Inferential rationality and internalistic scarecrows

dc.contributor.author	Faria, Paulo Francisco Estrella	pt_BR
dc.date.accessioned	2017-02-18T02:42:39Z	pt_BR
dc.date.issued	2015	pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn	0100-6045	pt_BR
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10183/152719	pt_BR
dc.description.abstract	In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the ‘a priority of our logical abilities’. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.	en
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	pt_BR
dc.relation.ispartof	Manuscrito : revista internacional de filosofia. Campinas, SP. Vol. 38, n. 3 (set./dez. 2015), p. [5]-14	pt_BR
dc.rights	Open Access	en
dc.subject	Racionalidade	pt_BR
dc.subject	Inferential rationality	en
dc.subject	Content internalism	en
dc.subject	Inferencia	pt_BR
dc.subject	Singular terms	en
dc.subject	Filosofia	pt_BR
dc.title	Inferential rationality and internalistic scarecrows	pt_BR
dc.type	Artigo de periódico	pt_BR
dc.identifier.nrb	001012941	pt_BR
dc.type.origin	Nacional	pt_BR

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