing in policy-oriented publications. Graph 25 (below) shows the share of the top 10 most influential academics who have published in either *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*, or both.

Graph 25 - Publications of "top ten" in Policy-oriented outlets



Source: author's own elaboration

As can be seen nine out of these ten academics have published in Foreign Affairs and six of them have published in both Foreign Affairs and Foreign Policy. The sole exception to this trend is Alexander Wendt, who has not published in either of them. It appears that even though academic publications might have become less appealing to outsiders, scholars show a concern with reaching a wider audience by publishing shorter pieces in policy-oriented outlets. The fact that the "top" ten have published in these outlets is also interesting due to the fact that most of them are known for their contributions to the disciplines are *theorists*, rather than by being scholars concerned with the practical application or policy-relevance of their work. Again, this goes somewhat against the idea that the academics eschew policy-oriented outlets for their publications.

6 CONCLUSIONS

Hans Morgenthau (1961, p.5) wrote that "every shoe maker, every physician, every peasant, is secure in the awareness of the meaning of his vocation. But is the scholar? Is he certain of the meaning of what he's doing?". This uncertainty seems to have been a part of the academic profession from its inception, and it is at the core of the debate regarding its purpose even today. It stems, perhaps, from the intangibility of much of the fruits of academic work, or perhaps from the perception that academic work is not simply a profession but a vocation, and an accompanying sense of duty towards society – a duty which some may feel perhaps is not being performed.

Despite their different perspectives, the authors who have debated the role of the intellectual had something in common: the view that knowledge and knowledge producers have a unique purpose in society. The differences between them were related to *what*, precisely, this purpose was, and *how* best to fulfill it. The ideas put forward in this work rested on the assumption that these motivations – that is, the different perceptions regarding what is the role of academics in society – guided the actions of scholars in how they chose to design and pursue their professional goals. As shown in chapter 3, the historical evolution of the academic profession has increased the number of tasks academics are asked to perform, and the rewards structure that is in place has an inevitable effect over the choices available to academics. Nevertheless, the ideal-types of academic vocation proposed rest on the assumption that there is room for maneuver, and that scholars are still able to make choices based on their broad perception regarding their social role. In this sense, academics who are not engaged in policy do not do so due to a carelessness regarding their social role, but rather because of their perception of what it is.

Ideal-types are oversimplifications, built for their utility as a tool for analyzing a vastly more complex reality. One doesn't expect to find anything out there in the "real world" that perfectly resembles them. Therefore, there was no expectation when this research started that either individual academics or the profession as a whole (on the analyzed field) would perfectly align with the "clerk" or the "engaged" academic ideal-types. However, the hypothesis forwarded here was that one would find a predominance of engaged academics in IR during the first period analyzed (1945-1960) and of clerks in the second (2000-2016). This hypothesis was only partially confirmed.

According to the ideal-types proposed here, engaged academics are motivated by the possible effects of their work on political reality. In this sense, they have in mind the possible practical application of their work as it is developed. Realist authors during the "golden age" certainly had this application in mind. According to themselves, they did not wish to develop a utopic view of how things *should* be, as "idealists" had done in the interwar period, but rather a faithful depiction of how the International System in fact worked. This did not imply, however, a theory devoid of any commitment to defining political goals – as behaviorism was perceived to be. Rather, these goals were to be defined by the *national interest*, a concept that despite its centrality remained elusive.

Realists saw the guiding of foreign policy as a central objective of theory. Morgenthau affirmed that theory is only significant if relevant to political action, and realist authors had this significance in mind when they developed their analyses. The limit to the role of theory in guiding political action here was not the idea of value objectivity or the necessity of a distance from politics, but rather the inherently subjective character of politics itself. It is mainly in this sense that Realists reject behaviorism and its view of the role of science in "fixing" the problems of the social world.

In this objective of guiding political practice, International Relations academics found, during these early years of the Cold War, an ally in private foundations, most notably Rockefeller. Those in charge of the Program on International Relations at the foundation, particularly Dean Rusk and Kenneth Thompson, diagnosed the lack of theoretical orientation as one of the issues of American foreign policy at the time. Their hope was that the funding of IR institutes, programs, and researchers would remediate that. This monetary aid was instrumental in building the realist theoretical project which, despite its short dominance, developed a "paradigm" which is still one of the main forces in IR today.

The Rockefeller Foundation also provided the opportunity for scholars to interact directly with policymakers – the most notable occasion being the 1954 Conference on theory. It was in this mostly informal fashion that academics had contact with the policy world. Both the foreign policy apparatus and academia were smaller worlds at the time. Stephen Walt, for instance, claims that Foreign-policy making in the United States was then "the preoccupation of the old 'Eastern establishment' as embodied by institutions like the Council on Foreign Relations and 'wise men' like George Kennan, Dean Acheson, John McCloy, and others who played key roles in creating the post-World War II order." (WALT, 2018, online) Similarly,

IR academia was much smaller. Additionally, it was much more homogeneous than it is today. Connecting these worlds was possibly an easier task, and one which the Rockefeller foundation was eager to undertake.

When it came to the recruitment of academics by policymakers, however, the interest seemed limited, as the composition of the Policy Planning Staff of the Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations shows. S/P, the "in-house think-tank" of the State Department, whose main objective was the development of a strategic view for American foreign policy was composed mainly of members who came from the Department itself – albeit those who possibly had some academic inclination.

The number of venues for academic publications was also much smaller during the "golden age". Some of the journals that are still important in the field, however, already existed, notably *International Organization*, *World Politics* and *Foreign Affairs*. The analysis of these publications showed that, in terms of language, academic articles were as readable as either Foreign Affairs articles of the time or current New York Times op-eds. Considering that quantitative methodologies were still scarcely employed at the time, all in all it is possible to affirm that academic writing was fairly accessible to an educated public. Nevertheless, a comparison of authors who published in the more scholarly venues (International Organization and World Politics) with those who published in the more policy-oriented one (Foreign Affairs) shows the two groups have very little intersection. It appears authors who published in academic journals did not venture into the policy publication, and vice-versa.

International Relations academia in the twenty-first century is a much larger and more diverse world than it was in the 1950s, without a clear dominating pole and at least three mainstream theoretical perspectives. This made locating *an* academic motivation an impossible task, for which the focus on the "top ten" IR academics was the best – if limited - solution. What emerged from that analysis were at least two different perspectives. The first one – forwarded by authors such as Joseph Nye - is very much on par with that put forward by the Realists of the "golden age". It rests on the idea that theory has as its task the guiding of policymakers, and for this reason must be both useful and accessible to them. The second position does not necessarily eschew policy-relevance, but is mostly unconcerned with it, as one would expect a clerk to be. The main example of this position is Kenneth Waltz. Considering the discipline as a whole, data from the TRIP survey shows that a considerable share of academics take policy-relevance into consideration when choosing their topics of

research, and that the vast majority of scholars believe there should exist a closer relationship between academics and policymakers.

Most of the authors considered to be the most influential in the field of International Relations have addressed the topic of academic engagement in way or another. Joseph Nye, as mentioned, is one of the champions of policy engagement. Robert Jervis, John Mearsheimer, and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita all have displayed favorable opinions of academic engagement with the policy world, and Robert Keohane, despite his cautionary tale does see several possible benefits of engaging. James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, for their part, seem to favor a public intellectual approach, which nonetheless still transpire an engaged academic viewpoint.

In terms of direct engagement with the policy world, while the majority of the "top ten" has not engaged directly, TRIP data shows that about a quarter of IR academics had either worked or consulted for the American government, a non-negligible number. In terms of recruitment by the policy apparatus, in the Policy Planning Staff, at least, the number remains small, as S/P remains composed mainly by Foreign Service officers.

In a similar fashion to what Rockefeller had done in the 1940s and 1950s, another private foundation, Carnegie, which had already been involved in the field of IR in the early 20th century, with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, is attempting to bring together academics and policymakers. The current project, the Bridging the Gap Initiative, is focused on a small number of Policy Schools, which are already geared towards a policy-oriented research and education model. Besides bringing together academics and policymakers, it also aims to make academic writing more accessible and interesting to policymakers.

One of the main arguments put forward by those involved in the gap debate is that current academic research is increasingly useless to policymakers, due to the topics chosen, the methodologies used, and the esoteric language it employs. While there is an inherent subjectivity in determining what is a *useful* topic or what topic is worthy of research efforts, one could point to the fact that IR scholars (as shown by TRIP data) are strongly influenced by current events, which are very likely to be topics of interest to policymakers. On the other hand, the use of quantitative methodologies has grown considerably in the past decades, and about half of articles published in the main academic journals of the field employ these

methodologies. This very likely has a connection with both methodological and theoretical shifts in the field since the 1960s, and with the predominant view in American Political Science that quantitative methodologies are more scientific than qualitative ones. These shifts possibly also made it less acceptable to describe the writings of practitioners as academic work, something that was more current in the 1945-1960 period.

