INDETERMINATION OF THE MENTAL IN ANOMALOUS MONISM AND PARTICULARISM IN AGENCY

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Philonous: And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?
Hylas: How often have I acknowledged that they are not?
Philonous: But is not motion a sensible quality?
Hylas: It is.
Philonous: Consequently it is no action.
Hylas: I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain, that when I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion, is active. (BERKELEY: Dialogue II)

Resumo: O Monismo Anômalo é caracterizado por duas teses fundamentais: (1) que o mental é indeterminado (anômalo); e (2) que racionalizações são explicações causais, mais especificamente, que elas são de um tipo que depende da identificação de particulares mentais – eventos – que têm eficácia causal. Este texto critica a tese da indeterminação de um modo limitado, somente na medida em que ela está baseada na concepção das racionalizações como dependendo de uma específica metafísica da ação: o particularismo. Eu procurarei mostrar que a explicação das ações em termos da explicação da ocorrência de particulares é equivocada. Positivamente, proporei que o agente é o causador, não de suas ações, mas dos resultados de suas ações. Consequentemente, as a-
ções podem ser concebidas como causações de eventos por parte de um agente, elas serão, então, causações dos resultados das ações do agente. Essa proposta claramente explora a possibilidade de que as ações elas próprias não sejam eventos. Eu aqui pretendo somente dar relevo a essa possibilidade, porque eu a vejo como um caminho não-explorado na discussão corrente sobre o tópico.

**Palavras-chave:** Monismo Anômalo; indeterminação do mental; particularismo na agência; ações e eventos.

1. Two ideas by Donald Davidson seem to be crucial for all his thought on the nature of the mental. To the second idea is linked an argumentative strategy that aims to establish a monism, a token-physicalism. The first idea constitutes the gist of his early paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”, and is present in Condition 2 for the proper account of rationalizations, i.e. as causal explanations. Condition 2 reads: “A primary reason for an action is its cause” (DAVIDSON 1963, p. 2). This idea is the idea that really to explain an action is to explain it as the consequence of the cause of the action. Davidson, since this paper, made many think that it is crucial for a genuine explanation of action, not only that the action should be seen as reasonable for the agent given his beliefs and desires, but also that we point out what exactly it was that made the agent do what she did. Davidson ponders: “(...) A person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reason and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action because he had the reason” (DAVIDSON 1963, p. 9). This is the “because” which for Davidson wears the trousers of genuine explanation and of which a philosophy of mind must explain the force. In general, the idea is motivated by the consideration that it is not enough
to credit an agent with a reason, rather to explain is to pinpoint the reason which led the agent to do what she did. According to Davidson, we not only want to know that subject A had a reason to visit her grandma in the hospital, but we also want to know why she went, or what comes to the same, what actually made her go. In his discussion with Melden apropos the case of the driver’s signalling a turn, Davidson maintains: “But of course there is a mental event; at some moment the driver noticed (or thought he noticed) his turn coming up, and that is the moment he signalled” (DAVIDSON 1963, p. 12). And about this noticing or the driver’s thought that he did, Davidson remarks: “(...) It had better be the reason why he raises his arm” (DAVIDSON 1963, p. 13). It is hard to exaggerate the influence Davidson’s construal of what it is to explain an action had.

The second idea, in fact a whole conception, is that of the indetermination or the anomalousness of the mental. For the moment, I would like only to point out the dialectical connection of the two central ideas in Davidson’s philosophy, i.e., to stress the fact that Davidson developed an argument for the ontological part of his position using a specific strategy. The anomalous character of the mental is used as a premise in an argument of which the conclusion is token-physicalism. This is not unimportant. It is rather crucial for the way Davidson wants to reach his conception in the seminal paper “Mental Events” (1970). It is important for him to develop what was correctly identified as (by Jennifer Horsnby) a less direct route to monism. The point is: Davidson did not want to argue that mental events are physical directly, i.e., by showing that they are law-governed even while conceived of as belonging to mental kinds. What we have instead is the following. Mental events are conceived of as nonetheless subjected to laws, and
are thus far necessarily physical, and this is established through the intermediation of two considerations: (1) that of the causal intercourse of the mental with all phenomena (the principle of the causal interaction of the mental and the physical – premiss 1 in Davidson’s argument) and (2) that of the involvement of any causal intercourse with nomologicality (the principle of the nomological character of causality – premiss 2). So, premiss 3 – the anomalousness of the mental – ensures the indirectness of the approach and gives a specific identity to its physicalism: of tokens.

