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dc.contributor.authorZillig, Raphaelpt_BR
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-17T04:09:02Zpt_BR
dc.date.issued2019pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn0100-6045pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10183/204401pt_BR
dc.description.abstractAccording to Aristotle, phainomena or “appearances” provide the basis from which researches proceed. This shows that in spite of phainomena often corresponding to what falsely appears to be the case, there is genuine cognition through them. In this paper, I focus on two features of phainomenal cognition: accessibility and epistemological limitation. A phainomenal cognition of x is limited in the sense that there is always a stronger cognition of x to be attained. In this way, a research always aims at surpassing the phainomenal cognition of its subject matter. On the other hand, phainomenal cognition is always somehow accessible. Resorting to the relation between phainomena and the distinction between the more intelligible to us and the more intelligible by nature, I intend to put forward a relative (as opposed to an absolute) understanding of both accessibility and epistemological limitation of phainomena.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfpt_BR
dc.language.isoengpt_BR
dc.relation.ispartofManuscrito : revista internacional de filosofia. Campinas, SP. Vol. 42, n. 4 (Oct./Dec. 2019), p. [439]-468pt_BR
dc.rightsOpen Accessen
dc.subjectAristóteles, 384-322 A.Cpt_BR
dc.subjectPhainomenaen
dc.subjectAppearancesen
dc.subjectCogniçãopt_BR
dc.subjectAparência (Filosofia)pt_BR
dc.subjectResearchen
dc.subjectFilosofiapt_BR
dc.subjectMethoden
dc.subjectAristotleen
dc.titleAristotle on phainomenal cognition : accessibility and epistemological limitationpt_BR
dc.typeArtigo de periódicopt_BR
dc.identifier.nrb001107824pt_BR
dc.type.originNacionalpt_BR


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