The pressure to establish what is and what isn't academic work is also likely related to the increasing pressures on the profession as a whole, as described in chapter 3. These pressures are also fueled by the growth in competition related to the decrease in the likelihood of PhD holders obtaining a satisfactory and stable job within academia due to the decrease in available tenure track jobs (as share of the overall offer of academic positions). These pressures probably contribute to the eagerness to put forward an image of either scientificity or utility, which despite having the same origin (the necessity of jurisdiction claim) create much dispute within academia, due to their distinct perceptions of the academic vocation and of what kind of research academics should be producing.

The writing of academic articles itself does appear to have become less accessible to laymen. According to Flesch Reading Ease and New-Dale Chall measures, articles published in International Organization and World Politics are now perceptibly more difficult than articles published in Foreign Affairs and New York Times op-eds. The share of articles who include any kind of policy prescription is virtually nil. One could argue, however, that there are limited incentives to include these prescriptions, given that policymakers (and even academics when working temporarily with policymaking) do not engage with academic journals. At the same time, there appears to be an effort being made in disseminating research beyond academic circles by publishing in policy-oriented vehicles – at least that is clearly the case of the most influential academics in the field.

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International Relations academics of the "golden age", at least those in Realist circles, were indeed concerned with the practical application of their theories. The consciously pondered the matter of how to make them useful to policymakers. They saw it as their role as academics to either aid those in power or speak against them when necessary. They had mostly informal connections to policymakers that were in large part provided by the Rockefeller Foundation. Their work was likely easily apprehensible to an educated audience,

something that had as much to do with their particular epistemological and methodological choices than it had to do with any conscious effort in this regard. At the same time, there already existed what appears to be a distinction between those authors who published in policy-oriented and in academic publications. While there are well-known academics who ventured into policymaking, there is no evidence that this was a general trend. In sum, while IR in the 1945-1960 period was much closer to "engaged" than to "clerk", the perception that it was a "golden age" of policy engagement is probably owed, in part, to a rosy view of the past.

It is more difficult to argue that the current period is marked by a "great gap" between academics and policymakers. Most academics who answered the TRIP survey argue in favor of a closer relationship to policymakers. Most influential authors in the field also argue in favor of policy relevance. A quarter of IR academics have worked for the American government, and more than half have worked for either governments, think-tanks or international organizations. There are initiatives to bring academia and the policy world closer. At the same time, academic "speech", that is, academic publications do seem to have become less appealing and less accessible to a non-academic audience. At least to a degree, there appears to exist a disconnect between academic perceptions of their role (their motivations) and academics' actions.

While it is not possible at this time to point with certainty to the cause of this disconnect, some reasons seem likely. Firstly, when academics speak of a wish to bring academia and policymakers closer, they might speak of a broad and diffuse perception of academia, rather than their own work – that is, the idea that some academics should engage with policy, though not necessarily themselves. Secondly, it is hard to argue that the reward system of the academic profession plays a part in this. Several scholars have spoken towards this, claiming that policy engagement, be it by working directly for the government or publishing in policy-oriented publications, works *against* them within the profession. This seems to be due to the fact that these activities are not rewarded and, additionally, take time and focus away from publishing in top-tier academic journals, the main condition for advancement in the profession.

Whether one agrees or not with the need to engage with policymakers, it seems clear that the current constraints imposed by the structure of the profession are restricting the freedom of at least some academics to engage with topics they would be interested in. The

reason behind this seems to be an increasingly narrow perception of what constitutes valid academic work. That being said, it is unlikely that these constraints work only over policy-oriented research, but more likely restrain academics with a variety of interests and methodologies that do not fit this perception and who therefore do not find an outlet for their research in the top tier academic journals. In an odd turn, this seems to bring academics involved in the "gap debate" closer to those involved in the methodological and epistemological debates that circled around, in large part, the matter of unification *versus* diversity in IR.

Additionally, the current publish-or-perish model has been criticized not only for its possible effects over policy engagement, but for its possible connection to series of different issues, including the emergence of a number of predatory journals and the overall rate of mental health issues among graduate students (which has been proven to be considerably higher than for the general population). If the current model is indeed – indirectly - constraining academic freedom to pursue what academics perceive to be their vocation, perhaps what is required, in this sense, is a much broader analysis of the system as whole.

As for the future of the gap debate, perhaps this small addition to it may contribute to make the debate more informed regarding changes in academic engagement that appear to have been somewhat exaggerated. If the last three decades of epistemological debates have made anything clear, it is that the trend within the field is towards diversity. If any homogeneity is ever achieved, it seems more likely it would be through imposition rather than consensus. Within this diversity, some academics will pursue policy-relevant avenues of research, other scholars will find that their vocations is better fulfilled by addressing different topics. Regardless of their choices, it is important that they have the freedom to pursue them, and may find an open-minded audience with which to debate them.

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APPENDIX A – BIOGRAPHIES OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF (TRUMAN, EISENHOWER AND KENNEDY ADMINISTRATIONS)

Notes: Publications do not include transcripts of lectures or speeches, newspaper articles, book reviews, works of literature, and working papers produced for the US government as a government employee. I chose to maintain academic books or articles that were unrelated to foreign policy and international relations (i.e.: Henry Villard's books on aviation).

1 HARRY S. TRUMAN (1945-1953)

1.1 Directors

GEORGE KENNAN
Director from 1947-1949 **Education:** Graduated from Princeton in 1925. Studied Russian at the University of Berlin (funded by the Department of State). **Career:** Joined the Foreign Service in 1926. Was posted in Switzerland (1927-1929), Germany (1929-1931 and 1939), Latvia (1931-1932), Russia (1934-1937, 1945 and 1952), Czechoslovakia (1938), Portugal (1942-1945) and Yugoslavia (1961-1963). Joined the National War College in 1946 as deputy commander for foreign affairs. Appointed as the first Director of the Policy Planning Staff in 1947. Joined the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 1950. **Publications:** <u>Books</u> *American Diplomacy*, University of Chicago Press, 1952

Realities of American Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, 1954

Russia Leaves the War: Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920, Princeton University Press, 1956

The Decision to Intervene: Soviet-American Relations 1917-1920, Princeton University Press, 1958

Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, Little Brown and Co, 1961

On Dealing with the Communist World, Harper and Row, 1964

Democracy and the Student Left, Atlantic-Little 1968

From Prague, After Munich: Diplomatic Papers, Princeton University Press, 1968

The cloud of danger: Current realities of American foreign policy, Little Brown, 1977

The Decline of Bismarck's European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875-1890, Princeton University Press, 1981

Nuclear delusion: Soviet-American relations in the atomic age, Pantheon Books, 1982

The Fateful Alliance: France, Russia, and the Coming of the First World War, Manchester University Press, 1984

Articles

Foreign Affairs:

"The Sources of Soviet Conduct", July 1947 (under the pseudonym Mr. X)

"America and the Russian Future", April 1951

"Disengagement Revisited", January 1959

"Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View", January 1960

"Polycentrism and American Policy", January 1964

"Japanese Security and American Policy", October 1964

"The Russian Revolution – Fifty Years After: Its nature and consequences", October 1967

"To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal", |April 1970

"Hazardous Courses in Southern Africa", October 1970

"After the Cold War: American Foreign Policy in the 1970s", October 1972

"Europe's Problems, Europe's Choices", Spring 1974

"Two Hundred Years of American Policy: The United States and the Soviet

Union", July 1976
"Morality and Foreign Policy", Winter 1985/86
"Containment 40 years later: containment then and now", Spring 1987
"Communism in Russian History", Winter 1990-91
"On American Principles", March/April 1995
"Diplomacy Without Diplomats?", October 1997

The Journal of Modern History
"The Sisson Documents", vol 28(2), 1956

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), MILNE (2016)

PAUL NITZE (1907-2004)

Director from 1949-1953

Education: Attended Hotchkis School. Graduated from Harvard in 1928 (major in economy and finances).

Career: Joined investment bank Dillon Read & Co at Wallstreet in 1929 (stayed on until 1938). Assistant to James Forrestal, Under Secretary of the Navy, in 1940. Became finance director of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in 1941. Named chief of the Metals and Minerals Branch of the Board of Economic Warfare in 1942. Became director of foreign procurement and development for the Foreign Economic Administration in 1943. Vice-chairman of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey from 1944-1946. Joined the Department of State in the Office of International Trade Policy in 1946 or 1947 (date unclear). Named deputy to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs in 1948. Became Director of the PPS in 1949. Joined Eisenhower's Presidential Committee in 1957. Assistant Secretary in the Pentagon 1961-1963. Secretary at the Navy 1963-1967.Appointed Deputy Secretary of State in 1967. Joined the United States delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union in 1969. Appointed special adviser to President Reagan on arms control matters in 1984.