Having mentioned the two fundamental ideas of Davidson, let me now refer to the main criticism Anomalous Monism has received: that the position is epiphenomenalist about the mental. There have been many rounds in the fight between accusers and defenders, including Davidson with his “Thinking Causes”. It is possible that many should think this issue is already settled. Nonetheless, at a further remove, the point I want to make in the present paper can be seen as an accusation that Anomalous Monism, in spite of its emphasis on the anomalousness (which is intended as a defence of the autonomy and relevance of the mental), threatens to lose the causal efficacy of the mental as we ordinarily understand the phenomena related to it. Self-evidently, not as Davidson thinks about the phenomena in question. And in this, Anomalous Monism as such is brought into question. It is as Hornsby puts it:

The feeling that Davidson’s theses conflict may be based in a sense of conflict between the picture one gets of the operation of mental events if one accepts Davidson’s version of monism on the one hand, and a picture of how we understand people (HORNSBY 1997, p. 171).
Davidson’s commitment to the principle of the nomological character of causality makes him uphold the view that whenever we rely on any causal notion we can be sure that there is a law involved in the case. But then the following question, again by Horsnby, becomes terribly important:

Can we support this even while we assume that finding people causally intelligible is a ‘categorically different’ matter from understanding physical causal goings on? What are the grounds for believing that rational explanations themselves mention items that can be picked out in nomological vocabulary? (HORNSBY 1997, p. 171).

Accordingly, my aims in this paper are (1) to bring doubt about Davidson’s rationale for the anomalousness, the indetermination of the mental, in so far as it is connected to the desideratum of a view of the explanation of action that should be events-based. So, it is true that the anomalousness of the mental is a premiss in the argument for a physicalist monism, and in so far it has to have independent support, and it has some in Davidson’s conception of the nature of mental content involved in the propositional attitudes ascribed to people whose behaviour we try to explain (see next section). However, the just-mentioned desideratum gets involved in the general argument for the anomalousness, leaning as it does on a particularistic metaphysics of action. This brings me to my second aim, (2) to argue for the centrality of a question about whether actions are events. A determinate answer to this question promises to open up the way for a better understanding of agency, being agreed among opponents concerning this particular issue that persons, agents, are – to use Strawson’s concept – one type of “basic particulars”, i.e., a primitive notion in a defensible metaphysics.
2. According to Davidson, the anomalousness of the mental is due to the fact that mental predicates do not allow “strict laws”. There are some elements – constitutive elements – that enter constitutive principles, called by Davidson synthetic a priori, which define, some of them, nomologicality, or strict lawlikeness. E.g.: “hotter than”, “heavier than”, and “longer than” are relations that are transitive and asymmetric, and this is constitutive of what our understanding of rigid objects is (Cf. DAVIDSON 1970, p. 115-23). “I suggest that the existence of lawlike statements in physical science depends upon the existence of constitutive (or synthetic a priori) laws like those of measurement of length within the same conceptual domain” (DAVIDSON 1970, p. 221). Now, mental predicates have features that make them in fact incompatible with those features that allow nomologicality. Mental predicates are related to another set of constitutive elements issuing a different set of constitutive principles, e.g., maximization of rationality.