Publications:

Books

Securing The Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options, Westview Press, 1979

From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision, Grove, 1989

From Hiroshima to Glasnost: A Memoir of Five Perilous Decades, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1990

Tension Between Opposites: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics, Scribern 1994

Articles:

Comparative Strategy

SALT II and American strategic considerations, vol 2(1), 1980

Foreign Affairs

"Assuring Strategic Stability in an Era of Détente", January 1976

"Atoms, Strategy and Policy", October 1955

"Strategy in the Decade of the 1980s", Fall 1980

"Livint with the Soviets", Winter 1984/85

"America: an Honest Broker", Fall 1990

Foreign Policy

"Deterring Our Deterrent", Winter 1976-77

International Security

"The Relationship of Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces", vol 2(2), 1977

"NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered", vol 4(4), 1980

SAIS Review of International Affairs

"American Foreign Policy in the 1990s", vol 10(1), 1990

"Perspective on U.S. Foreign Policy Today", vol 19(1), 1999

Survival

"Political aspects of a national strategy", vol 2(6), 1960

The Review of Politics

"The Role of Learned Men in Government", vol 20(3), 1958

"The Vladivostok Accord and SALT II", vol 37(2), 1975

The Washington Quarterly

"Is it Time to Junk Our Nukes?", vol 20(3), 1994

Sources: BURR; RAMPLER (2004), PAUL H NITZE… (2014), PAUL H. NITZE (2014b)

FRANCIS T. WILLIAMSON (1908-1964)

Director July-November 1952

Education: Studied at University of Richmond, City College in New York and Johns Hopkins University.

Career: Instructor at Johns Hopkins University 1930-1937. Joined the State Department in 1944. Assigned to Italy (1953 and 1963-64), Germany (1960). Faculty adviser at the Naval War College (date unclear). Deputy Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, Department of State (until July 1952). Director of the Planning Staff of the Office of Western European Affairs (until 1953)

Publications: none found

Sources: FRANCIS T. WILLIAMSON… (1964), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

1.2 Deputy Directors

GEORGE HOWLAND BUTLER (1894-1967)
Deputy Director from 1947-1950 **Education:** Graduated from the University of Illinois in 1915. **Career:** Joined the Foreign Service in 1926. Ambassador to the Dominican Republic from 1946-1948. Left the foreign service in 1952. **Publications:** Books: *Inter-American relations after world war II*, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945. **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

JOHN H. FERGUSON
Deputy Director from 1951-1953 **Education:** Graduated Yale University and Harvard Law School. **Career:** Lawyer. Ambassador to Morocco 1962-1964 (non-career appointee). Vice-president and Executive Director of the Committee for a National Trade Policy (date unclear). Assistant to the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (date unclear). **Publications**: none found **Sources:** JOHN H. FERGUSON… (1970), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

1.3 Members

BERNARD A. GUFLER (1903-1973)
Education: Graduated Yale in 1925. Attended Harvard Business School. **Career:** Joined the Foreign Service in 1929. Was appointed to Latvia (1930-1933), Poland (1933-1934), Lithuania (1938-1940), Berlin (1940-1941), Germany (1945-1951), Ceylon (1951), Sri Lanka (1959-1961), Finland (1961-1963). Served as Political Desk for the division of European Affairs from 1934-1938. Assistant Chief of the Special War Problem Division of the Department of State from 1941-1945. **Publications**: none found **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

CARLTON SAVAGE (1897-1990)

Education: Graduated from the University of Oregon with a Bachelor in Science in 1921. Received a master's in international law and diplomacy from George Washington University in 1927.

Career: Principal of Glendale High School 1921-1922. Business Manager of Oregon state Normal School 1923-1926. Joined the State Department in 1927. Aide to Secretary of State Cordell Hull 1936. Joined the Policy Planning Staff in 1948. Remained until 1951. Joined again in 1953. It is unclear when he left the PPS. Retired in 1962. Professor of International Relations at Utah University and American University after his retirement from the Department of State.

Publications: none found

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), CARLTON SAVAGE… (2017)

CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL (1908-1999)

Education: Graduated from the University of Texas. Received a PhD in International Law/ International Relations from Harvard in 1939.

Career: Lecturer at Harvard 1938-1942. Joined the Army as Executive Officer in 1942. Joined the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. Joined the Committee on Foreign Affairs as a Staff Consultant in 1947. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1951-1952. Joined the Faculty of the School of Advanced International Studies in 1965. Retired in 1975.

Publications:

<u>Books</u>

The Limits of Foreign Policy, Holt, 1954

The cold war: A concise history, F. Watts, 1965
The Exercise of Sovereignty: Papers on Foreign Policy, Johns Hopkins Press, 1965
Crisis over Rhodesia: A skeptical view, Johns Hopkins Press, 1967
American foreign policy as a dimension of the American Revolution, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974.

Articles

American Political Science Review
"Character and Mission of a United Nations Peace Force, Under Conditions of General and Complete Disarmament", vol 59(2), 1965

Foreign Affairs
"Reflections on a Revolution in Pakistan", January 1959

SAIS Review
"Waiting for the Curtain", Summer 1966

Sources: C.B. MARSHALL… (1999), MARSHALL (1989), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017).

CHARLES C STELLE (1909-1964)

Education: Received a Bachelor's degree and a PhD from the University of Chicago.

Career: Rockefeller Foundation fellow at Harvard, 1938-1941. Joined Office of Strategic Services in the Far East in 1941. Joined the State Department in 1946. Chief director of research for the Far East (1946-) Member of the Policy Planning Staff 1952-56. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Plans, August 1956-August 1957. Chief Negotiator on Disarmament Talks, Geneva, 1960-1964

Publications:

Books

Americans and the China Opium Trade in the 19th Century, Ayer Co Publications, 1981.

Articles

Pacific Historical Review

"American Trade in Opium to China, 1821-39", vol 10(1), 1941

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), CHARLES C STELLE… (1964)

DOROTHY FOSDICK (1913-1997)

Education: Received a B.A. from Smith College in 1934 and a PhD in public law from Columbia University in 1939.

Career: Professor of sociology and political theory at Smith College from 1939-1942. Joined the State Department in 1942, being assigned to the Division of Special Research. Joined the Policy Planning Staff in 1948, stayed at least until 1950. Was the Chief Foreign Policy advisor to Democrat presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson in 1952. Was the chief foreign policy advisor to Senator Jackson (Democrat, Washington D.C.) until 1983, when she retired.

Publications:

Books

What is Liberty? A Study in Political Theory, Harper & Brothers, 1939.

Common Sense and World Affairs, Harcourt and Brace, 1955.

Staying the Course: Henry M. Jackson and National Security (editor), University of Washington Press, 1987.

Articles

Political Science Quarterly

"Ethical Standards and Political Strategies", 57(2), 1947

Sources: DOROTHY FOSDICK… (1997), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

EDMUND A. GULLION (1913-1998)

Education: Received a B.A. from Princeton in 1935. Graduated from the National war College in 1949.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1937 was commissioned to France (1937), Greece, Finland (1944), Vietnam (1949-1952), Cong (1961). Records found of his participation in the Policy Planning Staff in 1952, 1953 and 1954. Deputy Director of the U.S. Disarmament Administration. Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University from 1964-1978.

Publications:

Books

Uses of the Sea (editor), Englewood Cliffs, 1968

Sources: EDMUND ASBURY… (1998), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

FOY D. KOHLER (1908-1990)

Education: Received a B.A. from Ohio State University in 1931.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1931, was assigned to Canada (1931-33), Romania (1933), Yugoslavia, Greece, Egypt, Russia (1948-48; 1962-1966), Turkey (1953-56), retired in 1967. Named assistant chief of the division of Near Eastern Affairs in 1944. Records indicate he was part of the Policy Planning Staff from 1950-52. Named assistant secretary of State for European Affairs in 1959. Named deputy undersecretary for political affairs in 1966. Became a Professor at the Center for Advanced International Studies at the University of Miami in 1967.

Publications:

Books

Understanding the Russians: A Citizen's Primer, Harper & Row, 1969
The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow – A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow (editor with Mose L. Harvey), University of Miami Press, 1975
Custine's Eternal Russia: a New Edition of Journey for Our Time (with Phyllis Penn), University of Miami Press, 1976

Articles

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs
"The International Significance of the Lunar Landing" (with Dodd L. Harvey), 12(1), 1970, sept. 1970.

Science
"Administering and Managing the U.S. and Soviet Space Programs" (with Dodd L. Harvey),

Social Science
"Negotiation as an Effective Instrument of American Foreign Policy", 33(4), 1958

Studies in Soviet Thought
"The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow", 15(4), 1975

Sources: SAXON (1990), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

GEORGE LEWIS JONES JR. (1907-1971)

Education: Attended Harvard University, Cambridge University and the London School of Economics.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1930. Was posted in England (1930-31; 1946-49; 1961-64), Egypt (1932-35; 1953-55), Greece (1935-39), Egypt (1941-42), Tunisia (1952-53; 1956-59), Iran (1955-56). Was Assistant Chief of the Division of Near East Affairs (1945-46), Director of the Office of Near East Affairs (1950-52) and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs (1959-61). Joined the Policy Planning Staff in 1950, there are no records of his participation in other

years.

Publications: none found.

Sources: G. LEWIS JONES (2014), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

GEORGE WADSWORTH. (1893-1958)

Education: no information found.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1917. No information was found regarding his assignments prior to 1941. He was assigned to Italy (1941), Lebanon (1942-47), Syria (1942-47), Iraq (1946-48), Turkey (1948-52), Czechoslovakia (1951-53), Yemen (1953-58), Saudi Arabia (1953-58). Was part of the Policy Planning Staff in 1952.