Davidson writes in “Psychology as Philosophy”: “(...) The satisfaction of conditions of consistency and rational coherence may be viewed as constitutive of the range of applications of such concepts as those of belief, desire, intention and action” (1974, p. 237). The approach to behaviour that Davidson has in mind is one according to which when we try to understand people’s behaviour by attributing to them propositional attitudes what we do is to interpret their behaviour. And to do that, we have to use the whole system of the agent’s beliefs and motives. Now, when we in fact infer that system from evidences in behaviour, we necessarily use notions of coherence, consistency and rationality so that we end up attributing to the agent a system of beliefs that is maximally coherent and rational⁶. This imperative of maximization of coherence and rationality in interpretation is a constitutive element in the as-
cription of mental states in psychology. Davidson also uses this type of point to defend that the correct approach to the mental should be holistic, which therefore precludes reductionistic definitions of the mental in terms related to mere behaviour.

The general point being made is that the constitutive elements of the mental are necessarily neglected when we try to pigeonhole them in physical theories, basically because considerations of rationality are not constitutive elements in our conception of the nature of physical objects. The standard argument here runs as follows. If $p$ is the proposition stating that there are 15 oranges in my basket and $q$ is the proposition that states that there are at least 5 oranges in my basket, then, as $p$ implies $q$, principles of rationality require that if the little-boy Phillip believes $p$ then he cannot believe non-$q$, on the condition that he knows basic arithmetic. Now if there were certain psycho-physical laws linking the belief that $p$ with neuronal state $M$ and the belief that non-$q$ with neuronal state $N$, then, these laws should allow the inference that if someone is in state $M$ she cannot be in state $N$. But, with this we would be doing something unacceptable, which is letting an “ought” to intrude the context of the physical and its laws, since what could it mean to say that someone cannot be in a neuronal state based on what she ought to believe when we are dealing with laws which relate neuronal states distinct from one another?

This is why Davidson asserts that if we subsumed the mental to physical predicates this would amount to “changing the subject”, i.e., “deciding not to accept the criterion of the mental in terms of the vocabulary of the propositional attitudes” (1970, p. 216).
3. Now, Davidson intends that all this should sit quite comfortably beside condition 2 for the explanation of actions, *i.e.*: “A primary reason for an action is its cause”. Let us examine this companionship. The issue to be put under discussion is the demands Davidson’s causalism about agency present to his doctrine of the anomalousness of the mental. How are the two central ideas of his position *theoretically* related to each other? So, what are the requirements, the terms in which Davidson presents *his* causalism?

I. When Davidson says that an action is caused by a primary reason, he means by an action a *bodily movement* (a “primitive action”). This is an important element of what may be called the “standard story about action”9. So, an action is an *event* and we get from Davidson an answer to the fundamental question of the philosophy of action, *i.e.* which events are actions? (cf. DAVIDSON 1971). Davidson’s answer being, clearly: those caused by primary reasons. So actions are *events*, *particulars*, which form a special category by being concrete, spatiotemporal entities which are non-repeatable. Davidson’s position is quite clear about one specific point here. Suppose that X steals the money by taking it from the drawer. According to Davidson, X’s stealing of the money is the same event as X’s moving her hands in taking the money from the drawer. So X’s stealing was her moving her body, even though we describe that movement as – for Davidson – the action it was because of the effect the movement had (cf. 1971, p. 57-9).

II. As we saw, to explain an action is, according to Davidson, to identify *the* cause of why it happened, *i.e.*, the primary reason that *caused* that action, that bodily movement.

III. These two elements build up what deserves the qualification of an *events-based* account of action and agency (Cf. HORNSBY 2004, p. 4). It is crucial to note that such an ac-
count involves not only element one, but also element two, that is, it not only accounts for actions as bodily movements redescribable by their effects, but also accounts for the whole phenomenon of agency by saying which events are actions because caused by other events, their primary reasons. So, the phenomenon of agency is accounted for by claims about particulars, events (Cf. idem).