Publications: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

HARRY H. SCHWARTZ (1-1991)

Education: Majored in Politics at Princeton University in 1937. Attended the National War College.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1940. He was assigned to Canada, Morocco, Congo (then Belgian Congo), Germany (1956-1960), Iran (1960-64). He was Consultant at the Department of Defense and special assistant at the White House, deputy assistant in the Pentagon's international security affairs office (1967-69) and special assistant to the secretary of state on international narcotics traffic (1969-1971). Retired in 1971. Records show him as a member of the Policy Planning |Staff in 1949, 1950, 1953, 1954 and 1955.

Publications: none found.

Sources: HARRY H. SCHWARTZ… (2017), HARRY SCHWARTZ… (1991), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017).

HENRY S. VILLARD (1901-1996)

Education: Graduated from Harvard in 1921. Studied French Theater at Oxford.

Career: English professor. Reporter for the Hearst. Joined the State Department in 1928. Was assigned to Iran (1928), Libya (1952), American Delegation at the United Nations (1954-55), U.S representation at the European Office of the United Nations (date unclear), Senegal and Mauritania 91960). Retired in 1961. Joined the Policy Planning Staff in 1948. Although there were no records of his presence in the Staff in 1950 and 1951 he reappears in 1952. There are no subsequent records of Mr. Villard. Deputy commandant for foreign affairs of the National War College 1955-57.

Publications:

Books:

Libya: The New Arab Kingdom of North Africa, Cornell University Press, 1956

Affairs at State, Thomas Y. Crowell, 1965

Contact! The Story of the Early Birds, Smithsonian Press, 1987

Blue Ribbon of the Air: The Gordon Bennett Races, Smithsonian Press, 1987

Articles

Current History

"Libya: An Experiment in Independence", July 1959

Sources: HENRY S. VILLARD… (1996), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017).

JAMES L. BERRY (1908-1980)

Education: PhD from Yale. Attended the National War College.

Career: Was assigned to India (1943) Singapore (1954), Sri Lanka (1958-59). Was Deputy Operations Coordinator at the Office of the Under Secretary of State (1953-54), Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (1955-1956), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (1956-58). Appears as member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1949, 1950, 1952 and 1953.

Publications: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017).

JOHN PATON DAVIES JR (1908-1999)

Education: Received a B.S degree from Columbia University.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1931. Was assigned to Canada (1932-33), China (1933-40; 1942-45), Russia (1945-47), Germany (1952-53), Peru (1953-54). Was part of the Policy Planning Staff from 1947-42. Was dismissed from the Foreign Service by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for lack of "judgment, discretion and reliability".

Publications:

Books

Foreign and Other Affairs, Norton, 1964

Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another, WW Norton & Co, 1972

China Hand: an autobiography, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012

Articles

Foreign Affairs

"Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy: American and East Asia", January 1977

Sources: HARRY S. TRUMAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM (2017), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

KENNETH C. KRENTZ

Education: no information found.

Career: Consul in Kobe (1936), Mukden (1941), New Delhi, Bombay (1943), Taipei (1947-9). Member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1949 to (likely) 1951.

Academic Publications: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

LEON FULLER (1895-)

Education: Received a Master of Arts from the University of Michigan in 1922 and PhD from the University of Colorado in 1933.

Career: Divisional Assistant, Division of Political Studies, Department of State in 1943. Deputy Director of the Office of German Affairs in 1952. Member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1952-1961.

Publications:

Books:

The Effect of the first Moroccan Crisis on Anglo-German Relations, 1932.

The Problem of German Political Revival, 1946.

Articles

The Journal of Modern History

"The War of 1914 as Interpreted by German Intellectuals", 14(2), 1942

The Mississippi Valley Historical Review
"Colorado's Revolt against Capitalism", vol 21 n 3, 1934.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

LOUIS J. HALLE (1895-1998)

Education: Graduated from Harvard University in 1932. Complete graduate studies also at Harvard (date not found).

Career: Was a Research Professor of Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. Joined the State Department in 1941. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff between 1952-1954. Became a professor at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland in 1957.

Publications:

Books:

Civilization and Foreign Policy: An Enquiry for Americans, Greenwood Press, 1955
Dream and Reality; Aspects of American Foreign Policy, Harper, 1959
The Cold War as History, Harper&Row, 1967
The United States Acquires the Philippines, University Press of America, 1975
The Elements of International Strategy - A Primer for the Nuclear Age, University Press of America, 1984
History, Philosophy, and Foreign Relations, University Press of America, 1987.

Articles

Foreign Affairs
"Does War Have a Future?", October 1973
"A Hopeful Future for Humankind", Summer 1980

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)**,** HALLE (1987)

ROBERT G. HOOKER. (?- 1984)

Education: no information found.

Career: Worked at the Department of State in 1945. In 1947, 1948, 1949 was Associate Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs. Appears listed as a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1949-1951. Was again part of the Bureau of European Affairs in 1954. Was posted in Great Britain in 1958.

Publications: None found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

ROBERT PRATHER JOYCE (1903-1984)

Education: Received a BA from Yale in 1926. Studied at the *École Libre des Sciences Politiques* in Paris.

Career: Joined the United Sates Foreign Service in 1928. During his diplomatic career he held posts in China, Bolivia, Panama, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Italy, France, and Brazil. In 1943 he joined the Office of Strategic Services, where he worked until 1947, when he rejoined the Foreign Service. He was a member of the Policy Planning Staff between 1949 and 1952. In 1958 he became special assistant and later acting director, of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He retired in 1962.

Publications: None found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)**,** JOYCE (2017).

ROBERT W. TUFTS

Education: Received a PhD from Oberlin College sometime after 1955, funded by the Rockefeller foundation.

Career: In 1946, 1948 was part of the Division of Commercial Policy. Member of

the Policy Planning Staff from 1949-1953.

Academic Publications: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)**,** ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION (1955).

WALTER J.LEVY (1911-1997)

Education: Studied at the universities of Berlin, Freiburg, Heidelberg, Munich and Kiel.

Career: German citizen, moved to the U.S. in 1939. Was head of the petroleum section of the Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S.) during World War II. In 1948 he became chief of the petroleum, oil and lubricant division of the Economic Cooperation Administration. In the early 1950's the started his own consulting business, W. J. Levy Consultants Corporation. Appears to have work with the Policy Planning Satff on a consultant capacity in 1952 and 1953.

Publications:

Books:

*Oil Strategy and Politics, 1941-198,*Westview Press, 1982

Articles

Foreign Affairs

"Issues in International Oil Policy", April 1957.

"Oil Power" vol 49 n 4, 1971.

"World Oil Coöperation or International Chaos", vol 52 n4, 1974.

"The Years That the Locust Hath Eaten: Oil Policy and OPEC Development Prospects", vol 57 n2, 1979.

"Oil and the Decline of the West", vol 58 n5, 1980.

"Oil: An Agenda for the 1980s", vol 59 n 5, 1981.

Foreign Policy
"An Atlantic-Japanese Energy Policy", vol 11, 1973

Middle-East Journal
"Economic Problems Facing a Settlement of the Iranian Oil Controversy", vol 8 n1, 1954.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), WALTER JAMES… (1997)

WALTER K. SCHWINN (1901-1995)

Education: Received a B.A. from the University of Wisconsin and an M.A. from Harvard.

Career: Worked as a journalist between 1923 and 1943. In 1943 he became an economic intelligence officer for the Foreign Economic Administration and was assigned to Allied Force Headquarters, first in Algeria and afterwards in Italy. Joined the Department of State in 1946. He held posts in Poland, Singapore, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia. He only appears on the Policy Planning Staff records in 1949. He retired from the Department of State in 1961. He then he became a member of the Board of Trustees of the Hartford Art School, and a Regent of the University of Hartford.

Publications: None found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), SCHWINN (1995)

WARE ADAMS (1905-1996)

Education: no information found

Career: Was Second Secretary and Consul in the United Kingdom 1942 - 1944. Was at the Division of Central European Affairs in 1945. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff between 1948-1950. In 1956, 1957 1958 was the Director of

the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs.

Publications: none found

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

2 DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER (1953-1961)

2.1 Directors

GERARD C. SMITH (1914-1994)

Director 1957-1961

Education: Graduated from Yale College in 1935 and Law School in 1938.

Career: Worked as a lawyer at General Motors. Joined the Navy in 1941, left in 1945. Joined the public service in 1950 as a special assistant to the head of the Atomic Energy Commission. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1957-1961 and a consultant to the Staff in 1962. Was appointed Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1969 (maintained this post until 1973). Was appointed U.S.A. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1977 (until 1980). Left the government in 1981, when he founded the Consultants International Group.

Publications:

Books:

Doubletalk: The Story of SALT I by the Chief American Negotiator, Doubleday, 1980.

Gerard Smith on Arms Control, UPA, 1987

Disarming Diplomat: The Memoirs of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Arms Control Negotiator, Madison Books, 1996.

Articles

Foreign Affairs

"Reassessing Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy" (with George W. Rathjens), spring 1981.

"Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance" (with Mc. George McBundy, George F. Kennan and Robert S. McNamara), spring 1982.

"Arms Control: The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control" (with Mc. George McBundy, George F. Kennan and Robert S. McNamara), winter 1984/85.

"A Blind Eye to Nuclear Proliferation" (with Helena Cobban), summer 1989.

Sources: BARNES (1994), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

ROBERT R. BOWIE (1909-2013)

Director 1953-1957

Education: graduated from Princeton in 1931 and from Harvard Law School in 1934.

Career: Worked as a lawyer in his father's law firm after graduating Law School. Was assistant attorney general in Maryland 1940-1942. Joined the Army in 1942, left in 1946. Was a professor at Harvard from 1946-1950. From 1950-1952 assisted Mr. McCloy, the high commissioner, in the reconstruction efforts in Europe. He was in nhe Policy Planning Staff from 1953-1957. After leaving the Staff he returned to Harvard, where he founded the Center for International Affairs in 1958 (now the Weatherhead Center), and worked as Director until 1972. From 1977-1979 he served as deputy director for national intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency. He maintained his position as Harvard's Dillon professor of

international affairs until his retirement in 1980.

Publications:

Books:

Studies in Federalism, Little, Brown, 1954.

Communist China 1955-1959: Policy Documents and Analysis (with John King Fairbank), Harvard University Press, 1962.

Shaping the Future: Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition, Columbia University Press, 1967.

Suez, 1956 (International crises and the role of law), Oxford University Press, 1974.

Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (with Richard H. Immerman), Oxford University Press, 2000.

Articles

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

"Formulation of American Foreign Policy", vol 330, 1960

Daedalus

"Basic Requirements of Arms Control", vol 89 n4, 1960.

"Arms Control in the 1990s", vol 120 n1, 1991.

"The Atlantic Alliance" vol 110 n1, 1981

Foreign Affairs

"Atlantic Policy", October 1963.

International Organization

"Strategy and the Atlantic Alliance", vol 17 n3, 1963

Law and Contemporary Problems

"Renegotiation and Procurement" (with William L. Marbury), vol 10 n2, 1944.

Sources: MCFADDEN (2013), PROFESSOR…(2013), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

2.2 Members

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL (1924-1974)

Education: Received a B.A. from the New York City College in 1947 and a Law degree from Harvard in 1950.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1950 as a law officer. Was a Special Assistant to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff in 1953. In 1954 became a research assistant at Harvard. In 1956 he joined the faculty of Yale's Law School. In 1962 he was named Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History. He was William C. DeVane Professor from 1971 to 1974.

Publications:

Books:

The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis: The Supreme Court at Work, Harvard University Press, 1958.

New Age of Political Reform, Joanna Cotler Books, 1969.

Politics and The Warren Court, Da Capo Press, 1973.

The Morality of Consent, Yale University Press, 1977.

The Judiciary and Responsible Government 1910-21 (with Benno Schmidt), McMillan, 1985.

The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, Yale University Press, 1986.

Caseload of the Supreme Court: And What, if Anything, to Do About it?, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1987.

The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress, Universal Law Publishing, 1996.

Articles

Arizona Law Review

"Citizenship in the American Constitution", vol 15 n1, 1973.

Chicago-Kent Law Review

"Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War", vol 48 n2, 1971.

Columbia Law Review

"The Decade of School Desegration: progress and prospects", vol 64 n 2, 1964.

Cornell Law Quarterly

"The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Federal Courts in Cases of Admiralty", vol 35.

Harvard Law Review

"The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision", vol 69 n1, 1955.

"Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case", vol 71 n1, 1957.

"The Supreme Court, 1960 Term", vol 75 n1, 1961

The Supreme Court Review

"The Voting Rights Cases", vol 1966, 1966.

Sources: ALEXANDER M…(1974)**,** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

CHARLES C. STELLE
Was a member of the Eisenhower administration Policy Planning Staff from 1953-1956. See also: item 1.3 of Appendix A. **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

CHARLES W. YOST (1907-1981)

Education: Graduated from Princeton in 1928. Was a post-graduate student at the *École des Hautes Études International* in Paris.

Career: Joined the Foreign Service in 1930. As a diplomat he was posted in Egypt, Poland, Thailand, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Greece, Laos and France. Records show him as a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1958. He retired in 1966, when he joined the Council on Foreign Relations, but was called back in 1969 to represent the U.S. at the United Nations. He retired in 1971 as a career ambassador and worked at the Brookings Institution and the Aspen Institute. He also taught at the Columbia University School of International Affairs and the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service (dates unclear).

Publications:

Books:

The age of triumph and frustration: Modern dialogues, R. Speller, 1964.

The insecurity of nations: International relations in the twentieth century, Council on Foreign Relations, 1968.

The Arab-Israeli War: How it began, Council on Foreign Relations, 1971.

The conduct and misconduct of foreign affairs, Random House, 1972.

History and Memory: A Statesman's Perceptions of the Twentieth Century, W W Norton & Co, 1980.

Articles

Foreign Affairs

"The United Nations: Crisis of Confidence and Will", October 1966.

"World Order and American Responsibility", October 1968.

"The Arab-Israeli War", January 1968.

"The Instruments of American Foreign Policy" October 1971.

International Security

"Commentary: The Governance of International Affairs", vol 6 n3, 1981/82.

The American Journal of International Law

“"Self-Determination" And The Palestinians” (with M. C. Bassiouni), vol 65 n4, 1971.

Sources: LYONS (1981)**,** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017).

EDMUND A. GUILLON

Was a member of the Eisenhower administration Policy Planning Staff in 1954.

See also: item 1.3 of Appendix A.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

EDWARD E. RICE

Education: no information found.

Career: Foreign Service officer in China, 1935-45. Worked for the Office of Chinese Affairs 1945-1951. U.S. Consul General, Stuttgart, West Germany, 1953-56. He was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1959-62. Was the Consul General in Hong Kong 1964-1967. Retired from the Foreign Service in 1968. Was the diplomat-in-residence at the University of California Berkley in 1968.

Academic Publications:

Books:

Mao’s Way, University of California Press, 1974.

Wars of the Third Kind: Conflict in Underdeveloped Countries, University of California Press, 1990.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER PRESIDENTIAL ARCHIVES (2017)

ELBERT G. MATHEWS (1910-1977)

Education: B.A. from the University of California at Berkeley.

Career: Joined the Foreign Service in 1935. He was posted in Canada, Australia, Nicaragua, Afghanistan. India, Turkey, Norway and Liberia. He was Assistant chief, of the Division of South Asian Affairs between 1947-48. Chief of the same division between 1948-49 and director of the Office of South Asian Affairs between 1950-51. He as a member of the Policy Planning Staff between 1955-1959. He was deputy assistant secretary of policy planning between 1957-59.

Publications: none found.

Sources: MATHEWS (1975), EX-ENVOY…(1975), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

FRASER WILKINS (1909-1989)

Education: Graduated Yale in 1931.

Career: Entered the foreign Service in 1940. Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs, Division of North-Eastern Affairs in 1949. Posted at the American Embassy in India from at least 1952 until 1953. Also posted in Morocco, Iran and Iraq throughout his diplomatic career. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1953–1954. In 1954 was detailed to National War College. Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs starting in 1956 (end date unknown). Ambassador to Cyprus from 1960-1964. Inspector general of the Foreign Service from 1964-1971.

Academic Publications: none found.

Note: Sometimes appears as ERASER Wilkins on documents (presumed typing error).

Sources: FRASER WILKINS…(1989), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), WILKINS (1988)

EVAN M. WILSON

Education: Studied at Haverford College and Oxford.

Career: Worked at the Home Owners Loan Corporation between 1934-1936. Joined the Foreign Service in 1937. During his diplomatic career, he was posted in Mexico, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Israel. He was part of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into Palestine between 1945-46. He was the assistant chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs between 1946-47. He was part of the Policy Planning Staff in 1960. Retired from the Foreign Service in 1967. After his retirement he worked as a consultant at the Middle East Institute.

Publications:

Books:

The Palestine State: A Rational Approach (with Richard J. Wartz and Don Peretz), ssociated Faculty Pr Inc, 1977.

Decision on Palestine: How the U.S.Came to Recognise Israel, Hoover Institute Press, 1983.

A Calculated Risk: The U.S. Decision to Recognize Israel, Clerisy Press, 2008.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), WILSON (1975)

GEORGE A. MORGAN

Education: Studied at Haverford College and Oxford.

Career: Worked at the Home Owners Loan Corporation between 1934-1936. Joined the Foreign Service in 1937. During his diplomatic career, he was posted in Mexico, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Israel. He was part of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry into Palestine between 1945-46. He was the assistant chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs between 1946-47. He was part of the Policy Planning Staff in 1960. Retired from the Foreign Service in 1967. After his retirement he worked as a consultant at the Middle East Institute.

Publications:

Books:

The Palestine State: A Rational Approach (with Richard J. Wartz and Don Peretz), ssociated Faculty Pr Inc, 1977.

Decision on Palestine: How the U.S.Came to Recognise Israel, Hoover Institute Press, 1983.