From all this one central point bears on the topic of the anomalousness of the mental. Because events must be on the offing when we speak of actions, we have to account for whatever anomalousness of the mental in terms of the features of those other events that are the causes of actions. We have to end up saying how and why those particulars constitute a whole, a system, being crucial taking into account its peculiar features of coherence, consistency and rationality. Davidson’s rationale for the anomalousness of the mental resides, therefore, on the one hand, on the centrality of the criterion of the mental which resides in the vocabulary of the propositional attitudes; and on the other hand, on the needs of the unavoidable process of interpretation in the attempt to understand agency, i.e., in terms of the genuine explanation of actions, that is, in terms of mental causes as events. Interpretation, for Davidson, is interpretation of behaviour, which needing to be interpreted is in fact explained; and so we end up getting involved with the theoretical commitments of an events-based account of action and agency. At bottom, then, what we get is a rationale for the anomalousness that stresses the shortcomings of a system of beliefs and, in general, propositional attitudes as particulars which fail as such to live up to the demands of “strict law” or nomologicality. Now, events-based accounts of action and agency have been criticised, which opens up one other theoretical possibility for the anomalousness of the men-
tal. By presenting one such criticism, mainly by Jennifer Hornsby, of two central elements of the events-based account of action in the continuation I intend to bring support to the claim that Davidson’s views on the anomalousness are thus far defective.

4. The first central element of the events-based account of action is the constitution of every action by an event. As a matter of fact, “action” has become – in spite of Davidson’s mentioning of “our practical lore” (1970, p. 219) – a philosophical term of art, a semi-technical term. Actions so conceived are always events, particulars that are bodily movements. So we only have the phenomenon of agency where we have action so conceived. However, it seems possible that someone might do something intentionally without there being any action so understood, that is, without such an “action” we would still have a doing of something. It seems possible for someone to do something intentionally without existing, as it were, any “positive performance” on the part of the agent.10

Take the case of the subject refraining from taking another glass of wine. She did not move, there was no movement on her part, she stood still. It is beside the point to suppose in this case that there was a tensing of the muscles in this refraining, because we can certainly tell a story so that there simply is no such event, supposedly up to the rescuing operation here. Think of a case where there simply is no event, no particular, which would be an appropriate candidate for the subject’s doing what we all certainly allow was her doing something intentionally. The crucial issue is that we may concede that, as Hornsby puts it, “there will be plenty of events in the region of [the] agents at the time at which they do their things”11, but this is of no avail given that we would be needing that the
event in question be a particular which is a person’s intentionally doing a thing, and this is what is not the case with these other events, they are not what warrants that the person is doing something intentionally by not moving at all.

So, an events-based account of action is committed to bodily movements that are spatiotemporal particulars, happenings we can see. However, there seem to be cases, of omittings, refrainings, lettings-happen which are *bona fide* cases of doings intentionally, but which are not “positive performances”; so where there is, on such an account (in its own sense), no action\(^\text{12}\). Thus far, the account *fails* to deal with such cases, about which we would allow that they were intentional doings\(^\text{13}\).

The second central element of the events-based account of action is its commitment to what I have presented as one of Davidson’s fundamental ideas: the conception of action-explanation as necessarily a causal explanation that speaks of particulars, events, which are *the* causes of specific bodily movements, also particulars, events. But what is it to explain an action? Must we be committed to antecedent particular events if we are willing to accept that explanations of actions are, at the bottom, causal explanations? What do we want to explain in the explanation of actions? Is it the occurrence of non-repeatable spatiotemporal entities: particular bodily movements?

The point made about the first element can be of help here. If there are intentional doings without “positive performances” and explanations thereof, is it necessary to pinpoint an event in terms of which we will explain an “action”, is it really this we are doing when we explain why someone did something by appealing to her beliefs and desires? Can we not get along explanatory-wise even without any attention, as it were, to such “positive performances” and what they seem to
require? If we can, this would imply that what we want in so-called explanations of actions is to know why someone did something, and not why a particular event happened in space and time as a bodily movement. Now, this seems to be of importance even for cases which, according to the standard story about action, involve events, bodily movements. For if that type of approach to explanation of action could be generalised, then it is not the occurrence of a bodily movement that gets explained in these explanations, but rather why the agent did what she did. According to this approach, an action-explanation is not in fact geared to the occurrences of events, but rather to agents and their doings.

An action-explanation tells one about the agent: one learns something about her that makes it understandable that she should have done what she did (HORNSBY 1997, p. 8).

So when B pours A another glass of wine, we do not want to know why there happened the event of B’s body going through a movement. What we want to know is why B is doing this, is she intending to get A drunk or whatever? Hornsby summarises well the whole point:

An action-explanation is not a reply to a question about why some event occurred, and, in revealing what an agent thought and what she wanted, it does not introduce any singular term for ‘the cause’. Rather it shows a person’s doing something to make sense by seeing her as (at least approximately) rational – as conforming (more or less) to norms of consistency and coherence in her thought and practice. Since its focus is how things are with her, it is no wonder that no ‘purely causal’ statement can be extracted from the explanation. The objective is to see a causally complex whole – a person – in a certain, intelligible light; and this fits ill with the idea of locating an item on which an event that happens to be an action
may be seen to follow in the way things do, nomologically speaking (1993, p. 172).

So, where does this lead us to?

6. From the centrality of agents, revealed in what I said we do want to get in action explanation, we could move to a view of agent causation. However, it better not be the conception of the agent as operating as the action’s cause, i.e., actions as events caused by agents. Agents would not be the cause of their actions. Agents may, nonetheless, be causers, of the events that result from their actions.

Going back to refrainings, ommings and lettings-happen, I have argued that these are things we do intentionally without there being any “positive performance” by the agent. Should we say they are actions? It depends. According to Davidson’s standard story about action we saw that we cannot; notwithstanding his pleading that we should “interpret the idea of a bodily movement generously” (1971, p. 49) (is it not dangerously generous, to the point of meaninglessness?) But perhaps even for a completely different view of agency, in which agents as causers becomes a central element, we should say no to that question. If an agent is someone or something that makes things happen, and this is to cause an event, to exercise the power to cause, we could have that – not that actions are events caused by agents – but that an action is a causing of an event by an agent. From this perspective, the event caused by the agent’s action is not her action, and this causing which is a causing of an event is not an event. An action would then be a causing of an event by an agent; the result of an action is that very event. But, then, about refrainings, etc, because there is no event the agent’s action caused, even though this was all intentionally done, there are no actions. Failing to signal and re-
fraining from waving her arm may be intentional, but would not be actions. This is Alvarez and Hyman’s view.

I trust it can be gathered from what has been said that the issue of whether actions are events is central. About this there is disagreement even among critics of Davidson’s events-based account of action and agency. I mean, e.g., Maria Alvarez and John Hyman on one side and Jennifer Hornsby and Helen Steward on the other. They agree on the importance of the distinction between the transitive and intransitive forms of a verb like “to move”\textsuperscript{14}. Therefore, there is an ambiguity in the phrase “bodily movement”. Concretely, “a movement of B’s finger” may mean an action which consisted in B’s moving of his finger – this is B’s making his finger move, corresponding to the transitive form of the verb – or it may mean the result of such action, the movement of B’s finger – which corresponds to the intransitive form of the verb (or it may mean, though this is not the relevant context here, a movement that is neither an action nor the immediate result of one by B). The importance of this distinction in this context is that without it we cannot avoid the conclusion that agents cause their actions in an argument as the following:

A moves his finger.
A causes a movement of his finger (I).
His action is a movement of his finger (T).
Conclusion: A causes his action.