A Calculated Risk: The U.S. Decision to Recognize Israel, Clerisy Press, 2008.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

HARRY H. SCHWARTZ

Was a member of the Eisenhower administration Policy Planning Staff from 1953-1955.

See also: item 1.3 of Appendix A.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

HENRY BRODIE

Education: Received a PhD in economics from New York University.

Career: Served with the Office of Strategic Services and the United States Navy. Joined the State Department in 1946. Appears on the records of the Policy Planning Staff as a member between 1959-1961. In 1964 was a part of the Office of International Resources, Bureau of Economic Affairs. From 1966 to 1971 the was minister-counselor for economic affairs at the United States mission in Geneva and permanent United States delegate for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Retired from the Foreign Service in 1973, when he became an economic adviser to the United States Catholic Conference.

Publications:

Articles

Journal of the American Statistical Association

"An Empirical Approach to Economic Intelligence in World War II", vol 42 n 237, 1947

Sources: DR. HENRY…(1981), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

HENRY C. RAMSEY

Education: no information found.

Career: In 1943 was on the Board of Economic Warfare. Posted in Bolivia in 1944, 1945; Germany in 1950. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1959 to 1963. Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1963.

Publications:

Books: none found.

Articles

The Foreign Service Journal

"The Modernization Process and Insurgency", 1962

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

HENRY D. OWEN (1920-2011)

Education: Received a B.A. from Harvard in 1941.

Career: Served on the Navy during World War II. Joined the State Department in 1946, where he worked as an economic counselor specializing in international affairs. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1952 until 1969 (was its Director from 1966-69). Was the director of foreign policy studies at the

Brookings Institution from 1969 to 1977. From 1978-1981 was Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Economic Summit Affairs.

Publications:

Books: none found.

Articles

The Foreign Service Journal

"The Modernization Process and Insurgency", 1962

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

HOWARD E. FURNAS (1919-2007)

Education: Received a B.A. from Hillsdale College in 1940 and a postgraduate degree from Harvard in 1947.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1947. Member of the Office of Research and Intelligence from 1950-1952 and from 1954-1957. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff and Representative to the National Security Council Planning Board from 1958-1961. Was the Deputy Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Outer Space from 1961–1962. In 1962 was Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State. Special Assistant to the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from 1969 to 1971.

Publications:

Books: none found.

Articles

The Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Sciences

"The President: A Changing Role?", 1968

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

JACOB D. BEAM (1908-1993)

Education: Received a B.A. in History from Princeton. He studies for a year at Cambridge University in England (it is unclear whether he received any degree from the institution).

Career: Joined the State Department in 1931. As a diplomat he was posted in Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Germany, England, Indonesia, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia. He was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1953-1954. In 1962 he was named assistant director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He retired in 1973.

Publications:

Books:

Multiple exposure: An American ambassador's unique perspective on East-West issues, Norton, 1978.

Articles

None found

Sources: LAMBERT (1993), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), SMITH (1993)

JEFFREY C. KITCHEN (1908-1993)

Education: no information found.

Career: Member of the Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs in 1949. Special Assistant to the Secretary of State in 1952. Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat in 1954. Became Deputy Director of Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs (Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs) in 1954. Appears on the records as a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1954. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs from 1961 until 1967. Was Chairman of the Steering Group on Implementation of the Nassau Decisions from December 1962.

Publications: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

JOHN C. CAMPBELL

Education: Graduate degree in modern European history (unclear which degree or institution).

Career: Professor at the University of Louisville in 1940. Joined the State Department in 1942 as a Specialist Eastern Europe (position retained until 1946). Was a member of the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1946; political advisor, U.S. delegation and the Danube Conference in 1948. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff between 1949-55. Left the Department of State in 1955 and joined the Council on Foreign Relations, where he remained until 1967. In 1967, returned to the Department of State as a member of Johnson's Policy Planning Council. Left again in 1968 and retired.

Academic Publications:

Books:

Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy, Praeger, 1961. [authorship debatable]

Sources: CAMPBELL (1974), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

NATHAN SPENCER BARNES (1914-1970)

Education: no information found.

Career: Chief of the Eastern Affairs Division, Berlin Element from date unknown until 1955. Counselor of the Mission in Hungary from 1955 until 1957. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1957 until at least 1960. Was Deputy Chief of the American Mission in Israel from date unknown until December 1964.

Academic Publications: none found

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

PHILIP H. WATTS (1901-1996)

Education: Attended Harvard.

Career: Executive Officer at the Herter Committee in 1948. Member of the Policy Planning Staff 1950-1954. Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence in 1954. Probably at the Executive Secretariat, Department of State in 1960.

Publications: none found.

Sources: BENKARD (1956), INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION (1956)**,** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)**,** WATTS (1960)

RALPH J. BLOCK

Education: no information found.

Career: In 1943 was the Special Assistant to the Personal Representative of the President in charge of supervising the psychological warfare unit of the Office of War Information. In 1947 was with the Office of Intelligence and Educational Exchange. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1953. After August 1953 became Chief of the General Policy Information Staff, United States Information Agency.

Publications: none found

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

RICHARD H. DAVIS
Education: no information found. **Career:** Officer in Charge of Soviet Union Affairs at the Office of Eastern European Affairs in 1950-1951**.** Counselor at the American Embassy in Austria in 1954. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1956. Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs and Minister-Counselor of the Embassy in the Soviet Union until 1959. Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, August–December 1959. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs in 1960-1965. Ambassador to Romania 1965-1969. **Publications**: none found **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

ROBERT C. STRONG (1915-1999)
Education: B.A. from Beloit College in 1938. **Career:** Joined the State Department in 1940. Was posted in South Africa, The Soviet Union, China and Taiwan. Was the Special Assistant to the Director at the Office of Chinese Affairs from 1951-53. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1953-1954. Was the Ambassador in Iraq from 1963-1967. **Academic Publications**: none found **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), ROBERT C. STRONG (2014)

ROBERT F. PACKARD
Education: no information found **Career:** Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1960-1961. Was the Chief of the Outer Space Section at the Office of the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy

and Outer Space from 1961-1962 and Officer in Charge of Outer Space Affairs at Office of International Scientific Affairs subsequently. In 1970, 1971 was the Director of the Office of Space, Atmospheric and Marine Science Affairs at the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs. Received the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Honor Awards in 1972.

Academic Publications: none found

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

ROBERT MCCLINTOCK (1909-1976)

Education: Received a B.A. from Stanford in 1931.

Career: Joined the State Department in 1932. Was posted in Panama, Japan, Chile, Dominican Republic, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Egypt, Vietnam. Was Special Assistant to the Director at the Office of Special Political Affairs from 1946-1948. Was a member of the Office of UN Affairs from 1948-1949. Was the Ambassador to Cambodia from 1954-1956. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1957. Ambassador to Lebanon from (December) 1957-1961, Ambassador to Argentina from 1962-1964. Coordinator for Preparations for the Symington Committee on Overseas Commitments, and Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group from 1969. Ambassador to Venezuela from 1970-1975.

Publications:

Books:

The meaning of limited war, Houghton Mifflin 1967.

The development of nationalism and the nationalism of development, 1971.

Articles: none found

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

WILLIAM LEONHART (1919-1997)
Education: Received a B. A. from the University of West Virginia in 1939 an MA from Princeton University in 1940 and a PhD also from Princeton in 1943. **Career:** Joined the State Department in 1944. Throughout his career was assigned to Argentina, Italy, Japan, England. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff from 1955-1957 and Alternative Department of State Representative on National Security Council Planning Board in 1956-1957. Ambassador to Tanzania from 1962-1965 and to Yugoslavia from 1969-1971. Deputy Special Assistant to the President 1965-1967, thereafter Special Assistant to the President. Deputy Commandant for International Affairs, National War College (1971-75); Vice President, National Defense University and adviser to the Department of State (1977-79); Chairman, Senior Intelligence Review Panel, Central Intelligence Agency (1979). In 1980 became President of the Daval Foundation. Taught at the College of William and Mary (exact dates unknown). **Publications**: none found. **Sources:** JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM (2002)**,** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

3 JOHN F. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION (1961-1963)

3.1 Directors

GEORGE C. MCGHEE (1912-2005)
Director in 1961 (there are inconsistencies between his biographical sources and documents which list him as director of the policy planning staff/council). **Education:** Graduated from the University of Oklahoma in 1933 with a degree in geology. Received a PhD from Harvard (Physical Sciences) in 1937.

Career: Worked for various oil companies between 1933-1937. In the same period, he received a patent for a method of making dip determination of geological formations. After 1937 worked as an independent oil explorer. Served in the Office of Production Management and on the War Production Board during World War II. Joined the State Department in 1946. Was named Director of U.S. Commercial Co. in 1946. Special Assistant to Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, U.S. Department from 1946-47 and Coordinator for Aid to Greece and Turkey, 1947. Was the Special Assistant to Under Secretary of State from 1947-49 and Special Assistant to Secretary of State in 1949. Was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern South Asian-African Affairs from 1949-51. Served as Senior Adviser for the North Atlantic Treaty Council in Canada in 1951. Was Ambassador and Chief of American Mission for Aid to Turkey from 1951-53. Was Ambassador to Germany from 1963-1968. After his retirement from public service, he rejoined the private sector, serving on the board of several companies.