But when the phrase “movement of his finger” occurs with different meanings in (2) and (3), then we can avoid having to accept the conclusion. But is it not then necessary that a causing of a movement by an agent – a causer – should not be
an event, on pain that there would not be any direct agency by an agent.\textsuperscript{15}

7. Even though, according to Richard Moran, Elizabeth Anscombe has the view that actions are events, the main features of the type of knowledge of actions we have would, it seems, fit well with an account such as Alvarez and Hyman’s. Practical knowledge, this knowledge which is “the cause of what it understands”, is characterized by “intentionality”, it depends crucially on the “specificities of certain descriptions”. “(...) In referring to some event as a intentional action, we are constrained to descriptions that will capture ‘what happened’ as something the agent had a reason to make happen, and this provides us with a way to circumscribe the extent and specificity of the agent’s practical knowledge. For when an action is successful, it extends as far as the descriptions under which the agent has reason for pursuing the end which his action is aimed at realizing”\textsuperscript{16}. However, the importance of this point about this kind of knowledge is not epistemological; it concerns rather the metaphysics of action. “(...) Anscombe’s conception of practical knowledge points to the place where one person’s conception of the action does not bear only an epistemic relation to the action (...), but rather also plays a role in constituting it as the action it is. For practical knowledge, on her account, is a necessary condition for the thing known to be the sort of thing it is, vis. the agent’s intentional action” (2004, p. 67-8). This gives a specific type of privilege to the perspective of the person on her own actions (not making failures and mistakes impossible though), because without it there would not be the sort of thing we would like to know about others, i.e., what they are up to, what they are doing. “An observer can be said to see straight off what someone is doing.
only if he is entitled to assume that the agent himself knows what he is doing without looking. The agent himself cannot know what he is doing intentionally by looking, if that means only by looking. For if he can’t know this non-observationally, in the manner of practical knowledge, then there is nothing of the right kind for another person to see him doing” (2004, p. 68).

These views are one with Hornsby’s points to the effect that the “standard story of action” leaves agents out (Cf. 2004) and that action is essentially a phenomenon known, and also only real, from the “personal point of view”17.

The ontological part of Davidson’s position seems, then, to be in peril, even if the explanation of action is a causal explanation. However, and perhaps as a development of this, it does not seem to be clear yet what we should say about the precise relationship between actions and events.

**Abstract:** Anomalous Monism is characterized by two major theses: (1) that the mental is indeterminate (anomalous) and (2) that rationalizations are causal explanations, more specifically though, of a sort that depends on the identification of mental particulars – events – which possess causal efficacy. This paper criticizes the thesis of the indetermination in a limited way, only in so far as it is based on the conception of rationalizations connected with a specific metaphysics of action: particularism. I try to show that the explanation of actions in terms of the explanations of the occurrence of particulars in mistaken. Positively, I propose that the agent is the causer, not of her actions, but rather of the results of her actions. Consequently, actions may be conceived as the causations of events by an agent, they will then be the causations of the results of the actions of the agent. This proposal clearly explores the possibility that actions themselves are not events. I intend only to bring to the fore of the philosophical discussion of action this possibility, because I see it as the unexplored theme of much of the current discussion of the topic.
Keywords: Anomalous Monism; indetermination of the mental; particularism in agency; actions and events.

NOTAS

1 Helen Steward (1997, p. 24) refers to Jaegwon Kim’s views on events and explanations as follows: “(...) For example, in asking why Socrates drank hemlock, we are asking for an explanation of why some individual event of Socrates’ drinking hemlock occurred, or that in saying that he died because he drank hemlock, we are referring to the particular, individual hemlock-drinking event which caused his death”. Cf. also op.cit. Chapter 5: “Particulars, Facts, and Causal Explanations”.


3 This does not intend to preclude the point made by Helen Steward (1997, passim, specially though chapter 8: “Token Identity Theories”) that the monist conclusion put forward by Anomalous Monism is intended as an important discovery about the nature of the mental, being thus far not an analytical claim.

Cf. Honderich: “The Argument for Anomalous Monism” (1982); Crane: “Mental Causation and Mental Reality” (1992); Davidson (1993), Kim (1993), McLaughlin (1993) and Sosa (1993) in: Heil and Mele: Mental Causation (1993). Cf. also Hornsby (1997, p. 170); and Steward (1997, Chapter 9: “Eliminativism and the Problem of Epiphenomenalism”, for a different approach on the importance of the issue. Perhaps I should say that my criticism of Anomalous Monism is that it is epiphenomenalist pace Steward correct claim: “(...) the ontological framework in terms of which the problem of epiphenomenalism is usually stated is a vestige of a way of thinking about mental causation which the emergence of the problem has itself revealed to be unfruitful. Token states have not helped us with the problem of mental causation” (1997, p. 258-9).

Cf. op.cit.: p.231.

Cf. “Mental Events”: “We know too much about thought and behaviour to trust exact and universal statements linking them” (1970, p. 217).


Cf. Hornsby (1997, p. 4-6). This is her coinage.

(1997, p. 5). Cf. also: “But it seems most unhappy to say that a vigil is composed of changes. The whole idea is that everyone should be still and silent. Obviously, there will be changes occurring at the region of the vigil during the time at which the vigil takes place – metabolic changes in the participants and breathing for example – but these do
not seem to be parts of the vigil; the relevance considerations associated with the concept of a vigil would surely exclude them” (Helen Steward [1997, p. 69]).

12 Cf. Alvarez and Hyman (1998) for a different reason for the non-existence of any action in such a case. “Someone’s doing something intentionally needs not be an action, for refraining from causing a stir is something one can do intentionally” (p.241n43). But, then, from this perspective an action is not a bodily movement as an event, but rather “(...) a causing of an event by an agent; the result of an action is that very event” (p. 233). Cp. Steward who seems to maintain, at the one hand, that standings still and sayings (of) nothing are events, though because they do not involve change, they are changeless events: “To the extent that such events [standings still and sayings of nothing] can be intentional actions, (...) it is arguable that we ought not to exclude them from the class of events” (1997, p. 70). So a vigil, a staying still, a demonstration, though occurrences and actions, are changeless events (cf. 1997, p. 60, 62, 101). But, on the other hand, there is a place where she implies that it is wrong to count omissions and failures (presumably intentional ones) events (cf. 1997, p. 157). So, Alvarez and Hyman are understanding events as involving change, which Helen Steward does not seem to do (cf. the criticism of the view in Chapter 2, “Events as Changes” in: The Ontology of Mind, 1997, p. 56-74).

13 Cf. Hornsby (1997, p. 6), and her question: “Should the class of actions be so circumscribed that it is required that an agent move her body for there to be an event which is an action?” (1997, p. 5n6).

14 Hornsby in “Bodily Movements, Actions and Epistemology” (“Postcript: a disjunctive conception of bodily” in:
Simple Mindedness; [1997, p. 102-10]) seems to imply the distinction. But she explicitly helds back from her former employment of the subscripts T and I to mark the distinction (cf. 1997, p. 91-2).

What has to be clarified is what is in contention among the views of the philosophers referred. How can we know our way about in pronouncements like the following by Horsnby, when at some points they comes close to Alvarez and Hyman’s position? “What it will be important now to realize is that the agent’s role – as cause of what her action cause – still has application in connection with moving the body. (...) The movement of a foot is not an action: it is not an agent’s doing anything. It is not a mere quibble to insist that someone’s moving a bit of their body is their doing something, and that the movement they produce is not. For when the label ‘action’ is attached to bodily movements – to events which aren’t actions – the events which are actions (...) are left out of account. Proponents of the standard story identify actions with bodily movements. And the identification gives their game away” (“Agency and Action” [1998, p. 20]).


Cf. “Agency and Causal Explanation” (1993); and “Action and the Mental-Physical Divide” (the essay-introduction [chapter 5] to the part on agency in Simple Mindedness [1997, p. 83-92]). We should take care not to make a mistake here: the “personal point of view” is not the “first-person perspective”, so the “non-personal point of view” is not the “third-person perspective”, but rather the “impersonal point of view”. This implies that the “personal point of view” is not a view “confined to a particular self”.
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