Publications:

Books:

Envoy to the middle world: Adventures in diplomacy, Harper Collins 1983.

Diplomacy for the Future, University Press of America, 1987.

At the Creation of a New Germany: from Adenauer to Brandt: an ambassador's account, Yale University Press, 1989.

National Interest and Global Goals (with Kenneth Thompson and Peter Kroth), University Press of America, 1989.

The Us-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection: How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East, Palgrave McMillan, 1990.

I Did It This Way: From Texas and Oil to Oxford, Diplomacy, and Corporate Boards, 1992.

International Community (with Kenneth Thompson), University Press of America, 1989.

*On the Frontline in the Cold war: an Ambassador Report*s, Praeger Publishers, 1997.

Oxford Letters: The Transformation of a Texan, Routledge, 2002.
The Strategic Importance of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan to the United States (book chapter in: *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan* edited by Hafeen Malik), Palgrave MacMillan, 1987.

Articles
Foreign Affairs
"Turkey Joins the West", vol 32 n 4, 1954.

Sources: BEMSTEIN (2005), MCGHEE (1975), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017).

WALT W. ROSTOW (1916-2003)

Director/Chairman from 1961-1966

Education: Graduated from Yale University in 1936 with degrees in History and Economics. Attended the University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar between 1936-1938. Received a PhD in Economics from Yale in 1940.

Career: Joined the faculty of Columbia in 1940. Served in the Office of Strategic Services during World War II. Taught at Oxford, Cambridge and MIT between 1945-1961. Became Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in 1961, later in 1961 was named Counsellor to the State department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council. Was named Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in 1966. He left the Department of State in 1969 and joined the faculty of the University of Texas at Austin.

Publications: [selected]

Books:
The American Diplomatic Revolution, The Clarendon Press, 1946.
The British Economy of the Nineteenth Century, The Clarendon Press, 1948.
The Dynamics of Soviet Society, MIT Press, 1952.

The Process of Economic Growth, Norton, 1952.

The Prospects of Communist China, MIT Press, 1954.

An American Policy in Asia, MIT Press and Wiley, 1955.

The Stages of Economic Growth: a non-communist manifesto, Cambridge University Press, 1960.

The United States in the World Arena: an essay in recent history, Harper, 1960.

Politics and the Stages of Growth, Cambridge University Press, 1971.

The Diffusion of Power: an essay in recent history, Macmillan, 1972.

How it all began: origins of modern economy, McGraw Hill, 1975.

Getting from Here to There, McGraw Hill, 1978.

The World Economy: History & Prospect, University of Texas Press, 1978.

Why the Poor Get Richer and the Rich Slow Down: Essays in the Marshallian Long Period, University of Texas Press, 1980.

The Division of Europe After World War II, University of Texas Press, 1981.

Pre-invasion Bombing Strategy: General Eisenhower's Decision of March 25, 1944, University of Texas Press, 1981.

Europe After Stalin: Eisenhower's Three Decisions of March 11, 1953. University of Texas Press, 1982.

Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955, University of Texas Press, 1982.

The Barbaric Counter Revolution: Cause and Cure, University of Texas Press, 1982.

Prospects for the World Economy, National Bank of Egypt, 1983.

India and the Fourth Industrial Revolution, IIM, 1984.

Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aide, University of Texas Press, 1985.

The United States and the Regional Organization of Asia and the Pacific 1965-1985, University of Texas Press, 1986.

Rich Countries and Poor Countries: Reflections of the Past, Lessons for the Future, Westview Press, 1987.

Essays on a Half-Century: Ideas, Policies and Action, Westview Press, 1988.

The Great Population Spike and After: Reflections on the 21st Century, Oxford University Press, 1998.

Concept and Controversy: Sixty Years of Taking Ideas to Market, University of

Texas Press, 2003.

Articles

[only the latest from each journal appears]

Business History Review

"A History of Prices in Sweden, 1732-1914", vol 48 n2, 1974.

Challenge

"Technology and Unemployment in the Western World, vol 26 n 1, 1986.

Foreign Affairs

"Lessons of the Plan: looking forward to the next century", vol 76 n 3, 1997.

International Organization

"The Economic Commission for Europe", vol 3 n 2, 1955.

International Security

"The Key Security Tasks of the 1980s" vol 4 n2, 1979.

The American Economic Review

"Is There Need for Economic Leadership? Japanese or US?" vol 75 n2, 1985.

The Economic Journal

"Comment from a Not Quite Empty Box", vol 32 n 365, 1982.

The Economic History Review

"The World Economy Since 1945: a Stylized Historical Analysis" vol 38, n 2, 1985.

The Journal of Economic History

"Kondratieff, Schumpeter and Kuznets: Trend Periods Revisited" vol 35 n 4, 1975.

World Politics

"Russia and China Under Communism" vol 7 n4, 1955.

Sources: HODGSON (2003), JOHN F. KENNEDY PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARY AND MUSEUM (2017)**,** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), WALT ROSTOW…(2003).

3.2 Deputy Directors/Vice-Chairmen

HENRY D. OWEN

Was a member of the Kennedy administration Policy Planning Council from 1961-1963.

See also: item 2.2 of Appendix A.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

MAURICE J. MOUNTAIN (1912-1994)

Education: Received a B. A. from Brown University, a master's degree and a PhD in government from Harvard University. Also attended the Army's Command and General Staff College, the Military Industrial Training Center and Far East Intelligence School.

Career: Served in the Army Intelligence during World War II. After the War worked as a consultant for the Operations Research Office and as staff director and counsel of the International Operations Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee. Was the Assistant Vice-President of Brown University from 1957-1960. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff in 1961. Was the Director of the Defense Department's Office of Strategic Technology and Munitions Control from 1961-1979.

Publications:

Books: none found.

Articles:

Foreign Policy

"Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy" (with Samuel P. Huntington, Franklyn Holzman, Richard Portes, John W. Kiser, and Robert E. Klitgaard), n 32, 1978.

Sources: MAURICE J. MOUNTAIN… (1994)**,** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

ROBERT H. JOHNSON (1921-2005)

Education: Received a B. A. from Concordia College, a master's degree in public administration from Syracuse University in 1943 and PhD from Harvard University in 1949.

Career: Taught at Harvard from 1950-1951. Joined the National Security Council in 1951. In 1961 Rockefeller Public Service Award, leaving the service temporarily to travel through Asia. Was a member of the Kennedy Policy Planning Council from 1962-1963. He left the Department of State in 1966. After leaving the government he joined the Brookings Institution. He later taught at Colgate University 1984 and the Salzburg Seminar in Austria. He also lectured at the Foreign Service Institute and the National War College.

Publications:

Books:

Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold War and After, Zip Publishing, 2009.

Articles:

Foreign Affairs

"Vietnamization: Can It Work?", July 1970.

"Reconsiderations: Periods of Peril: The Window of Vulnerability and Other Myths", Spring 1983.

Foreign Policy

"Escalation Then and Now", vol 60, 1985.

International Security

"Exaggerating America's Stakes in Third World Conflict", vol 10 n3, 1985/1986.

"The Persian Gulf in U.S. Strategy: A Skeptical View", vol 14 n1, 1989.

Political Science Quarterly

"Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine", vol 103 n3, 1988.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), SULLIVAN (2005)

3.3 Members

EVAN M. WILSON
Was a member of the Kennedy administration Policy Planning Council in 1961. See also: item 2.2 of Appendix A. **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

GERARD C. SMITH
Was a member of the Kennedy administration Policy Planning Council in 1961-1962 as a Consultant. See also: item 2.1 of Appendix A. **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

HENRY C. RAMSEY
Was a member of the Kennedy administration Policy Planning Council in 1961-1963. See also: item 2.2 of Appendix A. **Sources:** OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

HOWARD WRIGGINS (1918-2008)

Education: Attended Dartmouth as an undergraduate. Received a PhD in International Politics from Yale in 1952.

Career: Taught at Vassar College from 1951-1955. Conduct research in Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) from 1956-1957 (received a Rockefeller foundation grant for this purpose). Worked at the Library of Congress in the Legislative Reference Service. Was a member of the Policy Planning Council from 1961 to [likely] 1965. Was a member of the National Security Council from 1965-1967. Joined the faculty at Columbia University in 1967, left in 1977. Was the U.S. Ambassador to Sri Lanka and the Maldives from 1977-1979. He then returned to Columbia where he later became Director of Columbia's Southern Asian Institute and Bryce Professor of International Relations, Emeritus.

Publications:

Books:

Rulers Imperative, Columbia University Press, 1963.

Population, Politics and the Future of Southern Asia (with James F. Guyot), Columbia University Press, 1973.

Pakistan: The Long View (with Lawrence Ziring and Ralph Braibanti), Duke University Press, 1977.

Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four Systems on the Indian Ocean Rim, Columbia University Press, 1994.

J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka: A Political Biography (with K. M. da Silva), University of Hawaii Press, 1995.

Picking Up the Pieces from Portugal to Palestine: Quaker Refugee Relief in World War II, University Press of America, 2004.

Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, Princeton University Press, 2015.

Articles:

American Political Science Review

"Impediments to Unity in New Nations: The Case of Ceylon", vol 55 n 1, 1966.

Asian Survey
"Sri Lanka in 1980: The Year of Constraints", vol 28 n 2, 1980.

Journal of International Affairs
"Political Outcomes of Foreign Assistance: Influence, Involvement, or Intervention?", vol 22 n 2, 1968.

Pacific Affairs
"Pakistan's Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan", vol 57 n 2, 1984.

Sources: Office of the Historian, PASSING OF…(2008), WRIGGINS (1995)

JOHN CURTIS (1929-2008)

Education: Received a B.A. in government from George Washington University and a M.A. in Advanced Foreign Studies from Johns-Hopkins University.

Career: Worked for the CIA in Vienna in the aftermath of World War II. Joined the State Department in or around 1959. He was a member of the Policy Planning Council from 1961-1962. Was Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1962-1963. Retired from public service in 1969.

Publications: none found.

Sources: JOHN ROBERT…(2008), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

JOHN W. FORD

Education: no information found.

Career: Division of Security at the Bureau of administration in 1952-1953**.** Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff/Council 1961-1964. Director of the Office of Inter-American Political Affairs in 1968.

Academic Publications:

Books: none found.

Articles: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

JOSEPH A. YAGER (1916-?)

Education: Received a Law degree from Michigan University.

Career: Served in the OSS during World War II. Joined the State Department in 1945 as a member of the Interim Research and Intelligence Service. He was assigned to China, Hong Kong, Taiwan. Became Acting Chief of the Far East Division of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 1951. Became Chief of the Bureau of Chinese Affairs in 1961. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff/Council from 1963-1968. In 1968 left the foreign service to work at the Institute for Defense Analysis. Left the IDA in 1972 for the Brookings Institute.

Publications:

Books:

Energy and United States Foreign Policy (with Elenor Steinberg), Harper Collins, 1975.

New Means of Financing International Needs (with Elenor Steinberg), Brookings Institute Press, 1978.

Military Equation in North-east Asia (with S.E. Johnson), Brookings Institute Press, 1979.
Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy, Brookings Institute Press, 1980.
International Cooperation in Nuclear Energy (with Scott Fenn), Brookings Institute Press, 1982.
Energy Balance in Northeast Asia, Brookings Institute Press, 1984.
Transforming Agriculture in Taiwan: The Experience of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, Cornell University Press, 1988.

Articles: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017), YAGER (1999)

ROBERT PACKARD

Was a member of the Kennedy administration Policy Planning Council in 1961.
See also: item 2.2 of Appendix A.
Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

WILLIAM J JORDEN (1923-2009)

Education: Received a bachelor's degree in international relations from Yale in 1947. Received a master's degree in journalism from Columbia in 1948.

Career: Worked as an international correspondent for The New York Times from 1952-1959, reporting from Korea, Japan and Russia. In 1959 joined the Time's Washington D.C. office. Joined the Policy Planning Council in 1961 – he only appears on official documents in this year. In 1965 he was named Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. In 1966 he became assistant to the President's national security adviser. In 1972 he joined the National Security Council. He later left to become the scholar in residence at the Lyndon B. Johnson library.

Publications:

Books:

Panama Odyssey, University of Texas Press, 1984.

Articles: none found.

Sources: FOX (2009), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

WILLIAM R. DUGGAN (1915-1977)

Education: no information found.

Career: Chargé d'affaires ad interim in Tanzania in 1961. Was a member of the Policy Planning Council in 1963 and 1964 (at least). After his retirement became a lecturer in international affairs at Willamette University, Ohio.

Publications:

Books:

Socioeconomic Profile of South Africa, Praeger, 1973.

Tanzania and Nyerere: A Study of Ujamaa and Nationhood (with John R. Civille), Orbis Books, 1976.

An economic analysis of southern African agriculture, Praeger, 1986.

Articles:

African Affairs

"The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and the Rural African Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia", vol 79 n 315, 1980.

The Review of Politics

"The New African Chiefs" vol 28 n 3, 1966.

Sources: DUGGAN, (1977), OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017).

WILLIAM R. POLK (1929-present)

Education: Has B.A.s from Harvard University and Oxford University, and M.A. from Oxford and a PhD from Harvard.

Career: Was a professor of history and Arabic language and literature at Harvard University from 1955-1961. Was a member of the Policy Planning Staff/Council from 1961 to 1965. In 1965 he left the Department of State and became Professor of History at the University of Chicago. He returned temporarily to the government service in 1967 as assistant to the former Director of the National Security Council and then the President's special assistant, McGeorge Bundy.

Publications:

Books:

The United States and the Arab World, Harvard University Press, 1963.

The Arab World, Harvard University Press, 1963.

The Arab World Today, Harvard University Press, 1963.

The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788-1840, Harvard University Press, 1963.

Passing Brave, Knopf, 1973.

The Golden Ode, The University of Chicago Press, 1974.

The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century, St. Martin's Press, 1979.

Neighbors and Strangers: The Fundamentals of Foreign Affairs, University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Polk's Folly, Double Day, 2000.

Understanding Iraq, HarperCollins Publishers, 2005.

The Birth of America, Harper Collins, 2006.

Out of Iraq: A Practical Plan for Withdrawal Now (With Senator George McGovern), Simon & Schuster paperbacks, 2006.

Violent Politics, HarperCollins Publishers, 2007.

Understanding Iran, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

Blind Man's Buff, Panda Press, 2013.

Distant Thunder, Panda Press, 2013.

Humpty Dumpty, Panda Press, 2013.

Personal History, Panda Press, 2013.

Articles:

Background

"Problems of Government Utilization of Scholarly Research in International Affairs" vol 9 n 3, 1965.

Foreign Affairs

"Toward a Policy for the Middle East" (with Richard H. Nolte), July 1958.

"The Nature of Modernization", October 1965.

"Securing Iraq", January/February 2008.

The Atlantic

"Understanding Syria: From pre-civil war to post-Assad", 2013.

Sources:

Office of the Historian

WILLIAM WEBB

Education: no information found.

Career: Appears as a member of the Policy Planning Staff/Council in 1961.

Publications: none found.

Sources: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN (2017)

APENDIX B – INTERVIEW GUIDE

a. Motivations

• When and why did you decide to work with policymaking?

b. Experiences

• How was your experience working with policymaking? Which similarities or differences with regards to academic work did you observe?

• Was your academic training useful for your work?

• Did you keep up with academic publications while you worked outside of academia? Were these publications useful for your work?

c. Opinions

• Do you believe that academic work should strive to be relevant for policymaking? If yes, how?

• Are there incentives or disincentives for academics who seek to produce policy-relevant work?

• Do you believe there should be incentives for this kind of work?

• Do you believe there is a growing distance between the academic and political spheres in the past decades?

• Do you believe recent changes in the type of methodologies most used in academic work in the field have influenced this?

APENDIX C – INTERVIEWEES INFORMATION

Dr. Ash Jain

Dr. Jain is a Professor of International Relations at American University. He served on the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department and the Bureau of National Security and Nonproliferation, and has also served as a consultant for the White House and Senate members.

Dr. Bruce Hoffman

Dr. Hoffman is the director of the Center for Security Studies and Coordinator of the Georgetown University Security Studies Program. He was the director of the RAND Corporation, the CIA's Scholar-in-Residence and advisor to the Office of National Security Affairs.

Dr. Charles Call

Dr. Call is a Professor of International Relations at American University. He was previously senior advisor to the US State Department.

Dr. Colin H. Kahl

Currently Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States and National Security Advisor to the Vice President. He has also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East at the Pentagon. He is Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University.

* This interview was not recorded because it was held in Dr. Kahl's office at the White House, where electronic devices were not allowed in.

Dr. Jennifer Poole

Dr. Poole is Professor of International Economics at the School of International Service at American University. She previously served as Senior International Economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers.

Dr. Jim Goldgeier

Director of the School of International Service at American University. Professor Goldgeier was also a professor at George Washington University. His experience with policy formulation: he was Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs at the National Security Council Staff, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Henry A. Kissinger Chair at the Library of Congress. In addition, he is responsible for developing the Bridging the Gap project at American University, which aims to promote exchanges between academia and policy makers.

Dr. Jordan Tama

Professor of International Relations at American University. He worked as a senior aide at the US Congress. He is one of those responsible for the Bridging the Gap program at American University.

* This interview was not recorded due to technical issues with the recorder.

Dr. Nora Bensahel

Dr. Bansahel is a professor at American University and a lecturer at Georgetown University. She worked for more than ten years as a researcher at the RAND Corporation.

Dr. Robert Kelley

Dr. Kelley is a professor at American University. He previously worked at the US State Department.

Dra. Sharon Weiner

At the time of the interview Dr. Weiner worked at the US State Department on issues related to nuclear non-proliferation. She is currently a professor at American University and coordinator of the PhD program in International Relations.

* This interview was not recorded at the request of the interviewee.

ANNEX A – ORGANIZATION CHART US STATE DEPARTMENT